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A b s t r a c t
This thesis critically re-examines deliberative democracy from a rational and social-choice- 
theoretic perspective and questions its dominance in current democratic theory. I define 
deliberative democracy as reasoned, inclusive, equal and other-regarding debate aimed at 
making decisions collectively. The thesis examines both procedural and epistemic 
justifications for deliberative democracy. Procedural justifications are based on the 
normative values that underpin the theory of deliberative democracy: reasoned debate, 
equality and inclusion. The epistemic justification of deliberative democracy states that it 
will arrive at better outcomes or the tru th  m ore often than other democratic procedures. I 
conclude that the justifications offered for the claim that the model of deliberative 
democracy is superior to other models of democracy are not solid enough to warrant the 
strength of the conclusions presented in the literature. The thesis also examines whether 
deliberation is likely to produce the positive consequences that its proponents ascribe to  it 
by using findings from deliberative experiments, political science, psychology and other 
social sciences. I find that many assumptions about human nature and motivation that 
deliberative democrats make cannot be supported by empirical evidence. They do not 
sufficiently consider problems of instrumental rationality, cognitive limitations, self- 
interested behaviour and a lack of motivation to participate in highly resource intensive 
activities. Furtherm ore, the model of deliberative democracy is based on a very particular 
conception of politics. This conception is somewhat apolitical, requires a high level of 
popular participation and conflicts with other, m ore adversarial or interest-based 
conceptions of politics. Through these findings I challenge the dominant position of 
deliberative democracy in the current literature on democratic theory and argue in favour 
of a m ore comprehensive theory of democracy that puts m ore emphasis on other 
democratic mechanisms, such as representation or interest group politics.
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T h e s is  Su m m a r y
Over the last twenty years, the model of deliberative democracy has come to dominate the 
literature on democratic theory. Following standard accounts, I define deliberative 
democracy as reasoned, other-regarding, equal and inclusive debate betw een citizens 
aimed at collective decision-making. Much of the theory’s dominance stems from a 
reformulation of the need to give reasoned discussion a prom inent role in democratic 
decision-making, a theme that has been present in democratic thought from Aristotle 
through the Federalist Papers. However, deliberative democrats support deliberation not 
m erely as one of the m ore im portant elements of the democratic process, but argue that it 
is the most im portant one and that increasing political deliberation can transform 
democratic decision-making in W estern liberal democracies.
It is this assumption that I challenge in this thesis. I question whether political 
deliberation will necessarily bring about the positive consequences that the theory predicts, 
such as increasing other-regarding preferences in participants. I also question the 
robustness of deliberative arrangements itself. Can the justifications offered for 
deliberative democracy really lead us to believe that it should dominate all other forms of 
democracy? I answer these questions from  a rational and social-choice theoretic 
perspective. I use findings from deliberative experiments, political science, psychology and 
other social sciences to  examine whether deliberative democracy is likely to deliver the 
advantages its adherents ascribe to it.
I conclude that the justifications offered for the claim that the model of deliberative 
democracy is superior to other models of democracy are not solid enough to warrant the 
strength of the conclusions presented in the literature. Furtherm ore, the assumptions 
about human nature made by deliberative democrats are often questionable. The model 
underestimates the importance of strong beliefs and preferences, the competitive nature of 
politics and the role of other forms of democratic processes, such as bargaining or 
representation, each of which is necessary in a well functioning democracy. Deliberation is
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certainly im portant, but we cannot base our entire model of democracy on it. As a result it 
is not clear that the theory of deliberative democracy deserves its supreme position in the 
literature. In order to reach these conclusions I examine the various justifications offered 
for deliberative democracy and the underlying assumptions made by the theory.
The first two chapters set the background to the thesis. Chapter one is a general 
introduction to my arguments, as well as a brief overview of the deliberative democracy 
literature. In chapter two I look at the preconditions or practical foundations of making 
democracies m ore deliberative. These include the kinds of characteristics individuals, 
societies and political institutions need to possess in order to successfully introduce m ore 
deliberative decision-making processes. The main finding that will carry over to the rest of 
the chapters is that deliberative democrats would need to  overcome a lack of motivation 
both on the part of citizens and of politicians to embrace m ore deliberative political 
arrangements.
The main section of the thesis focuses on the justifications offered for the legitimacy 
of deliberative democracy or indeed its dominance over other models of democracy. These 
fall into two broad categories: procedural and outcome-based justifications. In chapters 
three, four and five I focus on procedural justifications. In chapter six I address the most 
prom inent outcome-based justification of deliberative democracy: the epistemic one.
In chapter three I look at procedural justifications based on the value of reasoned, 
other-regarding debate. These justifications are closely intertw ined with the conception of 
rationality used by deliberative democrats. I argue that the assumptions made by 
deliberative democrats about the nature of human rationality and motivations are not 
borne out by evidence from social science. As a result, the conception of rationality used in 
the literature is unable to support the values of reasoned debate and other-regarding 
preferences to a sufficient extent for them to provide a robust justification for deliberative 
democracy.
In chapter four I examine the m ost attractive values offered to justify deliberative 
democracy procedurally: inclusion and equality. These tw o are also at the heart of what 
can make deliberation democratic. Ideal deliberation should include all affected citizens
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and relevant arguments and give everyone equal influence over the procedure. This is 
clearly not the case in current political life, and deliberative democrats do not offer us 
strong mechanisms to ensure that it will be the case in a m ore deliberative democracy. If 
inclusion and equality cannot be ensured, the legitimacy of deliberation cannot derive from 
these two values.
In chapter five I address two concerns. Firstly, I criticise characterisations of 
deliberative democracy that find procedural value in aiming for a consensus. Secondly, I 
address the critiques that deliberative democrats make against social choice theory. I show 
that it is possible to reconcile deliberation with other forms of preference and judgment 
aggregation, most notably voting. As a result the difference betw een deliberative and 
aggregative democracy models of becomes less pronounced, and the theoretical debate that 
pits deliberation against aggregation becomes less im portant.
In chapter six I consider the epistemic justifications for deliberative democracy. 
According to  these, deliberative democracy is be tter than its alternatives because it is m ore 
likely to arrive at good decisions or is better able to track the tru th . W hile deliberation 
undoubtedly has epistemic benefits, these cannot be generalised to  all instances of 
democratic politics. In fact, deliberation may at times have no impact or have negative 
impact on the ability of a group to arrive at the correct outcom e. Furtherm ore, any 
epistemic gains will be dependent on procedural values. Therefore, procedural 
justifications of deliberative democracy are stronger than epistemic ones. However, as we 
have seen in chapters three, four and five, these justifications themselves are not 
particularly compelling.
Chapters seven and eight serve to draw out the implications of the findings of 
previous chapters and offer a conclusion to  the thesis. In chapter seven I aim to define the 
limits of deliberative democracy in light of the discussion in previous chapters. These are 
practical questions, which are nevertheless of great theoretical significance, asking when, 
where and for what topics deliberation is appropriate.
Chapter eight offers a conclusion to the entire thesis and draws together the different 
arguments I made earlier to provide us with a balanced evaluation of deliberative
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democracy. Here I answer the question of whether deliberative democracy ought to be the 
m ost dominant model of democracy given the findings presented in this thesis. 
Deliberation fulfils our desire to give appropriate weight and respect to collective 
decisions. However, the model of deliberative democracy is based on a very particular 
conception of politics. This conception is somewhat apolitical, requires a high level of 
popular participation and conflicts with other, m ore adversarial or interest-based 
conceptions of politics. Ultimately, a m ore well-rounded m odel of democracy is needed 
that combines deliberation with other democratic processes and that gives greater weight 
to strong beliefs and interests that create conflicts which cannot be resolved by deliberation 
alone.
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Chapter One: Introduction
C h a p t e r  O n e  
In t r o d u c t io n
The theory and practice of democracy have evolved substantially over tim e. Over the last 
hundred years democracy has been extended both in its breadth, territorially, and in its 
depth, through the extension of the franchise and increased transparency in politics. 
According to Freedom House1, at the end of 200S there existed 89 free and democratic 
states, nearly half of the 192 independent states in the world. O ver the last century, 
democracy has also been deepened considerably in established democracies, through the 
introduction of universal suffrage, campaign finance reforms and measures aimed at 
eradicating corruption and increasing transparency.
The question is in what direction the theory and practice of democracy should now 
evolve in. The most prom inent trend in democratic thought is for extending the scope of 
democratic politics by making democracy m ore deliberative. O ver the last tw enty years, the 
literature on the theory of deliberative democracy has expanded rapidly, followed by a 
growing num ber of empirical studies on deliberation.
The theory of deliberative democracy argues that the essence of democratic politics 
does not lie in voting and representation. Instead, its essence is the comm on deliberation 
that should underlie collective decision-making. This theory shifts the focus to the debate 
that needs to take place between citizens in order to make reasoned and considered 
decisions, whether these take place between groups of citizens, in the legislature or in the 
wider public sphere. The ideal-typical model that underlies much of the theory of 
deliberative democracy is that of a traditional tow n hall meeting betw een citizens (Fishkin 
1991, Ackermann and Fishkin 2004, Fung 2004). Such political discussions are intended to 
make citizens take into account the perspectives and needs of others in society. They move 
the emphasis of democratic politics from contestation to common problem-solving.
1 From h ttp ://w ww.freedom house.org/.
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The question I endeavour to answer in this thesis is whether deliberative democracy 
can really be the next step in the evolution of democracy, both in theory and in practice. 
There are plenty of theorists who would claim that this is the case. But, as I will argue, this 
is by no means a foregone conclusion. There exist alternative conceptions of politics and 
democracy. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the theory of deliberative democracy to 
test whether it will really perform  better than its rivals.
In this chapter, I will lay the foundations of the rest of my analysis. In the first 
section, I will look at the problems of current democratic theory and practice that 
deliberative democrats respond to. In the second section, I will give a m ore detailed 
definition of deliberative democracy and introduce the concepts of formal and informal 
democratic deliberation. In the third section, I briefly raise some of the criticisms that have 
been issued against the model of deliberative democracy. I will, however, deal with these 
in much m ore detail in later chapters. In the final section of this chapter, I will give an 
outline of the rest of the thesis.
What is Wrong w ith Democracy?
Deliberative democrats respond to a conception of politics as adversary contestation. They 
are also prom pted by the view that there is something wrong with democracy as it exists 
now. Thus, they respond both to trends in theorizing about democracy and to  current 
practices in real-world democracies. I will look at these two themes in this section.
Much of democratic theory and practice depicts democracy as an essentially 
adversary process by focusing primarily on competitive elections. Deliberative democrats 
often define themselves in opposition to aggregative models of democracy that see the 
aggregation of individual votes or preferences into a fair result as the key aspect of 
democratic politics. Social choice theory (Arrow 1951/1963, Riker 1982, Sen 1970) is the 
study of how voting rules can achieve fair results that reflect the preferences of individual
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voters as accurately as possible and is thus one of the main targets of deliberative 
democrats.
Social-choice-theoretic results indicate that it is impossible to find a voting rule or 
way of counting votes that fulfils a relatively small num ber of democratic values at the 
same time. The most famous of these is A rrow ’s theorem  (1951), but such results have 
been extended to aggregating judgments rather than preferences (List and Pettit 2002) and 
to showing that no aggregation rule is immune to manipulation (Gibbard 1973, 
Satterthwaite 1975). A significant part of social choice theory is concerned with relaxing 
various conditions in order to overcome these impossibility results.
According to Riker (1982), one of the most well-known proponents of these 
theories, the indeterminate and arbitrary nature of electoral outcomes means that the 
general will cannot exist, in so far as different electoral rules will result in different 
outcomes, and in view of the impossibility results there exists no unique best such rule. 
Elections are therefore a mechanism for removing bad officials, rather than a manifestation 
of the popular will.
Much of political science approaches the study of democracy from a rational-choice- 
theoretic perspective that is often described as an application of economic principles to the 
study of politics. These studies adopt the assumption from economics that individuals are 
utility-maximisers; they act in a way that will secure them  the outcome they m ost wish 
for. Individuals choose actions which, according to their beliefs, will lead them  to satisfy 
their preferences. Thus, if I want a cup of tea I know that the way to get this is by going to 
the kitchen and putting on the kettle, therefore I will choose to do so. Rational and social 
choice theorists are methodological individualists. They focus on individuals rather than the 
groups or institutions that structure their choices.
There is a very large literature in political science that produces increasingly 
sophisticated rational-choice-theoretic models2. These cover a large range of topics 
including electoral competition (Downs 1957, Besley and Coate 1991), redistribution 
(Meltzer and Richard 1981, Husted and Kenny 1997), models of bureaucracies (Niskanen
2 An excellent and very detailed survey of this field is provided in Dennis Mueller (2005) Public Choice III.
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1971, Dunleavy 1991) and legislatures (Cox and McCubbins 1993, Laver and Shepsle 
1995, Tsebelis 2002).
Some deliberative democrats argue that social and rational-choice-theoretic 
approaches to the study of democracy and politics are too limited. They do not pay 
sufficient attention to the non-selfish, other-regarding aspect of politics. By focusing on 
given individual preferences, so the critics say, social and rational choice theorists neglect 
the way in which these preferences are form ed. O ther deliberative democrats seek to 
reconcile deliberative democracy with social choice theory (Dryzek and List 2003) and 
rational choice theory (Fung 2004).
The theory of deliberative democracy also responds to the problems that currently 
exist in democratic practice. These include apathetic, badly informed voters, low turnout, 
elections fought with sound-bite rhetoric and political exclusion. N ew er democracies also 
experience m ore severe problems of corruption and a relative lack of transparency in 
political decision-making. But for now let us focus on well-established, stable democratic 
systems.
There is a large survey-based literature that shows that citizens in developed 
democracies know very little about politics. American citizens are m ore likely to know the 
name of the president’s dog than his stance on capital punishment (Delli Carpini and 
Keeter 1996). The question arises how such badly informed voters can be useful 
participants in the democratic process and whether they can be good citizens at all. In 
order to make sense of politics and to make choices in elections, m ost citizens use heuristic 
cues, such as the party affiliations of candidates (Popkin 1993). As a result, it is often felt 
that political contests, especially in the United States, are increasingly fought with simple 
rhetoric and aggressive attacks on opponents. Thus, from the perspective of deliberative 
democrats, current politics is neither reasoned, nor based on facts and accurate 
information.
But even the information that citizens do receive is often biased. Most of the media 
present issues in strongly partisan term s, and people are most likely to choose news 
sources which will confirm their existing ideological views (Campbell et al. 1960). This
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tendency is reinforced by the internet, which is fast becoming an im portant source of news 
and political commentary for many (Sunstein 2007). W hile it is possible to access 
traditional news sources, such as broadsheet newspapers, radio and increasingly, television 
online, there are also a very large num ber of highly partisan and biased news websites and 
weblogs. By accessing these, citizens will not be exposed to the points of view of others in 
society and will not learn enough about the interests of others to  take these into 
consideration when they make political decisions.
O ther studies have reported  a decrease in civic participation. The best-known such 
study is Putnam ’s Bowling Alone (2000), an influential book which highlighted the fact that 
Americans are now less likely to  be members of groups and associations such as PTAs, 
bowling clubs or even churches than they were in previous decades. This results in a loss of 
what Putnam calls social capital, the num ber of netw orks and relationships that people are 
part of in society. Instead, they participate in civic life through large, ‘cheque-book’ 
organisations and socialise with close friends and family. This means that citizens are less 
likely to get to know and learn about others around them  and be exposed to  other points 
of view. There is also some evidence that this may make citizens less likely to participate in 
politics, as they are not mobilised to do so through interaction with civic associations.
Most citizens do not participate in costly political activities, such as writing to their 
representatives, campaigning, attending demonstrations, signing petitions or standing for 
office. An increasing num ber of citizens do not even vote in elections. Instead, many 
citizens appear to be uninterested in politics. They feel that their political efficacy is low; 
they believe that even if they did participate, this would not make a difference. According 
to a study carried out by the UK’s Electoral Commission (Electoral Commission and 
Hansard Society 2007) 32% of British citizens feel they are too busy to participate in 
politics, 22% are too uninterested to do so, 6% feel their participation would not achieve 
anything, 2% feel they would not be listened to  and 17% of citizens do not even know why 
they do not participate. The same study found that 19% of citizens had not voted -or 
participated in politics for the previous two or three years. These results are echoed by the 
results of a survey carried out in the US over fifteen years earlier (Verba et al. 1995). In
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this study 39% of citizens cited tim e as the reason for not participating, 17% felt politics 
was too boring, 15% thought they would have no impact and 19% had never even thought 
of taking part in politics. N ot only are citizens apathetic, too busy or disillusioned when it 
comes to politics. Both of the above studies show that there are statistically significant 
variations in the likelihood that someone will participate in politics depending on income, 
education, socio-economic status and race. Thus, those who are better educated and better 
off dominate politics. Education is the single highest predictor of political participation, but 
is itself correlated with other factors such as income or socio-economic status (Verba et al. 
1995, Perrin 2006). As Schattschneider famously put it: ’’the flaw in the pluralist heaven is 
that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent" (Schattschneider 1960, 
p .35). Thus, current democratic systems tend to  include some groups m ore in political 
decision-making than others, while at the margins citizens can face political exclusion.
There appears to  be much that is wrong with contem porary liberal democracies. 
Deliberative democracy is aimed at making all citizens m ore involved and better informed 
and politicians m ore open and accountable. Thus, deliberative democrats display a strong 
concern for improving both the theory of democracy, by strengthening its normative 
foundations and making it less adversarial, and the practice of democracy, by finding 
practical ways in which day-to-day democratic politics can be made to  resemble the ideal 
more closely.
Defining Deliberative Democracy
This thesis is not simply about deliberation, but political and democratic deliberation. For my 
present purposes, I will define democratic deliberation as uncoerced, other-regarding, 
reasoned, inclusive and equal debate. This definition leaves open many questions about 
exact institutional arrangements and the practical limits of deliberative democracy. It does 
not tell us whether all issues should be decided through deliberation or only some, 
whether deliberation should take place locally, nationally or even globally and whether all
17 of 257
Chapter One: Introduction
citizens need to participate in it from time to time in order for democracy to be term ed 
deliberative. However, it encapsulates the most im portant normative commitments of 
deliberative democrats, regardless of the topic, participants, exact rules and setting of 
deliberation.
Deliberation is political inasmuch as it aims to solve problem s to which we need to 
respond collectively, whether these are moral issues or issues of distributing scarce 
resources in society. Furtherm ore, deliberation is democratic if it includes all substantively 
affected citizens and all relevant arguments to a sufficient degree and if it does so by 
guaranteeing at least minimal equality betw een them . I will now give a brief overview of 
these values, but their definition will be developed in m ore detail in the coming chapters.
Perhaps the m ost im portant comm itm ent of deliberative democrats is to reciprocal, 
other-regarding debate. This reciprocal quality of deliberation is grounded in the 
requirem ent to give reasons and justifications for our beliefs in the political forum. This 
presupposes respect for other citizens that is manifested by providing them  with reasons 
for our beliefs and preferences and by listening to the reasons they in turn  provide. The 
underlying assumption is that in the public, political forum  citizens and politicians need to 
justify their stand on issues in a way that others will understand, even if they will not 
necessarily accept.
Deliberative democracy is also aimed at making citizens m ore other-regarding: m ore 
concerned about the interests of others and less selfish. This captures the intuition that in 
politics citizens should take the needs and interests of others into account when they form 
their preferences and contribute to making decisions. According to  the theory, during 
deliberation citizens will learn about the perspectives, beliefs and interests of others to a 
much greater extent than they would be able to  under m ore adversarial forms of 
democracy.
Offering reciprocal justifications also makes deliberative democracy m ore reasoned. 
Thus, the aim is to make considered collective decisions that take all relevant arguments 
into account and that are carefully considered rather than hasty. Deliberation also serves as
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an im portant source of information and thereby facilitates learning. It helps citizens acquire 
new information and correct false beliefs.
Reason-giving also grounds the epistemic justifications of deliberative democracy. 
According to  these, deliberative democracy is a good and desirable procedure, because it is 
good at tracking the truth. David Estlund (1997, 2008) endorses a form of deliberativism 
based on such epistemic grounds. His epistemic proceduralism states that while not 
perfect, democratic procedures are good at arriving at the tru th  or best outcome, 
therefore we have grounds to  obey laws created through these procedures even when we 
believe them  to be wrong. Under his definition, democracy and deliberation derive their 
epistemic advantage from individuals talking to each other, since “tw o heads are better 
than one” (Estlund 2008, 177).
Another epistemic defense of deliberative democracy comes from pragmatist 
quarters. Peircean pragmatists such as Misak (2000) and Talisse (2005) argue that the value 
of deliberative democracy lies in creating an ongoing debate in search o f the tru th  that 
satisfies the requirem ents of pragmatic inquiry.
Thus, reasoned debate is valuable both from a procedural and from  an outcome- 
based viewpoint. From the procedural point of view, it helps political decision-making 
processes to  honour the seriousness of making decisions that affect a whole community. 
From the outcom e-oriented point of view, requiring deliberation to be reasoned is the 
foundation of the epistemic justification of democracy.
W hat makes citizens reasonable is a controversial question. The deliberative 
democracy literature usually takes Rawls’s concept of public reason (1993) as the standard 
of reasonableness in public debate. Some theorists (Fish 1999, Talisse 2005) criticise 
authors such as Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 2004) for holding conceptions of the 
reasonable that are much too narrow and will therefore exclude religious o r illiberal views. 
Others (Young 2000) argue that reasonableness should not be a function of individuals’ 
beliefs, but instead of their attitudes towards other deliberators. Thus, reasonable 
individuals are willing to engage in debate, offer public justifications for their preferences 
and reflect on their positions. By contrast, unreasonable citizens are unwilling to listen to
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others or even consider that their own position may be wrong. I will discuss the problem 
of reasonableness in m ore detail in chapter four.
The third normative value of deliberative democracy is inclusiveness. Thus, while in 
current democratic systems some individuals and groups are excluded from politics despite 
formal means of equality such as providing each person w ith one vote, deliberative 
democrats seek to include all relevant members of the community in the decision-making 
process. Deliberative democracy should not only be inclusive of persons, but also of ideas. 
Thus, it is necessary for all relevant arguments to be adequately represented during 
deliberative debates.
The inclusive aspect of deliberative democracy is emphasised particularly by so- 
called difference democrats such as Iris Young (1996, 2000). Their concern for inclusion 
originates from the need to give a voice to all citizens during deliberation and not to 
marginalise any groups by making deliberation a privilege of the elites. In order to facilitate 
inclusion, political deliberation must not resemble a debating club, but should rather 
acknowledge and encourage various forms of communication betw een citizens (Young 
2000). Thus, narratives and rhetoric m ust play an im portant role alongside logic and 
reasoning.
Deliberative democracy could be used as a tool to combat existing social injustices 
and political exclusion by giving those who are currently disadvantaged a voice and 
requiring the rest of society to listen. It could allow all citizens to present their 
perspectives, beliefs and interests to others in a forum , thereby enabling citizens and 
groups to  find out m ore about each other. Deliberation could thus serve as a powerful 
means of increasing political inclusion and counteracting existing differences of pow er in 
society.
Concern for equality is closely related to  concern for inclusion. Despite formal 
equality among citizens, not all have equal pow er in current democracies. W ithout 
countering problems of inequality, deliberative democracy may make this situation worse 
if the better educated and those with higher incomes dominate the debate. N ot all citizens 
may be able to participate in deliberation alike, as they may not have the necessary skills to
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present their arguments persuasively. O r they may not have the necessary resources, such 
as free time or money to  attend meetings.
Therefore, many deliberative democrats argue for m ore substantive equality 
betw een citizens (Bohman 1997, Knight and Johnson 1997) as a precondition of equal 
deliberation. This could include making sure that all citizens have adequate capabilities to 
participate in democratic deliberation and to influence the political process. Thus, some 
deliberative democrats argue for better education and increased material equality to ensure 
that politics can be truly equal. However, the ‘equality of w hat’ debate does carry over 
into the deliberative democracy literature and there is no consensus on what we should 
equalise — resources, primary goods or capabilities — or how equality can be secured in a 
deliberative context.
The above values provide a good picture of the conception of politics that 
deliberative democrats prom ote. By using these values, they respond both to weaknesses in 
current practices of democracy and oppose adversarial or aggregative theories of 
democracy. There are other values that are sometimes used to define deliberative 
democracy in the literature, such as that of aiming for a consensual decision (Cohen 1997), 
but deliberative democracy can be sufficiently defined without these. The values I have 
outlined above capture the essence of deliberative democracy and all deliberative 
democrats endorse them , no m atter what their disagreements over other questions may 
be. There is no such agreement over the need to aim for a consensus or the role that selfish 
preferences can play in deliberation.
I will now discuss two m ore specific ways in which deliberative democracy can be 
conceptualized, which I call the formal and informal models of deliberation.
Informal and Formal M odels o f  Deliberative Democracy
Beyond the basic values I defined above there is limited agreement on the definition of 
deliberative democracy and on the form that such deliberative arrangements would take in
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real-world politics. Therefore, it is helpful to differentiate betw een two main types of 
deliberation. The kind of deliberation that comes first to mind when deliberative 
democracy is m entioned is the debate that takes place in tow n hall meetings, legislatures 
and other political forums. This is formal deliberation. It allows participants to m eet face-to- 
face and the discussion has predefined rules in place. Formal deliberation can be a one-off 
event, or it can consist of multiple meetings over tim e, and it has an easily identifiable set 
of participants.
But there is another way of conceptualising deliberative debate; as the ongoing 
discussion that takes place in the public sphere. I call this informal deliberation. Such 
deliberation has fewer rules and its participants are less easy to identify, as individuals may 
leave or join the debate at any time. N ot only does it take place over longer periods of 
tim e, but informal deliberation does not require debate to  take place simultaneously in one 
place or setting. Instead, it is fragmented among multiple groups and participants, multiple 
settings such as informal discussion, formal legislative debate or the media, and over 
various points in time.
Both of these forms of deliberation encompass the normative values I discussed 
above, albeit in different ways. W hile much of the literature discusses formal deliberation, 
given that it is easier to define and evaluate, deliberative democrats recognise that in order 
for democracy to be truly deliberative, informal deliberation needs to  flourish.
Formal Deliberation
Much of the literature focuses on formal deliberative procedures. The theory describes 
deliberative democracy as discussion and endows deliberation with attributes that are 
reminiscent of face-to-face meetings. Institutional innovations are also designed with 
formal meetings in mind that would bring citizens together to  discuss a variety of political 
issues (Ackermann and Fishkin 2004). Finally, empirical studies of deliberative democracy 
also focus on such well-defined deliberative contexts (Fung 2004).
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Formal deliberative meetings allow participants to  m eet face-to-face. This is a 
qualitatively different interaction from deliberation diffused in the public sphere over long 
periods of tim e. It allows deliberators to get to know each other and as a result standards 
of respect and civility are often easier to enforce. At the same tim e, it also allows for the 
development of group dynamics which may not always be compatible w ith the normative 
values attributed to deliberation.
Formal deliberation is a discrete, identifiable and quantifiable event. The num ber of 
participants, the issues that are deliberated on, the num ber of meetings and the time 
period over which deliberation takes place are well-defined. It is possible to  impose rules, 
use m oderators and record the content of the discussion. Indeed, all such deliberative 
meetings will have a set of rules, whether they evolved informally over tim e or had been 
introduced from the outside and are enforced formally.
Because of these characteristics, it is easier to apply the normative values of the 
theory of deliberative democracy to  formal models of deliberation. W hen the group of 
those affected by a decision is easy to define, it is easier to ensure that all relevant 
individuals are included. W hen the issue of deliberation is well-defined, it is relatively easy 
to make sure that all relevant points of view are represented. In a discrete group equality 
betw een members can be enforced by rules or trained m oderators. It is also possible to 
ensure that participants justify their positions, that they listen to others and that they act 
with respect towards each other. Thus, a formal model of deliberation can serve as a 
theoretical ideal-type for the literature.
Most ideas for making democracy m ore deliberative propose some form of formal 
deliberation. The most well-known of these are the deliberative polls developed by James 
Fishkin. According to the Center for Deliberative Democracy, “the polling process reveals 
the conclusions the public would reach, if people had opportunity to become m ore 
informed and m ore engaged by the issues”3. Polls have been held in many countries over 
diverse issues, such as the future of electric utilities in Texas, the future of the monarchy in 
Australia or discrimination against the Roma in Hungary and Bulgaria. Even the Chinese
3 http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/index.htm l
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Communist Party has sanctioned some deliberative experiments4. One of the latest polls 
was organised between citizens of different EU m em ber states and was conducted with the 
help of translators5.
Deliberative polls usually take place over a weekend. Before the start of the 
deliberative poll participants receive a pack of articles featuring balanced information for 
them  to read through. This enables them to start deliberating with a basic understanding of 
the facts surrounding the issue at stake. The time is divided betw een small group 
discussions and larger expert panel sessions. The latter allow deliberators to  address their 
questions directly to  expert witnesses, stakeholders and politicians. The attitudes and 
preferences of deliberators are polled before and after deliberation.
A m ore ambitious version of deliberative polling is deliberation day (Ackermann and 
Fishkin 2004), which is a model of how m ore deliberative institutions could be introduced 
into national politics. In their initial proposal, Ackermann and Fishkin developed 
deliberation day as a means for US citizens to get together before presidential elections and 
to discuss who would be best suited to lead the country next. But they extended the model 
to cover other elections as well, such as those for Congress and Senate in the US, and m ost 
recently the referendum  on the EU constitution in Ireland (Ackermann and Fishkin 2008).
Deliberation day would serve to make citizens be tte r informed and m ore aware of 
the issues at stake through questions put to a panel of experts and politicians and through 
discussions among the citizens themselves. Most of the tim e would be spent deliberating in 
small groups of fifteen. The larger expert panel sessions would allow each smaller group to  
put their questions forward and every participant to listen to a reasoned argument from  
each side of the political divide. Citizens would thus be exposed to views different from 
their own as well as new facts. Hence, they would be able to make a reasoned decision 
come election day, based on the judgem ent they have arrived at after deliberation rather 
than on the shallow sound bites that characterize current political campaigning. The 
candidates would also have to respond to  the m ost common questions raised during the
4 h ttp ://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/china/
5 h ttp ://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/eu /
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day in a televised post-deliberation political debate. This would mean that politicians 
would have fewer incentives to rely on attack advertising and simple rhetoric and would 
instead have to focus on presenting their m ore substantive policy positions.
O ther plans for introducing m ore deliberative institutions include the idea of formal 
deliberation on controversial policies among citizens that is organised along the lines of 
jury duty (Leib 2004), and formal deliberation among representative groups of citizens that 
create a report on candidates before elections (Gastil 2000) that other citizens can use to 
help them make an informed decision on election day. W hat all these possible institutional 
models have in common is that they aim to introduce new  forms of formal deliberative 
meetings that uphold the normative values of the theory of deliberative democracy in a 
setting that is easy to control and regulate. But theorists would want to  introduce these 
meetings not m erely for their own sake, but also in the hope that they will contribute to 
making the w ider public sphere m ore deliberative when it comes to politics.
The Empirical Literature
N ot surprisingly, given the complexity of studying informal models of deliberation, the 
empirical literature on deliberative democracy focuses on formal deliberation instead. 
Empirical studies include quasi-experiments, such as the deliberative polls mentioned 
above, as well as studies of existing grass-roots deliberative institutions.
Some of the most valuable data on deliberative democracy comes from the 
deliberative polls organised by Fishkin and his colleagues (Luskin et al. 2002, Farrar e t al. 
forthcoming). There are also experimental studies on deliberation that are m ore stylised 
than deliberative polls (Dickson et al. 2008), as well as a growing num ber of deliberative 
experiments carried out among college students. Steiner et al. (2004) studied deliberation 
in a legislative setting. There are also smaller-scale deliberative initiatives that aim to turn 
the theory of deliberative democracy into empirical reality. These focus on deliberation at 
the local level and are among the most fruitful grounds for empirical research on actual
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deliberative procedures (Fung and W right 2003, Fung 2004). One of the earliest of these 
was Jane Mansbridge’s study of tow n hall and workplace democracy (Mansbridge 1983).
Probably the m ost frequently cited of these local-level initiatives are the 
participatory budget procedures introduced in Porto Alegre, Brazil (Souza 2001, Baiocchi 
2003). These procedures allow residents of poor, underprivileged districts to  take part in 
deciding how the city’s budget is spent. Ordinary citizens, who are selected in a 
deliberative assembly by local residents to represent their district, attend a series of 
meetings to  choose betw een possible spending options prepared by the city hall. This is 
aimed at both empowering under-privileged residents and giving an active say to  all 
residents in determining how the city hall should be run.
Fung (2004) studied initiatives in Chicago that increased parental and community 
involvement in decisions on how schools should be run, and involved local residents in 
m eeting with police representatives to set policing targets. He calls this model of 
deliberation empowered participatory governance, since these meetings aim to include and 
em pow er relatively powerless groups in making decisions on how  services in their 
community should be run. His study is rich in data and linkages betw een the theory and 
practice of deliberation.
There are also a growing num ber of organisations and groups of practitioners, such 
as the Kettering Foundation6 or America Speaks7, that specialise in organising deliberative 
meetings on the behalf of various authorities, the best-known forms of which is the citizen 
jury (Smith and Wales 2000). These have been taking place since the seventies. 
Organisations have arranged deliberative debates on various issues from  nanotechnology to 
pig farming, w ith a varying num ber of participants and meetings. They are, however, m ore 
oriented towards organising meetings than conducting empirical research on political 
deliberation.
Such studies also allow us to disaggregate how the different stages and characteristics 
of deliberation affect decision-making. By surveying participants before, during and after
6 h ttp :// w w w .kettering.org/
7 h ttp ://w w w .americaspeaks.org/
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deliberation and recording discussions, we can build a picture of w hether and how 
citizens’ preferences are transformed. By taping group discussions it is also possible to 
gather data on group dynamics and deliberative processes and to identify the exact social 
processes that take place during deliberation. However, this has been relatively 
underutilised until now.
This growing empirical literature is of the utm ost importance for the theory of 
deliberative democracy, as it allows theoretical ideas to be tested in practice. It serves to 
build a bridge betw een practice and theory, as initiatives are developed explicitly along 
deliberative lines and the results of these initiatives can then inform and improve the 
theoretical model. However, the theoretical literature has been slow in responding to  the 
empirical findings. Furtherm ore, much of the published empirical literature is very 
positive when it comes to reporting results. But in order to know when and why 
deliberation works, we also need to  know when and why it does not w ork. Therefore, 
there is a need to report m ore negative findings alongside the positive ones and to identify 
why some initiatives failed.
Informal Deliberation
In contrast to formal m odel of deliberation, the model of informal deliberation is much less 
well-developed, not least because informal deliberation is m uch harder to define. It 
consists of the ongoing political discussion in the public sphere that takes place in 
legislatures, in everyday talk, in the media and in civil society groups. Deliberation of this 
kind is disaggregated and takes so many forms that at times it is difficult to  identify what 
still counts as deliberation and what does not. Gutmann and Thompson (1999) argue 
against including private conversations among citizens in a deliberative theory of 
democracy, as these do not and need not fulfil the conditions of reciprocity, transparency 
and accountability. Thus, informal deliberation is much harder to  evaluate against the 
normative values of reason, inclusion and equality.
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Yet, such a model captures the fact that in order for democracy to be truly 
deliberative, a culture of deliberation needs to  develop. In addition, a model of 
deliberative democracy cannot afford to ignore the various forms of deliberation that 
already take place in the public sphere (Cram er Walsh 2004, Perrin 2006). Relying solely 
on formal deliberative meetings would remove the rich context of the public sphere from 
deliberative democracy. But surely, this is one of the decisive venues of politics, especially 
if we want to include as many individuals and groups as possible.
As well as face-to-face meetings, informal deliberation also incorporates 
communication where there is a greater distance betw een participants, such as writing a 
letter, making a statement or televised speech or publishing an article in a newspaper or 
magazine. Furtherm ore, many meetings are among homogeneous groups where members 
agree with each other on political issues rather than among heterogeneous groups where 
political opponents come face-to-face with each other. Such groups may be less respectful 
towards their opponents in their absence. Thus, standards of respect and civility will have 
to be m ore loosely interpreted and cannot be induced or enforced as easily as in the case of 
formal deliberation.
Informal deliberation is a continuous, diffuse process. Participants may enter and 
exit the public forum at any tim e and the set of participants is no t well-defined. Rather 
than focusing on predeterm ined topics, it serves to define and shape the issues relevant for 
political discussion. Informal deliberation takes the form of repeated bu t disaggregated 
communication. Such communication may take place simultaneously or at a distance of 
long periods of time. It has no fixed end, but is rather recurring and ongoing. The public 
sphere may consist of multiple overlapping smaller spheres, betw een which 
communication may be interm ittent. As a result, informal deliberation is difficult to 
regulate and it is indeed undesirable to regulate it.
In a deliberative democracy such a model of informal deliberation would form the 
background of all political actions, even non-deliberative ones, such as protests or 
bargaining. Therefore, all political actors w ould need to participate in it, including the 
government, citizens, politicians, civil society groups and the media. W e face a num ber of
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problems in ensuring adequate participation in informal deliberative settings. Some may be 
excluded either voluntarily or involuntarily from the deliberative process. Firstly, as we 
will see in chapters two and four, we cannot compel people to participate. Secondly, some 
underprivileged groups may have limited access to the public sphere. Deliberative 
democracy, of course, would aim to give voice to such groups. But under an informal 
framework, creating the preconditions for increased participation may be problematic, 
exactly because the process would be fairly informal. Furtherm ore, at times it might be 
difficult to tell whether a lack of participation is due to exclusion or voluntary withdrawal.
W hen it comes to informal deliberation in the public sphere, it becomes hard to 
define what is and what is not political deliberation. There are many different forms of 
potentially political actions: discussing the news with others, participating in
demonstrations, signing petitions, creating art that has a political message and so forth. In 
order to identify which of these are deliberative and which are not, a wide requirem ent for 
reason and civility can be established. Thus, informal deliberation needs to be characterised 
by a minimal respect for others and some reason-giving. The form er would lead to the 
exclusion of agitating for violence against others or intentionally causing deep offence to 
others. Non-deliberative political action can of course be the result of deliberation or lead 
to further deliberation. Thus, even if a protest may not be considered deliberative, it could 
lead to new issues entering the wider public political discourse.
Two-Track Deliberation
Formal and informal deliberation do not have to exist separately from each other and 
neither are they mutually exclusive. It is possible for an informally deliberative public 
sphere to coexist with formal deliberative meetings for specific issues and persons. Indeed, 
this is the m ost realistic m odel of deliberative democracy, as these formal meetings can 
contribute to the development of a m ore widely deliberative culture, which in return  
offers a background of respect, civility and reciprocity in which formal meetings can be
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situated and guarantees that normative standards of the theory of deliberative democracy 
will be respected.
The m ost well-known model combining informal deliberation in the public sphere 
w ith formal deliberation in a legislative setting through the use of elections comes from 
Habermas (1996) and has become known as the two-track model of deliberation. The informal 
deliberative sphere serves as the background from which normative values, preferences 
and attitudes emerge and where they are discovered. This stage of deliberation is not 
aimed at decision-making and is not organised or regulated. The formal deliberative 
sphere, on the other hand, consists of political actors and institutions. It is here that the 
political impulses of society are formally justified and are converted into law through 
formalised decision-making procedures. These two spheres are connected through 
elections, a mechanism that ensures that the norms and preferences of the w ider and 
weaker public sphere are translated into the political sphere. “This is a tw o-track model in 
which the informal public spheres are ‘contexts of discovery’ and the formal, public 
spheres are ‘contexts of justification’” (Squires 2002 p. 138).
Thus, the two-track model of deliberation highlights some of the deliberative aspects 
of existing democracies, while explicitly aiming to  strengthen these. It also acknowledges 
the fact that while the wider, informally deliberative public sphere has a vital role in 
shaping perspectives and attitudes in the end formalised decision-making procedures are 
needed and while these should also be deliberative, they can involve elected 
representatives rather than all ordinary citizens.
What is W rong w ith Deliberative Democracy?
Despite its popularity and prominence in democratic theory, deliberative democracy has 
not been immune to criticism. Some of the criticism comes from the rational-choice- 
theoretic camp (Pincione and Teson 2006, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002), some from a
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m ore elitist approach to politics (Stokes 1998) and others are made on methodological 
grounds (Hardin 1999).
Sunstein has criticised some aspects of the theory of deliberative democracy from 
within the deliberativist camp. His main concerns are the cognitive mechanisms that could 
introduce bias into the deliberative process. The first danger, according to him, is that of 
conformity. He argues that the best way to avoid this is by ensuring that dissenters are 
allowed to voice their views in the deliberative forums without being discriminated against 
in any way (Sunstein 2003).
The second is group polarization (Sunstein 2003, 2007): the phenomenon that the 
views of group members will become m ore extrem e as a result of deliberation. It is easy to 
see how this could happen. If we ask a group of pro-life activists to deliberate, the 
arguments they will hear are all going to favour their initial position. The further 
discussion and affirmation that each group m em ber receives of his o r her initial beliefs is 
likely to strengthen those beliefs. A parallel process would take place among a group of 
like-minded pro-choice activists. Thus, deliberation will not always arrive at a be tter 
outcome and may indeed contribute to the strengthening of mistaken or unacceptable 
beliefs. Sunstein (2002) observed evidence for the existence of this process from jury trial 
experiments which resulted in jurors consistently demanding higher compensation for 
victims after deliberation than before.
The third danger Sunstein identifies is that of informational cascades. These occur 
when individuals come to  believe facts or arguments not because they have independent 
evidence for their correctness, but simply on the grounds that others believe them , 
without knowing whether these beliefs were held for the right reasons or not. If m ore and 
m ore individuals jump on the bandwagon, a trend can easily develop where one argument 
is inexorably favoured over another, regardless of whether it is correct or not.
It is im portant to  note that these mechanisms are not always problematic or 
disadvantageous. If individuals all conform to a feeling of revulsion at racism or slavery, if 
they come to believe true arguments based on informational cascades or if they become 
polarised towards morally desirable beliefs, this will not be a problem . But what they
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highlight is that we cannot always rely on reasoned deliberation to provide us with the best 
outcom e and the kind of moral commitments that authors such as Gutmann and Thompson 
(1996, 2004) argue for.
The evidence from deliberative experiments is inconclusive. W hile positive findings 
are frequently reported, deliberation can also w ork counter to  the expectations of 
theorists. Let me illustrate this with an example. According to results published on the 
official web site8 of a deliberative poll held in Hungary on discrimination against the Roma, 
the opinion of deliberators did not change in the expected direction on all issues. Before 
deliberation 44%  of deliberators believed that discrimination against Roma citizens at 
entertainm ent venues, such as bars or clubs, was completely unacceptable and should 
either be legislated against or should be countered with a publicity campaign, 13% thought 
that it was the right of the proprietor to bar people from entering and 43% condoned 
discrimination. After deliberation only 36% of deliberators thought that such discrimination 
was unacceptable, 20% believed that it is the right of proprietors and 43% believed the 
behaviour was acceptable or even a ‘good thing’. Thus, not only did the percentage of 
those condoning the behaviour stay the same, but the percentage of those opposed to it 
actually decreased. A m ore charitable interpretation of the results could be that 
deliberators became convinced after discussion that night clubs have a right to throw  out 
whom ever they want, w ithout state intervention. But this still does not explain why the 
num ber of those supporting discrimination did not decrease.
Pincione and Teson (2006), two economists, offer a critique of deliberative 
democracy from a rational choice perspective that focuses on the theory’s epistemic 
claims. They argue that deliberative democracy will not be good at identifying the best 
outcomes, because citizens are not sufficiently well-informed and are not m otivated to get 
better informed and politicians and interest groups do not have the right incentives to  seek 
out the truth. According to them , public discourse will favour vivid explanations based on 
easily accessible, emotional imagery rather than opaque ones, which are m ore difficult to 
understand. As an example, citizens are m ore likely to explain rising oil prices through
8 h ttp ://w w w .magyaragora.hu
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vivid reasons, such as blaming greedy oil companies, rather than opaque ones, such as 
m arket forces of supply and demand. Interest groups are concerned with capturing scarce 
resources and they can best do so by using vivid reasoning. Finally, politicians use vivid 
reasons to appeal to voters and to appear to  be in charge even w hen the situation can be 
better explained through opaque, invisible-hand theories. W hile theirs is also a rational 
choice critique of deliberative democracy, it only addresses an outcome-based, epistemic 
justification rather than a procedural justification rooted in values such as reciprocity, 
equality and inclusion. In this thesis, I will focus on both types of justifications.
O ther critiques have focused on specific aspects of the deliberative democracy 
literature. Talisse (2005) argues that liberal deliberative democrats exclude too many 
points of view, thereby placing some contentious issues outside of the deliberative forum. 
Schroeder (2002) criticises deliberative dem ocrats’ tendency to assume that political 
deliberation will be analogous to jury deliberation. Estlund (2008) criticises deliberative 
democrats for focusing too much on the procedural values underlying their theory. Fish
(1999) argues that the definition of reasonableness used by deliberative democrats is too 
narrow. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) argue that citizens are simply not motivated and 
do not want to  participate m ore in democratic politics and are happy to  leave politics to 
the politicians.
None of these critics has so far provided a m ore comprehensive review of the core 
normative and positive characteristics of deliberative democracy. This is the gap I aim to 
fill in this thesis.
M ethodology
The theory of deliberative democracy is an ideal theory. Therefore, we can ask two 
questions about it. Firstly, we can ask whether the ideals described by the theory of 
deliberative democracy are desirable or not. Secondly, we can ask how far real-life
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deliberative politics would deviate from this ideal. I aim to ask both of these questions in 
this thesis.
The theory of deliberative democracy has a strong focus on putting the normative 
ideal into practice. Therefore, for the most part, my approach to evaluating the theory of 
deliberative democracy is a positive rather than a normative one. Throughout the thesis, I 
will draw on findings from the social sciences — political science, sociology and social 
psychology — and particularly on findings from the empirical literature on political 
deliberation. Such findings can help us to predict whether deliberative democracy would 
actually embody in practice the values that its proponents ascribe to it. W hile the best 
source of empirical information on political deliberation are the studies and quasi­
experiments carried out with an explicitly deliberative focus, the num ber of these is still 
relatively small and there is a rich literature in the social sciences that can help us make 
sense of human behaviour and offer us clues as to  how individuals are likely to behave in 
deliberative situations. Furtherm ore, as I m entioned above, studying informal, dispersed 
deliberative processes is very difficult and as a result no such large-scale studies exist at the 
m om ent. Therefore, it is necessary to  assess the empirical potential as well as the problems 
of deliberative democracy on the basis of, on the one hand, smaller-scale studies about 
formal deliberative meetings and, on the other, larger-scale studies o f some aspects of 
political behaviour in the public sphere, such as the impressive survey of political 
participation carried out by Verba et al. (Verba et al. 1995) and other findings in various 
fields of the social sciences.
Throughout this thesis, I will employ a rational and social-choice-theoretic approach 
to analysing deliberative democracy. There exists a large literature with an extensive range 
of applications in this tradition. Social choice theory allows us to  contrast deliberative 
democracy m ore directly with aggregative democracy. Rational choice theory gives us a 
foundation of methodological individualism and instrum ental rationality that can be used to 
evaluate the theory of deliberative democracy from  a positive perspective. As I will argue 
in chapter three, instrumental rationality and rational choice theory offer simplifications of
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real-life processes that allow us to examine whether deliberative democracy would actually 
w ork the way that the literature predicts.
W hile I analyse deliberative democracy from a rational and social-choice-theoretic 
perspective, I do not wish to in terpret these in a narrow way. Therefore, I agree w ith Fung 
(2004) that in order to apply them  to the study of deliberation, we should not adhere to 
strict notions of self-interested behaviour and fixed preferences. The first, I will argue in 
chapter three, is a m isinterpretation of the way in which rational choice theory describes 
human behaviour. W hile individuals are taken to be utility-maximisers this does not 
preclude them from holding altruistic or other-regarding preferences. The second, fixed 
preference orderings, is a simplification that allows modelling m ore than anything else and 
new models are increasingly becoming m ore complex and better able to  accommodate 
preference change. Thus, a rational-choice-theoretic perspective still allows us to  think 
about how individuals form and change their preferences.
Liberal Representative Democracy
In order to be able to evaluate the theory of deliberative democracy, it is useful to find a 
point of contrast. Since deliberative democracy is a theory of how democracy can be 
improved and extended, it is possible to  compare it against existing stable democratic 
regimes. I will call these liberal representative democracies. This comparison is also 
im portant because making democracies m ore deliberative is likely to be very costly and the 
costs need to be weighed against the benefits.
Liberal representative democracies have evolved over long periods of time. They can 
differ from each other in many aspects (Lijphart 1999). W e can differentiate between 
presidential regimes, such as the US, and parliamentary ones, such as the UK. Some, such 
as the US or German systems, have a federal structure. Due to the different electoral 
systems in place, the effective num ber of political parties can range from as little as 2 to as 
many as 6.9 (Lijphart 1999). However, each of these countries is based on liberal values
35 of 257
Chapter One: Introduction
and the rule of law, guarantees its citizens a range of rights, such as free speech and 
association, allows its citizens to participate in politics and is governed by elected 
representatives.
In his well-known definition Dahl (1989) identifies seven key characteristics that 
such democracies — which he calls ‘polyarchies’ — possess. Firstly, governm ent decisions 
are made by elected officials; secondly, elections are free and fair; thirdly, suffrage is 
universal; fourthly, citizens have a right to run for office; fifthly, they have a right to 
freedom of expression; sixthly, their citizens have a right to access alternative sources of 
information; and finally, they have a right to associational autonomy (Dahl 1989, 221). 
W hile this is a thin, descriptive, rather than a thick, normative definition of democracy, it 
captures the main characteristics and values of liberal representative democracies.
As we have seen above, this model of democracy is by no means perfect either in 
theory or in practice. However, it can be used as a benchmark against which the m odel of 
deliberative democracy can be evaluated. The question in whether changing the status quo 
in favour of m ore deliberative arrangements would be an im provem ent and w hether the 
benefits of doing so would justify the costs.
Plan o f  the Thesis
In the following chapters I will examine in detail the main characteristics and justifications 
of deliberative democracy. As I have m entioned above, these will include both procedural 
and epistemic justifications. Through this, I will be able to evaluate how solid the 
theoretical foundations of deliberative democracy are and whether deliberative democracy 
is likely to function in the way in which its adherents predict it will. I will also contrast the 
model of deliberative democracy with the model of liberal representative democracy in 
order to identify whether the first model has any significant advantages over the latter.
In chapter two I ask w hether the preconditions of successful deliberation exist on the 
level of individuals, societies and institutions. This is an im portant question, since
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deliberation is costly for citizens and it requires a very strong democratic political culture 
and an even stronger political will to see any large-scale deliberative reform  through. 
These three aspects will emerge as underlying difficulties that can potentially hinder the 
practical implem entation of a m ore deliberative democracy.
Chapter three looks at the reasoning and rationality underlying deliberative decision­
making. As we have already seen, the claims that deliberation will form and transform 
individual preferences and beliefs and that debate is going to be reciprocal and other- 
regarding are central to the theory of deliberative democracy. It is these claims that I 
investigate in this chapter. The fundamental question is whether justifying deliberative 
democracy on this basis gives a sufficiently solid foundation to the theory. This is an 
im portant question to ask when it is by no means guaranteed that deliberation will indeed 
function in this way. Instead, there could be other, alternative mechanisms at play, such as 
conformity or a common framing that remains uncontested. I will also compare 
communicative and instrumental forms of rationality in this chapter.
In chapter four I look at two m ore normative characteristics of deliberative 
democracy that provide procedural justification for it: inclusion and equality. Here I 
examine the inclusion and equality of both people and arguments. These are perhaps the 
two m ost attractive virtues of deliberative democracy or indeed any model of democracy. 
But the question is w hether deliberative democracy is in a better position to  deliver them 
than other models of democracy. I argue that overall, inclusion offers be tte r support for 
deliberative democracy than equality. However, even here, it is unclear how  deliberation 
will deliver results that sufficiently approximate the ideal.
In chapter five I look at the way in which deliberation would result in decisions. 
Deliberative democracy is often defined as aiming to find a consensual decision (Cohen 
1996), even if this cannot be achieved in practice. Here I examine the normative basis of 
this ideal. I also look at ways in which aggregative and deliberative models of democracy 
can be reconciled, both theoretically and practically, by combining deliberation with 
voting.
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In chapter six I tu rn  to  the epistemic justification of deliberative democracy. This 
suggests that deliberative democracy is desirable, because it will arrive at be tter outcomes 
than other decision-making procedures. I call this into question to argue that procedural 
justification would provide a m ore solid theoretical foundation for deliberative democracy.
Finally, in chapter seven, I address some descriptive questions, which can help us to 
define the limits of successful democratic deliberation. These address what topics are 
suitable for deliberation and who should deliberate, how, where and how often. These 
questions can be answered based on the findings of the previous chapters and help us to 
define the scope of successful deliberation.
Having examined the different ways in which deliberative democracy is justified and 
the way in which these normative ideals would perform  in practice, in chapter eight I give 
a broader evaluation of the theory of deliberative democracy and attem pt to answer the 
question I have posed at the beginning of this chapter: is deliberative democracy the best 
way forward for democratic theory and practice?
Ultimately, I find the normative bases of deliberative democracy too weak and its 
empirical reality too different from the ideal. Deliberative democracy cannot be the 
panacea for the ills of democracy in the way the literature seems to  suggest. W hile 
democracy should be and will necessarily have to  be deliberative in part, we must not 
neglect the other elements of democracy, such as elections, representation, bargaining and 
partisan, ideological politics. All of these have a role to play in democratic politics and an 
undue focus on deliberation may make us believe that the others are ills rather than the 
signs of a healthy democratic system. ‘One size fits all’ is not true for all countries and all 
issues when it comes to  democratic political decision-making. Deliberation has its place, 
but politics need not always be deliberative in order to be democratic. However, before I 
reach this final conclusion, I first need to thoroughly examine the theory of deliberative 
democracy.
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C h a p t e r  Two 
T h e  P r e c o n d it io n s  o f  D e l ib e r a t iv e  D e m o c r a c y
Deliberative democracy is often presented as the next step in the evolution of liberal 
democracies. Democracy is by no means a static system. There have already been major 
changes to  liberal democracies in the past, such as the extension of the franchise or the 
introduction of secret ballots. But many of the deliberative reforms proposed would mean 
an even m ore substantial change to democratic systems.
Deliberative democracy is an ideal theory and even the m ore practical suggestions of 
how it could be implemented are rooted in this ideal, normative realm. While the 
literature discusses the m erits and problems of these theories in great detail, less attention 
is paid to  the process through which a m ore deliberative form of politics could be 
introduced and the conditions that need to  be satisfied for its success. The aim of this 
chapter is to examine these preconditions and to assess whether current liberal 
democracies offer a solid basis for deliberative reforms.
Liberal democracy does not flourish equally in all countries. There is a large 
literature in political science examining the preconditions of democracy and the causes of 
democratisation. One of the first notable examples of this literature is found in 
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1945). New waves of democratisation during the 20th 
century both served to increase the data available to  scholars and to  fuel interest in what 
conditions are needed for the development of stable democracies. Arguments highlight the 
importance of political culture (Almond and Verba 1963/1989), economic development 
(Lipset 1959), the role of elites (Rustow 1970) and the role of class structure 
(Rueschmayer et al. 1992).
Equally, it is likely that deliberative democracy would not flourish in all places and at 
all times. The question is whether it would be possible to introduce large-scale deliberative
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reform  to existing democratic countries9. This chapter looks at the preconditions for 
political, democratic deliberation. Some of these preconditions, for example a tendency 
for tolerance, overlap w ith those of deliberation in general, but there are many which are 
unique to political deliberation.
For the purposes of this chapter I analyse the conditions necessary for successful 
deliberation based on three closely interrelated categories: individuals, society and political 
institutions. These are by no means definitive or exhaustive and no doubt a different set of 
categories could also be used. The individual level relates to the abilities and motivation 
individuals need to possess in order to participate in deliberative discussions effectively. 
The societal level relates to the social capital in societies and the political culture in which 
citizens are embedded. Finally, the institutional level deals with the existing democratic 
institutions in place and the processes needed for deliberative reform .
Motivation emerges as a significant factor. And w ithout the proper motivation in 
place, introducing sweeping deliberative reforms and making them  w ork is problematic. 
This points to the introduction of smaller m ore incremental reforms that build on existing 
deliberative elements in liberal democracies, rather than whole-sale reform. But the 
motivation for this is also problematic as existing incentives place low priorities on such 
deliberative aspects of politics.
In what follows, I will examine the three areas identified above. I will start with the 
individual at the micro level and then move up first to the level of society and then to the 
level of formalised political institutions.
The First Level: Individuals
W hile theories of deliberation are not always clear about who should participate in 
deliberative discourse, both formal and informal models of deliberation will require an 
increased level of participation by ordinary citizens (Elster 1986, Gutmann and Thompson
9 I limit my analysis to existing democratic systems. I will explain the reason for this later on in this chapter.
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1996, Habermas 1996, Ackermann and Fishkin 2004). Hence, when I examine the 
preconditions of deliberative democracy at the level of individuals, I look at average 
citizens taking part in tow n hall meetings or informal discussions in the public sphere, 
rather than professional politicians participating in parliamentary debates. The question is 
how busy, uninterested citizens can become com petent deliberators.
I will now address two areas of the preconditions for deliberation: the ability and the 
motivation of an average citizen to participate in deliberative procedures.
Abilities and Attitudes
Successful participation in deliberative decision-making processes requires individuals to 
possess certain cognitive abilities and psychological attitudes. These relate to the cognitive 
demands of deliberation at all stages of the debate, from understanding arguments to 
making well-reasoned decisions. They enable individuals to  act in a m anner which theorists 
say is normatively desirable, in particular to be open to new arguments and to  be other- 
regarding (for example Elster 1986, Gutmann and Thompson 1996 and 2004).
Deliberation is a demanding activity. Individuals need to perform  a m ultitude of 
cognitively complex tasks (Reykowski 2006). They need to  be able to concentrate on 
potentially complicated arguments put forward during long discussions. They need to be 
able to in terpret new facts and arguments correctly and they need to  be able to  evaluate 
them  critically. Furtherm ore, they need to be able to form logical arguments themselves 
which m ust be justified to  others and communicate these effectively. Different individuals 
have differing abilities to  perform  these tasks.
Lupia (2002) argues that much of the literature is too optimistic about our ability to 
reach better decisions through deliberation, as it relies on a false folk theory of learning. 
All of us rem em ber examples when we held an incorrect belief, learnt relevant new  facts 
and corrected this belief. But we will not rem em ber many instances when we failed to 
correct an incorrect belief because we paid inadequate attention to or forgot relevant new
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information, or because at the end of the day we decided that there was nothing wrong 
with the incorrect old belief. In fact we are only likely to find out about our mistakes once 
they have been corrected. Thus, when we informally ‘tes t’ the theory, perceived successes 
will far outnum ber failures.
Ordinary citizens would apportion relatively little time and effort to these 
cognitively demanding processes as work, family, relationships and daily life already take 
up much of their resources. However, it should be within the reach of nearly all citizens to 
arrive at an adequately reasoned argument on specific, not overly technical issues after a 
period of deliberation. This is what the jury system in Anglo-Saxon countries relies on. 
These might still be incorrect beliefs (Pincione and Teson 2006), but as individuals have 
spent m ore effort on acquiring and processing information, they are likely to  be better than 
they would have been if no deliberation had taken place. Thus, while cognitive demands do 
affect the quality of deliberation we can expect from ordinary citizens and the resulting 
outcomes, they do not affect the possibility that they would be able to participate in some 
form of deliberative process.
Apart from cognitive capacities, normative theories of deliberation also require 
citizens to hold certain attitudes, such as openness to new  ideas and experiences (Costa and 
McCrae 2003) and other-regardingness (Elster 1986, Mansbridge 1990). These attitudes 
are also some of the likely results of deliberative discussions, as citizens learn to launder 
their preferences (Goodin 1986) and increasingly come to respect and tolerate the views of 
others (Mutz 2006). However, some minimal level of tolerance and openness is necessary 
in order to make citizens willing to start deliberating.
W hile other-regarding attitudes are difficult to attain for m ost people, at the very 
least deliberative situations require participants to be tolerant towards each other. 
Tolerance would be called upon as participants need to give equal respect to arguments 
different from their own. Other-regarding attitudes may develop as a result of deliberative 
practices themselves, but tolerance should be sufficient to get deliberation started in the 
first place. Deliberative democracy would require a higher degree of political tolerance 
and support of civil liberties and democracy than liberal representative forms of
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democracy, as citizens would need to engage w ith views different from their own m ore 
directly. Studies have shown that the internalisation of democratic values leads to greater 
tolerance (Sullivan and Transue 1999); therefore citizens of democratic countries would be 
better prepared for deliberation than citizens of non-democratic regimes. Perceptions of 
threat reduce the extent to which individuals are tolerant; therefore it is im portant to 
ensure that all deliberators feel that the process is impartial and takes their views into 
account.
Citizens of democratic countries already possess sufficient levels of tolerance and 
openness to  have some kind of deliberative debate, even if this would not always 
approximate the ideal. The clearest evidence for this is that deliberative polls, meetings 
and experiments do not simply break down, but exhibit some measure of success (Luskin 
et al. 2002, Gastil and Levine 2005, Farrar et al. forthcoming and many m ore). Thus, it 
seems that neither cognitive capacities, nor attitudes provide problems for deliberative 
democracy, as long as we accept that they will not be present to an extent sufficient to 
produce ideal deliberation.
Motivation
However, individuals do not only need to have the ability to  deliberate. They also need to 
have the will to do so. Deliberation requires citizens to acquire new  information and to 
update their beliefs based on it. It also requires them  to hold well reasoned positions, 
rather than instinctive opinions. Yet it has long been a widely shared view in political 
science, especially among rational choice theorists, that individuals have little incentive to 
learn about politics (Downs 1957, Aldrich 1993, Popkin 1993). Turnout at elections has 
been falling for decades, political apathy is viewed as a common problem  for all developed 
democracies and m ost voters appear to be shockingly uninformed in surveys (Delli Carpini 
and Keeter 1996).
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Downs (1957) was one of the first to describe this rational ignorance on the part of 
voters. Seeking out new information is costly, and it only brings lim ited benefits to 
citizens. Reading newspapers and watching the news on television is tim e consuming, not 
to  m ention for some people also very boring. Therefore, only those who enjoy the fact of 
keeping up to date or those who can expect higher benefits by using their knowledge to 
influence others will engage in such a costly activity.
Most citizens, however, will rely on shortcuts and heuristics to form judgments 
about politics. Information acquired during day to day life serves as an im portant source of 
knowledge about economic and current affairs (Grofman and W ithers 1993, Popkin 1993) 
and party labels offer an easy indication as to candidates’ positions. For m ost of us bills and 
the weekly grocery shopping are the best indicators of inflation. Politicians are often 
evaluated based on seemingly irrelevant characteristics; for example, their personal 
integrity could be judged based on their family life. Average citizens also rely on lobby 
groups, community leaders and whistle blowers to let them  know if things are not going 
well and their interests are not represented in politics rather than following politics closely 
themselves (Popkin 1993).
The above picture, of course, applies to an aggregative political system where most 
citizens’ engagement with politics is limited to turning up at the polling station every few 
years. This is a situation that deliberative democracy would like to remedy. So would the 
calculus of rational ignorance be different for deliberative citizens?
It is sometimes assumed that participating in deliberation will make citizens m ore 
engaged with politics (Gutmann and Thompson 1996). They will become better informed, 
as deliberation helps participants learn new facts (Manin 1987). Deliberative programs 
could also help those to get involved who have never previously had the opportunity to 
become engaged in politics. It is easy to see that this could especially benefit poorer and 
more disadvantaged segments of society. Participatory budget projects in Porto Alegre 
(Baiocchi 2003) and Belo Horizonte (Souza 2001) provided an opportunity for people from 
poorer areas and with little education to participate in deliberative forums and become 
representatives for their neighbourhoods. Residents in Porto Alegre reported  how they
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learnt to participate from  those m ore experienced or better educated than themselves, 
even though at the beginning they did not know what they were expected to do (Baiocchi 
2003, 53).
This view, however, makes two key assumptions. The first is that people want to 
participate in deliberation, either because they enjoy the act itself or because of the benefits 
they receive from this mode of decision-making. I believe that this is not the case. The 
second is that people should participate in politics, as this is a civic virtue which all citizens 
should engage in. The following argum ent will take on the first of these assumptions; the 
assumption that people are motivated to participate in political deliberation, while I will 
discuss the second assumption later on in chapter eight.
Participating in political deliberation is a form of collective action that is aimed at 
securing outcomes that everyone will benefit from , regardless of whether they participated 
themselves or not. These outcomes can be concrete policies or they can be intangible 
benefits like an increase in civic virtue, tolerance and respect for others.
The collective action problem  (Olson 1965, O strom  1990) tells us that the cost of 
participating in activities aimed at securing a collective good will outweigh the benefits 
received by each individual. This leads to free-riding behaviour, as most people will rely on 
others to get the w ork done. In order for deliberation to be successful, the collective 
action problem  needs to be overcome. This is by no means impossible. One of the most 
potent examples of it is the paradox of turnout. The cost of voting is relatively high 
compared to the benefits each individual voter will receive from having his or her 
preferred party elected. Yet millions of people still turn  out to vote on election day. Thus, 
it appears that a simple cost-benefit analysis does not give us a full account of what 
motivates individuals to vote (Dowding 2005) and other explanatory variables need to be 
added to the benefit side of equation, such as habit, a sense of duty or the sense of 
enjoyment participation provides, despite the fact that these are difficult to quantify. The 
practice of deliberative democracy would need to  face a similar cost-benefit analysis. Given 
that the cost of deliberation is generally high, and certainly much higher than the cost of 
casting a vote, are the benefits large enough to compensate for this?
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In general, two aspects of deliberation can make or break people’s interest in 
participating. The first is how interested the individuals are in the topic of the debate. The 
second is whether they perceive that their participation has made a genuine difference.
Let us first look at the question of personal interest. People are m ore interested in 
issues which affect them directly or issues on which they hold strong views10. Thus, local, 
neighbourhood issues and high profile national issues will generate m ore interest. The cost 
of deliberating over these issues will be relatively low, as participants will already be to 
some extent informed about the facts and arguments and this is complemented by 
relatively high personal benefits in participating. However, people are also likely to have 
strong pre-form ed judgments about these issues, and therefore belief change is less likely 
to  occur (Bartels 1993, Fishkin et al. 2007), thus making deliberation less socially and 
politically useful and conforming less to the normative theory of deliberation.
Citizens will be less informed about obscure, complicated issues. W hile they might 
change their opinion about these m ore easily, deliberators will need m ore tim e to learn the 
necessary facts and arguments to come to a reasoned decision. This raises the cost of 
deliberation in these cases significantly, while the personal benefits are lower, as these 
issues will be of less interest to deliberators and the outcomes may affect them less 
personally. Thus, deliberation would here be m ore socially useful, while at the same time 
it is personally m ore costly and less beneficial. This could lead to the perverse outcome 
that citizens will be less motivated to participate in deliberation in cases that are m ore 
socially beneficial. W e can assume that other non-quantifiable benefits, such as a sense of 
fulfilling one’s civic duty would be equal in both of these cases.
The second aspect of deliberation that affects the benefits each deliberator receives is 
the material difference that their participation makes. One of the reasons why the benefits 
of voting are so low is that the benefits of each vote m ust be multiplied by the probability 
that it will be pivotal, that is, that it will actually make a difference to the outcome. This 
num ber is infinitesimally small in a large electorate. Deliberation faces the same problem
10 These two will often coincide.
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from tw o perspectives: firstly, the participation of each individual will actually have to 
m atter and, secondly, the results of deliberation have to be translated into public policy.
How much individual participation m atters is much harder to assess than in the case 
of voting. Each vote counts equally, but no t every argum ent is equal in a deliberative 
discussion. Thus, those who feel that their voice will have little impact will be less 
motivated to participate. And these are likely to  be those who are already disadvantaged in 
society.
W hether the outcomes of deliberation will make an actual impact depends on the 
political will to make it so. I will discuss this in m ore detail in section three of this chapter. 
For the tim e being let it suffice to say that if participants in deliberative groups feel that 
their decisions and their deliberations have little impact on actual policy, they are unlikely 
to  feel motivated to keep turning up. Material benefits would need to appear in a timely 
fashion in order to convince citizens that the process was working. If very little changes in 
individuals’ day-to-day fives as a result of deliberation, then the material benefits of 
participating may not be enough to  lure people along, unless they get other significant 
benefits from the process, such as personal enjoyment or a sense of fulfilling their duty.
In the cases where these benefits cannot be m et, the individual cost of participating 
in deliberation is high. One of the greatest constraints is of course time. Time constraints 
can limit the range of people who participate in meetings on a regular basis. Poorer people 
working in m ultiple jobs, professionals working long hours and those with small children 
in general have less time and energy to participate in meetings held in the evenings and at 
weekends. O n the other end of the scale the self-employed, stay-at-home wives and 
husbands, pensioners, students, those with flexible schedules, part-tim e workers and the 
unemployed have m ore time to participate (Souza 2001). There is evidence from the Porto 
Alegre project that wom en w ere less likely to participate, as holding a full-time job and 
carrying out household duties left them with little spare time (Baiocchi 2003). In the 
Brazilian participatory budget projects some of the poorest sections of the population lack 
motivation to participate in the process as their first concerns are for day-to-day personal
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survival, rather than the infrastructure and public goods projects that the budget focuses on 
(Souza 2001).
The costs for each individual citizen to participate in either formal or informal 
deliberation will often outweigh the benefits. In the absence of other significant personal 
factors, such as individual interest in politics or a sense of civic duty, m ost citizens are 
unlikely to  be m otivated to participate in deliberation. Making deliberation compulsory 
and coercing people to participate in formal deliberation might be problem atic since it is 
difficult to argue that such a costly activity constitutes a part of performing our basic duty 
as citizens.
Those most likely to be active in deliberative forums are those who are active in 
politics now. It is im portant to note that even in successful cases, such as the deliberative 
forums in Porto Alegre, the deliberators w ere self-selected. Many people dislike 
participating in public meetings or even discussing politics informally. Most people prefer 
to avoid confrontation when it comes to political disagreement and prefer to  discuss 
politics w ith like-minded people (Mutz 2006). Furtherm ore, many feel shy or feel they 
cannot argue their case as persuasively as others do (Mansbridge 1983). These individuals 
are less likely to  participate in formal deliberation. And self-selection can have dangerous 
consequences, as the unrepresented may lose out in the process. Fung (2004, 105-106) 
argues that self-selection and relatively low participation rates are not a problem , as 
citizens may have to  choose between a num ber of forums to  participate in and only get 
involved in one or tw o which they are most m otivated to attend. But the problem  is that if 
individuals can choose betw een a large num ber of groups, their efforts will be fragmented 
and each forum  will be captured by a homogeneous special interest group.
Overall, individual motivation may significantly lim it the extent to  which citizens are 
willing to participate in deliberative projects. This should no t pose a problem  as long as we 
admit that deliberative discussions would not extend to  cover all citizens. There are 
already a large num ber of individuals who are sufficiently interested in politics to  play a 
part in the political process, whether as elected representatives at the national or local level 
or as civil society activists. There will always be people who are motivated enough and
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capable enough to successfully participate in deliberative processes. Additional incentives, 
such as a cash rew ard for participating, could further increase their num ber. And as Gastil
(2000) argues, those who would not be willing to participate in deliberation when 
presented with the opportunity to do so would probably not be able to  make a significant 
contribution anyway. If deliberative democracy is defined in this way, rather than as a 
society-wide debate, then its individual level preconditions will be m et. However, in this 
case m ore attention needs to  be given in the literature to  mechanisms that make 
deliberation representative and accountable.
The Second Level: Society
Moving from  the individual level of preconditions for deliberative democracy to the social 
one offers us an opportunity to look for factors which could provide a motivating force for 
individual participation. At the same time we should continue to pay careful attention to 
the necessary aspects of social life that enable deliberation in the first place. This section 
examines tw o broad areas. Firstly, I shall look at the role that the homogeneity or 
heterogeneity of the population plays for the prospects of deliberative democracy. Then I 
will look at the role of social capital and political culture.
Commonalities and Differences
Meaningful politics requires that sufficient differences should exist betw een groups to 
make getting involved in politics worthwhile (Almond and Verba 1963/1989). If all 
members of a community unanimously agree about a decision w ithout deliberation, there 
are no incentives for individuals to take part in politics. The fact that different individuals 
and groups hold different sets of values or rank the same values differently means that the 
outcomes of politics m atter to citizens. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) argue that the 
reason m ost citizens are not interested in participating in politics is that they overestimate
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the extent of consensus in society. Thus, heterogeneity of beliefs and a realisation that this 
heterogeneity exists play a crucial role in motivating individuals to participate in politics.
O f course not all levels of heterogeneity are beneficial. Sometimes cleavages can be 
so deep that different groups find it impossible to talk to each other. This situation can lead 
to catastrophic consequences, such as civil war or genocide. In these cases it is m ore 
feasible to  start out with developing a relationship betw een the tw o communities through 
m ore group interest focussed and less deliberative means. Thus, the conditions under 
which a representative democracy could function should be created first. These first 
procedures could then be made m ore deliberative in the future.
So what kind of homogeneity does successful deliberation require? At the very 
minimum participants need to be able to communicate w ith each other w ithout difficulties. 
This presupposes that m em bers of a society share a common language. This condition can 
of course be m et for m ost citizens of a nation state. There are some special cases where 
citizens in different regions speak different languages, as is the case in Switzerland or 
Canada. However, these countries are already successful democracies and it is unlikely that 
language barriers would prevent them from becoming m ore deliberative.
W hile language itself may not pose a barrier for deliberation, citizens also need to 
possess a shared understanding of the world around them , in term s of understanding how 
the political system works and understanding the key values of democratic societies, such 
as freedom of expression. This is necessary in order to fulfil the condition of reciprocity in 
deliberation, whereby participants appeal to shared reasons (Gutmann and Thompson 
1996). If a significant section o f a population is no t com m itted to  upholding the values of 
democracy, then they are unlikely to be willing to participate in deliberation. There is 
evidence that acceptance of such values is generally common in societies, even though the 
extent to  which they are embraced might differ across individuals or groups (Dryzek and 
Braithwaite 2000). But even in well established democracies there will be some citizens 
who do not seek to  uphold democracy or who do not subscribe to otherwise commonly 
shared notions of equality or justice. These groups can pose special problems for 
deliberative democracy.
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Even when citizens of a country nominally share comm on values, it could be difficult 
to evaluate whether they interpret those values in the same way. This could result from the 
shorthand use of term s such as equality, which could mean both equality of opportunity 
and equality of outcome. O r it could be the result of different interpretations of the same 
term  such as freedom of speech, which some might in terpret as limitless, while others 
would exclude crudely hateful or discriminatory speech. In these cases citizens may end up 
talking past each other, even if deliberation does take place. Therefore, the depth of 
deliberation matters. Either fundamental values need to  be probed and clarified or 
deliberation has to be very clearly limited to a few policies or issues at a tim e, where 
decisions are made about the means to  achieve an end, rather than the end itself.
Dryzek and Braithwaite (2000) studied different sets of values among the Australian 
electorate and arrived at a four-fold division of value conflicts. Firstly, two distinct, but 
most likely overlapping value sets could face each other. This is the case in traditional left- 
right politics. Secondly, a group with a set of values might be faced with a group which 
held no values and was cynical about them. This could be the case when citizens become 
disaffected w ith the political and the social system. The authors argue that in these two 
cases meaningful deliberation is possible, either when reflection is inspired betw een two 
sets of values or when those with positive values try to bring the valueless along with them. 
The third and fourth cases, however, are not amenable to  deliberative procedures. In the 
third case a group defines itself in opposition to another group’s values without developing 
a coherent value set itself. This can lead to a dogmatic definition of their positions, which 
deliberation is unlikely to change, as whatever one party says, the others will say just the 
opposite in order to contradict them. In the fourth and final case a group’s values are 
rejected entirely by another group. Dryzek and Braithwaite find no evidence for this case 
in their study. However, there is certainly some alarming evidence indicating that there are 
some who reject liberal values m ore or less completely, albeit these individuals are in a 
small m inority. An example of such rejection of values can be witnessed in some of the 
slogans that protests against the infamous Danish M ohammed cartoons have produced.
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These slogans, one of which was “freedom go to hell11”, deny the right to free speech and 
as such oppose W estern liberal values fundamentally. It is ironic that it was the values 
which they denounce that allowed them  to publicise their renunciation in the first place.
Thus, deliberative politics in particular and democratic politics in general relies on 
getting the balance between homogeneity and heterogeneity right. A society needs to be 
heterogeneous enough to allow its members to understand each other and be able to solve 
problems peacefully and cooperatively. At the same time politics requires a tension 
betw een the interests of different groups, which needs to be resolved. W ithout this tension 
politics loses its meaning and can be replaced by m ere bureaucracy. The danger that 
deliberation accentuates is that many groups in a pluralistic society talk past each other. 
This could lead to a general lack of understanding, which could underm ine the 
effectiveness of deliberative discourse.
Civil Society and Political Culture
W hat m atters in society is of course not just the distribution of views or differences and 
commonalities betw een groups. The way different individuals relate to  each other is also 
very im portant. This is captured by the concepts of trust and social capital. M oreover, 
individuals do not just relate to each other, they also relate to political institutions. This is 
political culture. I will now deal with each of these ideas in turn.
Trust is a commonly used concept which describes the extent to which we feel that 
we can rely on other individuals. W e can distinguish between two kinds of trust. The first 
is generalised trust, and this relates to trusting others in society in general. This is the kind 
of trust m easured by survey questions asking people whether they perceive other people as 
trustworthy. By contrast, interpersonal trust is trust placed in specific individuals. 
Interpersonal trust is im portant in politics, as decision-making is a process that takes place 
betw een individuals (Leach and Sabatier 2005). For the purposes of deliberative
11 Associated Press Images.
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democracy, generalised trust might make it easier to initiate deliberative discussions, but it 
is going to be interpersonal trust that will allow deliberators to w ork together 
constructively.
Social capital is concerned with the networks and relationships betw een individuals 
in society. A society with rich individual networks based on goodwill, trust and reciprocity 
has high levels of social capital. Social capital is reflected in and can be measured through a 
num ber of different variables. These include religious attendance, the num ber of friends an 
average person has, volunteering, philanthropy, civic participation and participation in 
different groups whether it is a bridge club or a charity group.
Deliberation is an inter-personal affair and it can both draw on and build up social 
capital. It draws on social capital when it requires participants to  extend existing ties 
betw een each other to the political forum. Putnam (2000) links social capital both to 
generalised reciprocity and generalised trust — that is, willingness to act kindly towards and 
to trust others, whether we have known them  in the past or not. These are both factors 
that can contribute towards successful deliberation. It can also be argued that social capital 
develops a greater sense of community and through this civic duty. At the same time 
deliberation can also work to build social capital. Interactions betw een individuals develop 
new networks, which enable the group to develop arguments and decisions together.
Putnam (2000) distinguishes two kinds of social capital. The first is bridging social 
capital. These are networks and relationships that stretch betw een individuals in different 
social and economic groups. The second is bonding social capital. Bonding social capital 
allows likeminded individuals or those in similar socio-economic circumstances to develop 
stronger relationships with each other. Deliberative groups would ideally have to build and 
draw on bridging social capital. That is, individuals who hold different points of view and 
lead different kinds of lives would need to  get together in order to make decisions 
together.
The problem with the social capital approach is that it is broad and often intangible. 
Measuring it can be difficult, as group participation or volunteering will inevitably be
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proxies for a less tangible concept. There are three main reasons why social capital may not 
be as im portant as it is often portrayed.
Firstly, and most importantly, there is no clear evidence that social capital has a 
significant effect on participation in politics (Jackman and Miller 1998, Scheufele and Shah 
2000). Putnam argues that higher levels of social capital will result in higher levels of 
political participation. But this requires a logical jum p. Just because an individual enjoys 
playing bridge at a bridge club, salsa dancing w ith a local group, has many friends and 
attends church regularly, this does not indicate that he will also enjoy or feel a duty to 
participate or get involved in politics. Thus, high levels of social capital will not affect 
individuals’ likelihood to become willing participants of deliberative groups.
Secondly, many of these groups are homogenous, that is, they bring together 
individuals who share common interests and are likely to  view the world in a similar way. 
This is different from deliberative settings, where group members would come from 
heterogeneous backgrounds and could hold very different views from each other. Thus, 
the pre-existence of high levels of social capital, m easured in the form of group 
membership, will not necessarily lead to better deliberation, as m ost social capital will be 
of the bonding rather than the bridging form.
Thirdly, many authors have argued that social capital is not an exogenous, but an 
endogenous variable (Jackman and Miller 1998). That is, social capital does not exist as a 
variable separate from the situation we examine. It is rather a product of that situation. If 
this is the case, deliberative democracy would have to generate its own social capital and 
pre-existing rates of it m atter less.
Advanced industrial and post-industrial societies do display fairly high levels of social 
capital and trust and they are often described as im portant variables when it comes to the 
stability of representative democratic regimes. In fact, societies would be unlikely to 
survive w ithout these. Very few people do not belong to  groups, or have no ties to friends 
and family, although these ties are not always strong12. In general, society also requires a
12 20% of the UK population feel they have neither a satisfactory friendship nor relatives network (General 
Household Survey, 2000, Office for National Statistics).
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level of trust to function. W e need to place some basic trust in others to  get on with daily 
life. These levels of trust and social capital are sufficient to allow individuals to start 
participating in deliberative groups. Repeated interactions will of course build further 
social capital and trust, but their lack will not ham per the introduction of deliberative 
democracy.
Another research tradition identifies democratic political culture as one of the main 
preconditions of democracy. Almond and Verba (1963/1989), in their study of five 
countries, define it as “the particular distribution of patterns of orientation towards 
political objects among the members of a nation” (13). Thus, political culture determines 
how m ost individuals within a society relate to the political system. This encompasses how 
they think about, feel about and evaluate political processes. According to Almond and 
Verba, democracy is best supported by a participant political culture, where citizens 
expect to  be members of a political community who can influence policies. By contrast, 
parochial political cultures, where there are no specialised political actors, support 
traditional, such as feudal, systems and subject cultures, where citizens submit themselves 
to specialised political elites, best support authoritarian regimes.
The existence of a participant political culture is clearly crucial for deliberative 
democracy, but it is not sufficient. Almond and Verba find that while citizens in stable 
democracies are unlikely to participate in politics, they perceive that they would be able to 
participate, should they need or wish to do so. In order for democracies to become m ore 
deliberative, citizens would not only need to believe that it is possible for them  to 
participate, they would also need to be m ore willing than they are at the m om ent to seize 
those opportunities. Furtherm ore, deliberative democracy is m ore likely to  flourish in 
political cultures where there are no taboo subjects, such as the subject of the monarchy in 
Thailand.
Inglehart (1997) argues that citizens in developed countries are moving from a 
materialist to a post-materialist set of values as a result of a high degree of economic 
prosperity and the absence of other threats, such as wars. Thus, citizens are becoming less 
concerned with survival, personal security and material needs and they are becoming m ore
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concerned with their quality of life, self-expression and sense of community. While 
Inglehart argues that post-materialist values lower economic productivity, he also argues 
that they contribute to the development of citizens who are m ore active and involved in 
civic culture and that post-materialist societies display higher levels of generalised trust.
Post-materialist values are clearly beneficial for deliberative democracy. O ther- 
regarding attitudes, a concern for the common good and finding the best argument appear 
to correspond to  such values. In contrast, materialist values might discourage people from 
participating in politics as they are busy going about their daily lives or even if they do 
participate they focus m ore narrowly on their own interests. However, m ost individuals 
are likely to have a mix of materialistic and post-materialistic values, thus it is impossible to 
make very strong predictions about deliberative democracy based on them.
Trust, social capital and political culture are each im portant variables for the 
development of deliberative democracy. Citizens of liberal representative democracies 
already display levels of trust and social capital that are sufficient for some form of 
deliberation to exist. But in order for deliberative democracy to flourish our political 
culture would have to change. This is of course perfectly in line with the aims of the 
deliberative project. Rather than just being aware that it is possible for us to participate, 
should we wish to do so, we would need to be m ore proactive about getting involved in 
politics and deliberative debates, whether these are formal or informal. This may prove to 
be problem atic given the problems of motivation m ost citizens will face.
The Third Level: Political Institutions
In this final section of the chapter I will examine the political preconditions for the 
introduction of deliberative democracy and the way in which deliberative democracy could 
be introduced to  such institutions. In much of the literature, deliberative democracy is 
assumed to supersede current aggregative arrangements or in other words liberal 
representative democracies.
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Dahl characterizes liberal representative democracies as polyarchies (Dahl 1989). He 
identifies seven distinctive characteristics of such political systems: (1) governm ent 
decisions are made by officials elected in (2) free and fair elections under (3) universal 
suffrage, (4) citizens have a right to run for office, (5) right to  freedom of expression, (6) a 
right to access alternative sources of information and (7) a right to  associational autonomy 
(Dahl 1989 p .221).
O f course not all countries have such systems already in place. Some countries are 
not yet democratic and many others have only become democracies relatively recently and 
are not yet consolidated democracies. Illiberal (Zakaria 1997) and delegative (O ’Donnell 
1994) democracies are examples of nominally democratic regimes that lack many of the 
features of consolidated liberal democracies. It is unlikely that these systems will be able to 
introduce deliberative democracy straightaway, without developing a stable democratic 
regime first, as many of the preconditions I looked at in the previous two sections of the 
chapter will be missing, such as deeply rooted democratic values and a democratic political 
culture.
Many recently democratized or democratizing countries face severe cleavages within 
society. They may be emerging from civil war and have to  deal w ith conflict betw een 
different ethnic groups. Many countries suffer from the effects that years or decades of 
totalitarian regimes had on society and the political culture. It takes time for a more 
democratic political culture to take root and for new  institutions to become stable. Thus, 
the first aim of such countries is to establish a stable liberal representative democracy. 
Once this new system has earned the trust of all of society, there would also be greater 
willingness to  participate in deliberation and accept the outcomes of such procedures13.
In democratic regimes the rules of the democratic decision-making process are 
enshrined in w ritten  or unw ritten constitutions. These determ ine the way in which 
elections are carried out and policies are made. These constitutional rules provide 
legitimacy and stability for democratic laws and policies and are normally much more 
difficult to change than other laws and policies, requiring a supermajority o r even repeated
13 For an opposing argument see O ’Flynn 2006 and Dryzek 2006.
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supermajorities in the legislature. Thus, at the institutional level the rules of the game need 
to offer opportunities for deliberative reform  to be introduced.
Before I go on to discuss the potential opportunities and difficulties that introducing 
increased deliberation faces, I need to make two crucial points.
Firstly, aggregative, that is, voting based, and deliberative democracies lie on a 
continuum. W hat I call here liberal representative democracies already embody many of 
these deliberative elements. Yet deliberative theorists argue that the level of deliberation in 
politics is not high enough. Politicians do not offer the kind of reasoned justifications that 
should be required of them  (Gutmann and Thompson 1996). Citizens and politicians are 
not engaged in a process of exchanging reasons and reaching well-reasoned judgments 
together. Instead politics centres around powerful interest groups, lobbying, office-seeking 
politicians, disinterested and disenchanted citizens and so on. Yet, it is crucial to  realise 
that while voting is the most visible form of politics that the average citizen engages in, it is 
by no means all there is to political life. Professional politicians, civil society, the media 
and even ordinary citizens debate among each other. Thus, while one could definitely 
argue for an im provem ent in the quality of debate and maybe even in its quantity, the 
deliberative project is by necessity about improvement and not about the creation of a 
completely new political reality.
Secondly, there is no consensus about the type of reforms that could best increase 
the quality and quantity of deliberation in democratic politics. Some of the m ost well- 
known theories envisage large-scale reform (Ackermann and Fishkin 2004). Yet most 
empirical studies of deliberation focus on cases where small local groups discuss a carefully 
defined issue (Fung and W right 2003, Gastil and Levine 200S). W hile these deliberative 
processes share much normative ground, they would be very different from  each other in 
practice.
Much of the literature assumes that deliberative reforms should take the form of 
introducing new, deliberative political institutions alongside existing ones. These reforms 
assume substantial institutional change, whether that involves nationwide deliberative polls 
(Ackermann and Fishkin 2004) or compulsory deliberative jury duty (Leib 2004).
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Habermas’s deliberative ideas (1996), while not clearly defined as far as practical 
im plem entation is concerned, also seem to call for far-reaching change. It is usually 
difficult to introduce institutional changes which are this substantial. In many countries 
they require constitutional reform , which needs to be approved by a super-majority. The 
question is whether politicians would have incentives to introduce such wide-ranging 
deliberative reforms.
In their detailed analysis of what deliberation day might look like, Ackermann and 
Fishkin (2004) describe the increased pressures US presidential candidates would face 
during their campaigns if the new institutions were introduced. N ot only would citizens 
discuss the issues and candidates during the course of a special nation-wide deliberation day 
held before each election, but the most common questions would also be addressed by 
candidates in a televised debate. Presidential candidates would be evaluated based on 
different criteria than they are now once they had to face deliberation day. This would 
increase uncertainty about the outcome of elections and the established campaign machine 
would need to be significantly modified to  deal with these changed circumstances. And it 
would not even be guaranteed that citizens would be interested in this new institution and 
would keep turning up every four years.
Deliberation day would change the electoral system by making voters m ore 
informed about candidates and by possibly changing the position of the median voter, 
thereby increasing candidates’ uncertainty about the policies that will be attractive to the 
median voter who is considered to be decisive in an election. O ther arrangements, such as 
deliberative assemblies, would add new veto players to the political landscape or could 
change the agenda-setting and gate-keeping powers of political actors.
Given these pressures, incumbents may not be very amenable to  introducing new  
deliberative institutions. They have a vested interest in preserving the status quo, since this 
is what brought them  into pow er and allows them to stay in power. Even in the case of 
lame duck politicians, their close ties to their party and political allies who still face further 
elections halt their hands when they consider dabbling in deliberative experiments. W e 
m ust rem em ber that deliberative institutions along the lines of deliberation day are not
59 of 257
Chapter Two: The Preconditions of Deliberative Democracy
m inor changes and could alter the status quo drastically. Deliberation is only one option 
available to politicians for resolving conflict. And this alternative becomes attractive to 
politicians only when other alternatives are unfeasible (Leach and Sabatier 2005).
Politicians are of course not purely office-seeking. They also have process-oriented 
concerns (Bowler et al. 2006); that is, they care about the fairness and adequacy of the 
system that can bring them into power. In general, elites are more, partial towards 
democratic values (Sullivan and Transue 1999) than the general population. Thus, they 
may find the idea of increased deliberation attractive in itself. But concern for the quality 
of democratic processes is only rew arded by the electorate to a limited extent. Thus, on 
the supply-side of democratic innovations politicians will have little motivation to 
introduce deliberative institutions.
Furtherm ore, there is also a lack of popular demand for these institutions. There is 
no immediately obvious urgent need to make democracy m ore deliberative. The 
introduction of secret ballots was a reaction to  the threat of voter intimidation and bribery, 
acts that both politicians and citizens w ere rightfully concerned about, as they distorted 
elections unacceptably. W hat threat to democratic ideas does deliberative democracy 
respond to? Deliberation might respond to the widespread feeling that there is a 
democratic deficit due to voter apathy and distrust in politicians (Hibbing and Theiss- 
Morse 2002). These are certainly themes which are taken up regularly by politicians, civil 
society groups and the media. But the idea of increased deliberation betw een citizens does 
not appear to have caught on outside the academic sphere, despite relatively widely 
publicised deliberative experiments. Major w orld newspapers14 have only referred to 
‘deliberative democracy’ 147 times and ‘deliberative poll’ 204 times since the early 1990s. 
W hile general apathy and disenchantment w ith politics is frequently evoked, m ore 
deliberative arrangements are not mentioned as a possible solution.
One could argue that the reason for this is the relative novelty of the deliberative 
project. But participatory democracy, which has been popular in academia for a much 
longer tim e, has failed to  catch on as well. The lack of enthusiasm reveals a lack of
14 As identified by LexisNexis on 3rd September 2008.
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motivation and incentives on the part of citizens to embrace costly, tim e and resource­
consuming deliberative reforms. Deliberative democracy fails where participatory 
democracy has failed — there is a sense of disbelief that it will work, that corrupt politicians 
and busy citizens can make it work (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). Thus, deliberative 
democracy is not well-known and popular enough and the need for it is not strong enough 
to entice politicians to support large-scale reforms. But smaller, m ore incremental 
improvements may be m ore likely to succeed.
If deliberation will not be introduced from above, another possibility is to  introduce 
it from below — through local governm ent and civil society initiatives. Reforms could take 
the form of establishing small scale formal deliberative groups or encouraging informal 
deliberation among the wider electorate. This would circumvent the lack of political will 
on the national level and may motivate ordinary citizens to participate m ore directly.
Most documented deliberative or quasi-deliberative projects are such grass-roots 
initiatives. Fung (2004) gives the example of initiatives in the Chicago police and state 
school systems which give residents and parents greater input into how those services are 
run. Fung’s study finds that such citizen involvement had a significant positive impact. I 
have already mentioned the participatory budget projects in Brazil. This project was first 
introduced in Porto Alegre after the left-wing PT party won the city’s municipal elections. 
This process allows residents to set their own priorities for the city’s annual budget 
through a series of meetings. The general population only participates in the first meeting, 
where participants for further, ongoing deliberative groups are selected. The scheme was 
adopted by other cities as well, with varying success. But these projects are affected by the 
problem of individual motivation to participate in politics.
Moreover, even if citizens have the will to get together and deliberate, their 
decisions still need to  be implemented rather than ignored. Cohen and Rogers (2003) 
point out that the success of such projects is often ensured because there is a political will 
to carry out the kinds of policies favoured by the deliberative groups, and this will would 
have existed even without any kind of deliberative procedure. Thus, these projects were 
successful because their decisions coincided with those preferred by individuals, groups
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and institutions that were part of the existing pow er structure. This can be seen in Porto 
Alegre where the results of participatory budget coincided with the PT party’s aims, such 
as increasing taxes.
Secondly, Cohen and Rogers argue that another indicator of success is that these 
projects focus on a relatively small and well-defined area of public policy. Citizens are not 
required to set their own agenda and have to decide within budgetary constraints which are 
imposed on them  from outside. They also need to learn about a relatively limited area of 
policy-making. This simplifies their task considerably and does not pose excessive cognitive 
demands.
The current state of empirical research into deliberation does not yet tell us what 
distinguishes successful deliberative enterprises from  unsuccessful ones. The reason for this 
is that only successful cases are studied in detail. It would be interesting to see m ore 
studies of deliberative projects that have failed  in order to  identify which independent 
variables cause success or failure.
A second possibility is to strengthen the deliberative elements of existing 
institutions. Consociational (Lijphart 1999) democracies encourage m ore consensual 
decision-making. Countries such as Switzerland are characterised by cleavages along ethnic 
lines that necessitate a democratic system that ensures that minorities are included in 
politics. Such democracies usually feature proportional representation and broad 
coalitions. Steiner et al. (2004) argue that consociational democracies are m ore 
deliberative, as arguments for policies will need to be m ore inclusive.
Legislatures are already deliberative institutions, although the kind of deliberation 
present there is often very different from the kind of deliberation advocated by political 
theorists. Legislatures are by their very nature adversarial arenas, where divisions about 
m ost issues exist along party lines. Steiner et al. (2003, 2004) developed a discourse 
quality index which is a quantitative measure of how far political discourse in legislatures 
approximates deliberative ideals. The index measures w hether legislators were able to 
state their arguments without interruptions, the level and content of justifications offered,
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the respect legislators showed towards other groups and other arguments and the extent to 
which political discourse aimed at building a consensus.
They applied this index to legislative debates in Switzerland, Germany, the UK and 
the US (Steiner et al. 2004). They found the largest differences w ith regards to the level of 
respect legislators displayed towards others. They hypothesised that the quality of 
discourse would be higher in consociational and presidential systems, where the num ber of 
veto players is large, in second chambers, when the debates were not public and when 
issues under discussion were not polarised. The strongest evidence was in favour of 
consociational systems, veto players, second chambers and non-public arenas. The 
difference betw een different kinds of systems was in any case relatively small. As the 
authors emphasize, these systems are not worlds apart from each other. However, they 
argue that subtle differences can change the culture of political debates in the longer term . 
But many of the institutional variables that Steiner et al. found to make a difference would 
face opposition for the same reasons that m ore sweeping deliberative reforms would. 
Switching to proportional representation or grand coalitions would also alter the political 
game significantly.
Legislatures are far from the only political institutions that could build on existing 
deliberative practices. In fact most democratic institutions qualify. Deliberation already 
plays a m ajor part in judicial systems. Under common law jurisdictions citizens participate 
directly through the jury system and even in the absence of juries, judges are required to 
deliberate.
Executives could become m ore deliberative in two broad ways. Firstly, deliberation 
within the executive could be encouraged. This, however, is problematic as there is a lack 
of publicity of executive decision-making processes. Secondly, the executive could 
commission groups of citizens to conduct debates on its behalf, along the lines of citizen 
juries. Governing parties already make extensive use of focus groups, bu t their primary 
purpose is often to allow parties to stay in power. If the decisions citizen juries reach are 
regularly at odds with the governm ent’s own policy positions, this can endanger this 
project. This has been the case in Britain where New Labour has initially favoured
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experimenting w ith citizen juries, but eventually decided to abandon them  (W akeford 
2002). Unfortunately, deliberative ideas such as allowing people to  com m ent on 
governm ent policy through an online forum on the Downing Street web site are often 
symbolic gestures that have no effect on actual policy-making (W right 2006).
Public services could organise stakeholder meetings in order to  allow their clients to 
have m ore input into how they are run. This is especially useful for public services which 
are active locally, such as healthcare providers, schools or the police. Nevertheless, the 
importance of mechanisms that make sure that the input of citizens is then taken into 
account cannot be stressed enough. It would be very easy for large bureaucratic 
organisations to organise consultative forums in order to  comply with regulations, but then 
to ignore the outcomes.
Many European countries have state broadcasting services, which citizens have to 
support through a television license. The stated purpose of such services is often to  provide 
television and radio programs which commercial channels are less likely to produce. They 
are usually also obligated to  provide impartial news services. These could be strengthened 
to provide a real deliberative platform where representatives from  all groups would 
receive equal airtime and equal respect. O f course, not all citizens are going to watch these 
programs, but those who do could be exposed to different viewpoints as well as to  the idea 
that those viewpoints should be respected equally15. The media could also serve to  foster 
informal deliberative debates.
This brief list illustrates that there are already a wealth of deliberative institutions 
present in democratic societies. The first task of any serious deliberative democrat m ust be 
to  strengthen these institutions rather than to re-design the entire political system to 
accommodate new  ones. This would of course change the character of the deliberative 
democracy project. It would make it less ambitious, it would make it appear less ground­
breaking, but at the same time it would also become m ore realistic and easier to  embrace 
for politicians who will have to legislate and im plem ent reforms.
15 And there is evidence that those who do so are also more likely to be opinion leaders who engage actively 
in civic duties (Scheufele and Shah 2000).
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The question arises why such smaller-scale reforms have not already taken place and 
why there is no wide-spread call for such reforms. I believe the reason is that there is a lack 
of incentives for their introduction both for politicians and citizens. Citizens have no 
interest or tim e to participate and would get relatively little benefit out of getting involved 
in political deliberation. Thus, we return  to the problem  of motivation. Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse (2002) argue that most citizens would like democratic politics to function 
without intervention on their part, like a perpetuum  mobile producing good policy 
decisions. According to their findings citizens underestim ate the deep divisions that exist 
about policy m atters and believe that politics would function very well w ithout their help 
if only politicians and bureaucrats were not so inefficient, incom petent, selfish and 
rem oved from the reality of the wishes of ordinary people.
Yet liberal representative democracy appears to  w ork m ore or less as intended, 
which means that neither politicians, nor citizens will desire to  change it drastically — 
especially if this required increased effort on the part of citizens and increased risk for 
politicians. In order for deliberative democracy to  be successful, the case for deliberation 
needs to be very strong, both with respect to the theory and the practice of democratic 
deliberation.
Conclusion
Most of deliberative democracy’s preconditions do exist. Individuals have the right 
cognitive resources and attitudes to participate in some form of deliberation, even though 
its quality may not be ideal. There is also enough trust, social capital and homogeneity in 
most W estern liberal societies to  make deliberation possible. The preconditions that might 
be lacking are the individual motivation and the political will to deliberate.
O n the institutional level grass roots reform  is likely to  be m ore realistic than large- 
scale reform . However, there are tw o problems with such an approach. First of all, grass 
roots efforts require citizens to become m ore active. As the assumption that citizens will
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be motivated to participate is a problematic one, this may be difficult to achieve. There are 
already many examples of meetings that local residents could attend, such as the planning 
permission meetings of the local council. However, attendance at such events is low. This 
might be due to the fact that citizens do not feel that they will achieve anything by 
attending. Thus, in order for grass roots deliberation to  attract interest, residents need to 
feel that their attendance makes a real impact and the costs of attending need to be kept 
low.
But even then participation in tow n hall meetings is likely to be infrequent or limited 
to few participants. Even if residents are willing to attend, only the m ost com m itted will 
do so on a frequent basis. Such low and irregular attendance is in tu rn  unlikely to  change 
the political culture significantly. And w ithout a cultural change deliberation may not 
move above a grass roots level. A m ore promising route to increased deliberation is 
through existing institutions.
Thus, while the basic preconditions of deliberative democracy do exist, making 
democracy m ore deliberative will face problems of individual motivation and political will. 
However, these obstacles may be overcome if it can be shown that deliberative democracy 
has significant advantages over liberal representative democracy, by increasing democratic 
legitimacy or by producing better outcomes. Over the coming chapters I will therefore 
explore both procedural and epistemic justifications of deliberative democracy and 
endeavour to assess the m odel’s overall value as compared to liberal representative 
democracy.
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C h a p t e r  T h r e e  
D e l i b e r a t i o n  a n d  R a t i o n a l i t y
The next few chapters will focus on the different arguments that have been put forward to 
justify deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy can be justified on epistemic 
grounds16, but it is often justified on procedural grounds instead. Accordingly, values 
inherent in the deliberative decision-making process itself make the resulting decisions 
legitimate (Coleman and Ferejohn 1986). W hile some of these values may already be 
satisfied by other decision-making arrangements, such as liberal representative democracy, 
we would expect deliberative democracy to exhibit them  to a higher degree. Deliberative 
democracy can be defined in such procedural term s as decision-making through reasoned, 
other-regarding, un-coerced, equal and inclusive debate. This chapter focuses on the values 
of reasoned and other-regarding discussion, while the next chapter will focus on inclusion 
and equality.
According to procedural accounts of deliberative democracy, the communicative and 
reason-giving process that takes place during deliberation is one of the main sources of its 
legitimacy. The preferences, choices and their justifications by individuals that are 
expected to exist during such a process are crucially different from those we would expect 
based on the assumptions made by social choice and rational choice theory. These 
differences stem from basing deliberative democracy on the theory of communicative 
rationality and from laying down standards of reciprocity and reason-giving for deliberative 
debates. Thus, these procedural values depend to a large extent on the model of rationality 
that is used to underpin them . Therefore, in this chapter I will examine both the 
procedural justification that deliberative democracy derives its value from the fact that it is 
comprised of other-regarding, reasoned debate and the m odel of rationality that underlies 
this assumption.
16 I focus on epistemic justifications of deliberative democracy in chapter six.
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One of the m ost significant points made by deliberative democrats is that we should 
expect citizens’ preferences to change in the political forum. Earlier models of democracy, 
especially ones that are based on rational or social choice theory, take preferences to  be 
fixed. Each individual citizen enters the political arena with fully form ed, rational 
preferences in place and the function of the political process is to aggregate these inputs 
into a collective output or policy choice. Minimalist conceptions of democracy (for 
example, Riker 1982) could also be accused of taking a non-cognitivist view of preferences 
and voting. Thus, these theories do not require votes to be the product of a reflective 
process aimed at identifying the best decision, no m atter how we define ‘best’. Preferences 
are viewed as rational insofar as they fulfil a set of basic conditions that ensures that 
individuals do not hold contradictory positions, but minimal conceptions of democracy 
remain silent about the origin of those preferences or the extent to which they correspond 
to the actual interests of individuals.
The theory of deliberative democracy, on the other hand, assumes that the political 
process will contribute to shaping these preferences or inputs. This can happen in tw o 
ways. Firstly, it may be reasonable to suppose that citizens do not have fully form ed 
preferences in place. Deliberation can thus have a function of preference formation, as citizens 
are required to articulate their preferences in the public forum as well as listen to the 
preferences of others and increase their factual knowledge. Secondly, these processes may 
also lead deliberators to change the preferences they already have in place, thereby 
inducing preference transformation. Theories of deliberative democracy shift the focus to the 
creation and transformation of preferences through reciprocal, reasoned discussion. Thus, 
“the m ore collective decision-making processes approximate this [deliberative] model the 
m ore increases the presum ption of their legitimacy and rationality” (Benhabib 1996, 69).
This chapter will examine the belief and preference forming and transforming 
characteristics of deliberative democracy and the claims that these will increase the 
legitimacy of democratic decision-making processes. There are two approaches that rely on 
rationality and reason to furnish deliberative decision-making processes w ith legitimacy. 
The first approach is best exemplified by Dryzek (1990, 2000, 2006), who argues that
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deliberative or discursive democracy best embodies the values of communicative 
rationality. The best-known version of the second approach is found in the work of 
Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 2004), who argue that the legitimacy of deliberative 
democracy is based on a few of its m ost salient characteristics, first and forem ost 
reciprocity.
In the first section of the chapter, I examine these two approaches and the way in 
which a communicative conception of rationality influences the procedural values of 
reasoned debate and other-regardingness. In the second section, I look at three comm on 
mechanisms of human rationality that contradict the assumptions of deliberative 
democrats: conformity, biased interpretations of expert evidence and framing. Finally, I 
assess the accuracy of these assumptions and their importance to the deliberative project.
Deliberative Reason
Communicative versus Instrumental Rationality
The theory of deliberative democracy is often taken to  be founded on Habermas’s 
discourse ethics and theory of communicative action.17 For many authors discourse ethics 
provides the best framework for explaining the validity and legitimacy claims of 
deliberative democracy (Benhabib 1996, Dryzek 1990, 2000). Dryzek (1990, 1996, 2000, 
2006) has articulated this view most coherently; therefore, I will focus here on his work.
As m ost deliberative democrats, Dryzek (2000) sees democracy as an open-ended 
project and models of democracy as blueprints for further democratization. He argues that 
this democratization takes place in three directions; increasing the scope of issues subject 
to deliberative decision-making processes, expanding the range of participants and 
increasing the authenticity of deliberative decision-making processes (Dryzek 1996).
17 In this chapter I am concerned with the way in which the theory of communicative rationality is used in 
the deliberative democracy literature, where communicative action and rationality take on a broader and 
less precise meaning, rather than in Habermas’s work itself.
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Authenticity is “the degree to which democratic control is substantive rather than symbolic, 
informed rather than ignorant and competently engaged” (Dryzek 1996, p .5), and 
“[a]uthentic democracy can be said to exist to the degree that reflective preferences 
influence collective outcomes” (Dryzek 2002, p .2). He argues that currently the most 
substantial scope for democratization exists in increasing the authenticity of democratic 
regimes. For Dryzek, this can only be achieved through a deliberative, or as he puts it, 
discursive model of democracy. Discursive democracy increases legitimacy by facilitating 
the further democratization of politics through widening the control citizens have over 
politics through the participation of autonomous and com petent actors (Dryzek 1996, 
2000).
Dryzek then sets out to develop a theory of discursive democracy that takes account 
of the deliberative turn , but is founded on critical theory rather than liberalism. He sees 
liberalism as too closely intertw ined with a capitalist mode of production and existing 
pow er structures to be able to  function as the foundation of a m ore authentic model of 
democracy. And if critical theory is the m ost viable alternative to liberalism, then the most 
viable alternative to the theory of instrumental rationality dominant in political science is 
the theory of communicative action and rationality (Dryzek 1990).
Communicative rationality and instrumental rationality18 are often portrayed as 
competing models, w ith the form er offering a better support for the theory of deliberation 
than the latter. Instrumental or strategic rationality is the conception of rationality used in 
economics and it is also widely adopted by political scientists. This is the theory of 
rationality that forms the basis of rational choice theory and social choice theory as 
conventionally interpreted. Instrumental rationality takes the ends which individuals want 
to  pursue as given. Rational individuals then act based on their beliefs about how to bring 
those ends about.
According to  the thin definition of instrumental rationality used in economics, 
individual preferences need to satisfy three basic conditions (Varian 1999), which make
18 Instrumental rationality is also referred to as strategic rationality. I opt for the term instrumental 
rationality, as it seems more neutral.
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them  representable by weak orderings. Specifically, preferences need to  be reflexive; meaning 
that each alternative x is weakly preferred to itself (that is, an agent is indifferent betw een x 
and itself). Second, preferences need to be complete: that is, individuals have to be capable 
of comparing any two alternatives; formally, for any tw o alternatives x and y ,  either x is 
weakly preferred to y  o r y  is weakly preferred to x (or both). Finally, preferences need to 
be transitive: if an individual weakly prefers x over y  and y  over z, she will also weakly 
prefer x over z. For rational decisions made under conditions of risky choice, von 
Neumann and M orgenstem  (1947) added other conditions, including the principle of 
substitution, requiring that if x is weakly preferred to y ,  then an even chance of getting x or z 
is weakly preferred to an even chance of getting y  or z.
Another, related set of conditions has been developed for the rationality of binary 
judgements (List and Pettit 2002), that is, acceptance/rejection attitudes over 
propositions. Firstly, individual judgem ent sets need to  be complete: for each proposition, 
individuals need to accept either the proposition or its negation. Secondly, judgm ent sets 
need to be (weakly) consistent: individuals cannot simultaneously accept a proposition and its 
negation. Thirdly, individual judgem ent sets need to be deductively closed: that is, 
individuals will have to accept the judgements that follow logically from the ones they have 
already made.
Habermas (1984, 1996) links instrumented rationality to strategic action, which he 
portrays as a teleological model of action where actors aim to ensure the success of their 
goals, and in the pursuit of this success adopt an objectifying attitude towards their 
environm ent and towards other actors. In contrast, Habermas bases his theory of 
deliberative democracy on his discourse theory of communicative action. Here the focus is on 
communication and understanding rather than successfully achieving an end. Furtherm ore, 
“[rjeaching an understanding functions as a mechanism for coordinating actions through the 
participants coming to an agreement concerning the claimed validity of their utterances, 
that is, through intersubjectively recognising the validity claims they reciprocally raise” 
(Habermas 1985, 163 emphasis in original).
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W hen a speaker makes a valid claim he or she claims that his statement is true, that 
the act implied by the statement is right with regards to the normative context that the 
claim is situated in and finally that the intentions of the speaker are sincere. Communicative 
reason makes it possible to  make valid claims and to determ ine when a claim is valid 
(Habermas 1996, 5).
The theories of communicative rationality and communicative action offer an 
explanation of how shared norms develop and are passed on over tim e, which do not 
m erely appear to serve the narrow interests of the individuals who adhere to them. 
Accordingly, a com m itm ent to normative standards reached through participating in 
speech acts can only be adequately explained by communicative rationality (Heath 2001). 
Agreeing to the reasons behind a normative statem ent means that we accept that 
statement. Once this is the case, we are constrained from acting for our own benefit only, 
as we now have to conform to these norms. Thus, the theory of communicative rationality 
tells us that we overlook the explanation for social cohesion by referring to instrumental 
rationality alone. The closest political manifestation of this communicative process is 
deliberation.
N ot all scholars writing on deliberative democracy reject the instrumental 
conception of rationality. Fung (2003) applies some of the theoretical foundations of 
rational choice theory in his work, while arguing against a strict rational choice view that 
does not allow for preference change or the existence of other-regarding preferences.
Supporters of communicative rationality often offer a definition of instrumental 
rationality that is easy to  attack, as it is so loosely defined. Instrumental rationality is often 
taken to imply selfish actions in politics that are aimed at maximising one’s own utility 
without taking into account the interests of others. However, a m ore precise definition of 
instrumental rationality that could be derived from  the rational choice literature is both 
narrow er and broader than this. The simplest definition one could give is that 
instrumentally rational actors choose their actions in a way that will let them  achieve their 
preferred outcom e given the beliefs they hold about the consequences of those actions. To 
give an example, if a student prefers to get a good grade on a course, he will choose
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studying over going to the cinema to watch a movie unconnected to  his studies, as this 
action is m ore likely to result in his preferred outcome. Such a definition does not tell us 
whether the actor’s preferences are selfish or no t — many people have a preference for 
seeing others do well — or where those preferences originate. M ore sophisticated models 
could take preference formation and change into account as well.
This definition is narrow er than the ‘selfish actor’ definition, because it does not tell 
us about the normative contents of actors’ preferences; their preference could be to help 
or to  harm others or it could be neither. At the same tim e this makes it also broader, as it 
can encompass m ore types of action and allows for non-selfish preferences.
In fact Dryzek (2000) accepts that instrumental rationality does no t equate to selfish 
preferences, but holds that it still cannot account for preference change. However, the fact 
that preferences are modelled as constant is m ore a reflection on the current limitations in 
modelling techniques rather than a limitation of the theory of instrum ental rationality 
itself. Preferences are usually held constant in order to  simplify the assumptions behind 
models and to reduce their complexity and newer, m ore complex models are also 
increasingly accommodating preference change. But there is nothing contradictory 
betw een an instrumental conception of rationality and preference change.
Reasoned Deliberation
The second argument for the legitimacy of deliberative democracy based on reasoned 
debate is also strongly procedural. Here the legitimacy of deliberative decision-making 
process is ensured through the normatively desirable properties of the reason-giving that 
characterises it. The m ost sustained version of this theory, which I am going to focus on 
here, has been put forward by Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 2004). Their work has 
become extremely influential in the deliberative democracy literature and many of the 
m ore recent empirical analyses build on their theory of political deliberation.
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For Gutmann and Thompson deliberative democracy is a process that is morally 
legitimate because it arrives at provisionally justified decisions19 that are justifiable to all 
citizens who are bound by them  (1996, 51). They give four reasons why deliberative 
democracy can achieve this. Firstly, by considering options in a reciprocal, reasoned 
debate, deliberation makes decisions m ore legitimate under conditions of scarcity.
“The hard choices that democratic governments make under these 
circumstances should be m ore acceptable even to  those who receive less than 
they deserve if everyone’s claims have been considered on their m erits rather 
than on the basis of wealth, status or power. Even with regard to political 
decisions with which they disagree, citizens are likely to take a different 
attitude towards those that are adopted after careful consideration of the 
relevant conflicting moral claims and those that are adopted only after 
calculation of the relative strength of the competing political interests.” 
(Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 41-42)
W e must note that Gutmann and Thompson are concerned w ith the m orality and 
legitimacy of democracy in its everyday process, in the ordinary interactions between 
citizens, civil society, the media, politicians and political institutions. They distance 
themselves both from pure proceduralists, whom they see as only providing moral 
foundations for democratic processes, and contractualists, whom they see as concerned 
with whether democracy arrives at moral outcomes, while both neglect the morality of 
actual proceedings in democratic politics. Thus, for them , even those who get less than 
what they deserve should accept the legitimacy of outcomes if the process through which 
those outcomes were produced was sufficiently moral. This morality is then derived from 
fair and reasoned deliberation that is first of all reciprocal.
Gutmann and Thompson offer three m ore arguments in favour of deliberative 
democracy. Deliberation encourages citizens to  take a broader, m ore other-regarding
19 Only provisionally justified, as they could be revised at a later date.
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perspective of politics, thereby resulting in a m ore generous, less selfish and, once again, 
m ore moral decision-making process. It also helps citizens to “distinguish among the 
moral, the amoral and the imm oral” (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 43) and sort selfish 
claims from  other-regarding ones. Finally, learning through deliberation increases the 
moral knowledge and understanding of citizens, thereby further reinforcing the 
justification of decisions. From this brief summary, we can immediately see that the 
procedural characteristics of deliberative reasoning are of crucial importance for Gutmann 
and Thompson for making the m odel of deliberative democracy m ore legitimate than other 
models of democracy, and that it achieves this by producing justifiable decisions through a 
moral process.
These procedural characteristics are supposed to be the inescapable consequences of 
political deliberation. W hile deliberative democrats who base the legitimacy of their m odel 
of democracy to  a large extent on these characteristics (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 
2004, Benhabib 1996, Fung 2004, Ackermann and Fishkin 2004) acknowledge that citizens 
will not be transformed instantly into other-regarding altruists offering well-reasoned 
moral arguments, they argue that giving deliberation greater importance in politics will 
lead to a gradual increase in these desirable properties. As a result deliberation will change 
the rationality of political interaction itself. Instead of the rationality depicted in public 
choice models where agents w ith fixed preferences try to  maximise their utility leading to 
apathetic voters, loss-making, bloated bureaucracies and strategic politicians, the 
rationality of deliberative democracy will centre around the reciprocal reasons and other- 
regarding preferences generated by a deliberative discussion.
I will now examine in m ore detail the four main characteristics of deliberative 
rationality as described by this model. Firstly, deliberation demands reciprocity, or the 
mutual exchange of public justifications for judgements and preferences. Secondly, 
deliberation is preference transforming, both by requiring participants to become other- 
regarding rather than basing their preferences solely on their own self-interest and by 
inducing meta-agreement or in other words agreement over the most im portant dimensions 
of the decision to be made. Finally, rational learning takes place during deliberation,
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thereby improving the extent to  which individuals’ preferences correspond to their own 
and their comm unity’s best interests.
Reciprocity
One of the m ost im portant conditions for deliberation, endorsed across the entire 
literature on deliberative democracy, is that it should be characterised by reciprocity 
(Benhabib 1996, Gutmann and Thompson 1996, Fung 2004). Reciprocity requires 
participants (1) to justify their judgements and preferences in term s that are acceptable to 
other, reasonable individuals (2) and to be willing to listen to arguments presented by 
others in a similarly publicly oriented way. Thus, deliberative democracy makes use of the 
Rawlsian idea of public reason (Rawls 1993).
Deliberation increases the rationality and reasonableness of decisions by requiring 
delibcrators to  justify their judgements and preferences publicly. It increases its rationality, 
because deliberators will be m ore aware of what is in their own best interest and well as in 
the best interest of others. It increases reasonableness, as it increases the extent to which 
deliberative debates are based on shared norms, such as fairness. Reciprocity defines the 
kinds of reasons that are acceptable for such justifications. These reasons take into account 
that political deliberation will take place in pluralistic societies (Cohen 1996) where not all 
citizens share the same worldview or comprehensive doctrine. Any decision that can be 
justified publicly must be acceptable to all citizens, no m atter what comprehensive 
doctrine they hold. This makes reciprocity not only a source of rationality, but also of 
legitimacy.
Reasons are acceptable firstly, if substantive moral reasoning appeals to premises 
which individuals could plausibly accept from the perspective of their particular 
comprehensive doctrine, even if they do not in fact do so, and secondly, if they appeal to 
premises which rely on empirical evidence that can be tested according to reliable methods 
of enquiry (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 56).
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Reciprocity is not as demanding as it may appear at first sight. It is less demanding 
than impartiality (Gutmann and Thompson 1996), since it only requires that reasons given 
should be acceptable to others, and not that they m ust be given from an impersonal, 
universalistic viewpoint. Individuals do not need to  agree with an argument in order to 
find it acceptable. Acceptability simply means that those reasons cannot be shown to 
violate the fair terms of cooperation (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 78) that all citizens 
should be committed to.
Furthermore, adhering to the principle of reciprocity should not disallow individuals 
to support or to object to policies based on the effect that they will have on individuals or 
communities who hold a certain comprehensive doctrine in a pluralistic society, as these 
effects would constitute plausible empirical evidence. For example, in a case where certain 
outcomes or decisions would deeply offend the religious beliefs of some individuals, these 
individuals could introduce this into the public debate not on the grounds that it offended 
their God, something which would be a contentious statem ent, but that it offended them 
as individuals and failed to offer them  the necessary respect that an other-regarding, 
deliberative decision-making system should offer its citizens. The latter reason would be 
acceptable in the public forum , as the individuals affected could offer it as evidence of the 
effects of the decisions. This would be one piece of evidence among many, which could 
then be weighed in an impartial and other-regarding m anner, thus those whose sentiments 
are easily offended would not be able to veto decisions simply on the grounds that they are 
offensive to them. Once again, this highlights the key role of other-regarding preferences.
Reciprocity contributes to the legitimacy of deliberative decisions for a num ber of 
reasons. Firstly, reciprocity gives the process of deliberation a normative, moral value. 
Secondly, citizens are m ore likely to accept defeat in democratic politics if they feel that 
their views have received a fair hearing and if they find the reasons offered for this decision 
acceptable. Thirdly, offering reciprocally acceptable reasons in political discussions is a 
source of respect. Finally, reciprocity contributes to  the development of other-regarding 
preferences and hence contributes to preference transform ation and formation.
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Other-Regarding Preferences
Other-regarding preferences are central to the theory of deliberative democracy and are of 
key importance in its functions of preference form ation and preference transformation. 
These are the ethical or social preferences of individuals which are activated when 
collective choices need to be made (Goodin and Roberts 1975). Accordingly, ideal 
deliberation only draws on non-selfish preferences that take account of the effects of 
decisions on the well-being of others.
Let us consider in m ore detail what it means to be other-regarding. O ther-regarding 
preferences presuppose a capacity for empathy. This empathy needs to be accompanied by a 
concern for the welfare of others — not only do we need to be able to understand the feelings of 
others; we also need a motivation to react to those feelings20. These two together enable us 
to act in a non-selfish or other-regarding way. The preference orderings of other-regarding 
individuals take the preferences and beliefs of others as well as the effects that policies have 
on others into account (Fung 2004).
Humans appear to be unique in their ability for altruistic behaviour which extends 
beyond those related to us by blood — even to strangers or members of another species 
(Silk et al. 2005). Actions are altruistic in the strict sense if we help others when this does 
not benefit us personally and may even prove to be costly. Altruistic behaviour can provide 
significant psychological benefits to individuals. Experiments, using game-theoretic 
designs, also show that significant other-regarding behaviour exists among people 
(Hoffman et al. 1996, Frohlich e t al. 2004).
It is im portant to note that other-regardingness does not mean that all arguments 
presented during debate have to  refer to some greater good. Such a requirem ent would 
indeed be m uch too idealistic and it would also disable us from feeling empathy towards 
others as we w ould not find out how those others felt. Deliberators should be perfectly
20 One could presumably imagine someone who is endowed with empathy, understands others’ feelings, 
but then chooses to use this information to hurt those around him.
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free to explain what they believe to be in their best interest, and how a decision would 
affect them  personally. But these claims should be presented as part of an exchange of 
information that contributes to the function of learning through deliberation, rather than as 
demands or bargaining chips.
W hile other-regarding preferences might be present before the start of deliberation, 
this is no t a necessary precondition for its success, as the deliberative procedure itself could 
trigger their formation. This is what Elster (1998) calls the “civilizing force of hypocrisy” 
and Goodin (1986) calls the “laundering of preferences”. W hat is necessary is that every 
group m em ber should respect, or should be forced to respect, the rule that arguments put 
forward have to be based on m ore than narrow individual self-interest, or even the interest 
of a small group. But as deliberation is a repeated process, and individuals have to repeat 
these other-regarding arguments time and time again, eventually they will genuinely adopt 
them in order to  avoid the cognitive dissonance that thinking one way and arguing another 
would create (Miller 1992). Thus, non-selfish attitudes are created which once again allow 
groups to  w ork towards the mutually most acceptable outcom e. And even if they come to 
be expressed publicly, selfish or repulsive preferences will be challenged and defeated 
during the deliberative process (Dryzek 2000). Alternatively, Goodin (1986) suggests that 
we already hold both egoistic and ethical preferences, and that ethical preferences are 
already activated in situations where it is rational to do so, like elections or indeed 
deliberation.
Once again, it is im portant to emphasize that deliberative democrats only expect an 
increase in other-regarding attitudes as a result of participating in deliberative discussion, 
rather than a total and immediate transformation of citizens’ preferences (Gutmann and 
Thompson 1996).
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Meta-Agreement
The third aspect of deliberation that I would like to  discuss here is its supposed ability to 
create agreement on the meta-level. Even if substantive agreement cannot be reached over 
specific options, deliberation should help the group to define what the relevant dimensions 
are that they disagree over (List 2004). Citizens often do not hold well-reasoned positions 
and clear preference orderings over issues, but participating in deliberation may help them 
to achieve this (Benhabib 1996). Quasi-experiments in deliberative polling seem to 
confirm the hypothesis that deliberative discussion increases preference structuration (List 
et al. 2007, Farrar et al. forthcoming); that is, m ore individuals tend to  order their 
preferences along the same structuring dimension. The classic examples for such 
structuring dimension include the left-right continuum in politics and the ‘guns and b u tte r’ 
two-dimensional space, where ‘guns’ stand for defence spending and ‘b u tte r’ stands for 
economic spending.
Thus, deliberation followed by voting has a procedural advantage over voting alone, 
as it ensures that most voters will evaluate issues according to the same parameters. And as 
we will see in chapter five, even if no substantive consensus emerges during the 
deliberative debate, m eta-agreem ent helps to overcome some of the adverse affects of 
voting that social choice theory predicts.
Meta-agreement can be the result of becoming better informed about issues during 
deliberation (Farrar et al 2003). As the nature of the issues becomes clearer to individuals 
they might change their preference ordering based on new information in order to make it 
more compatible with underlying issue dimensions. They might also change their mind 
about the relative importance of issue dimensions.
The importance of deliberation might then become that it facilitates the development 
of single-peaked preference orderings across a group, and as a consequence makes it m ore 
likely that a mutually acceptable or at least representative outcome is found. This is 
somewhat removed from the normatively m ore ambitious objectives discussed until now,
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as it simply aims at creating the structural preconditions of agreement. However, we need 
to keep in mind that what deliberative democrats are after is not a simple compromise. 
Instead, reaching agreement on the meta-level complements all the other defining 
characteristics of democratic deliberation; inclusiveness, non-selfishness, correcting 
incorrect beliefs, and so on.
Deliberation as Education21
The final big advantage that deliberative democrats ascribe to  deliberation is that it helps 
m em bers of the group attain new information and correct incorrect factual beliefs. This 
contributes to the preference transforming quality of deliberation. Accordingly, 
“ .. .dialogue does not serve simply to clarify positions or to induce a change of preferences. 
Its purpose is to deepen knowledge about a problem ” (Pellizzoni 2001, 67). This benefits 
both those who hold factually incorrect beliefs, and those who have no clear beliefs over an 
issue. By sharing information with each other, members of the group ensure that beliefs 
that are obviously wrong will be corrected (Miller 1992).
W ithout discussion not all group members will be informed enough to make a 
reasoned judgem ent or to have clear preference orderings over a set of outcomes 
(Benhabib 1996). W hile deliberation will not result in all group m em bers holding 
complete information, as this is impossible, it will at least result in group m em bers having 
well-reasoned preferences (Manin 1987). By finding out m ore about an issue each of us can 
clear up any inconsistencies that might be present in our preference orderings. Making 
deliberators ’ information m ore complete about issues allows them  to present better 
justifications for their positions and is crucial in making deliberative debates m ore 
reasoned.
21 Some aspects of deliberative learning will be examined in a later chapter on the epistemic justification of 
deliberative democracy.
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It is argued that deliberation serves these purposes well by enabling group m em bers 
with m ore than average knowledge about a subject to share this information. Deliberation 
also helps individuals to find out m ore about the beliefs and preferences of others (Nino
1996). It allows participants to share narratives and points of view which are not available 
to other members of society. Additionally, deliberative groups might also draw on outside 
experts to make a m ore informed decision. Experiments in deliberative polling show that 
the extent to which participants are able to answer factual questions correctly increases 
significantly after deliberation (Luskin et al. 2002). They also appear to  confirm that 
learning through deliberation leads to significant changes in individual policy positions 
(Luskin et al. 2002, Farrar et al. forthcoming).
Incomplete information is one of the problems that rational choice models based on 
instrumental rationality have to face. Hence, deliberative democracy can be seen to  
increase the rationality of individual decision-making by contributing to  making 
information m ore complete and thus to  help individuals form preferences which represent 
their own interests, as well as the interests of others, m ore accurately.
Problems o f  Rationality
Thus, a crucial difference betw een deliberative democracy and other forms of politics is 
that it uses a different ideal of rationality in everyday politics. For the most part it rejects a 
rational or social choice theoretic view of rational political behaviour in favour of a m odel 
of communicative rationality in the case of Dryzek o r reciprocity and other-regarding 
preferences in the case of Gutmann and Thompson. W hile the first version of the theory 
seeks to replace instrumental rationality with communicative rationality, the second 
version of the theory does not reject instrumental rationality in its entirety, but instead 
argues that m ost instances of its use in political science are much too pessimistic and
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But would real-life deliberation correspond to the picture of reasoned, preference 
transforming deliberation that emerges throughout the literature? This picture is different 
in significant ways from basic notions of instrumental rationality. The theory of 
deliberative democracy tells us that individual preferences in the public deliberative 
context must originate in a discussion characterised by reciprocal reasoning. W hile 
individuals may be aware of their own best interests, the interests of others must also shape 
their final preferences. This is achieved through an expectation that preferences will 
become other-regarding. The learning that takes place during deliberation contributes to 
rationality too by increasing the knowledge of deliberators and bringing them closer to 
identifying their preferences and the effect of policies on others correctly. Finally, m eta­
agreement ensures that the deliberative group’s decisions are made based on the same 
grounds and are thus not irrational in an Arrowian sense.
I will now present three problems, which may contradict this picture of deliberative 
rationality: conformity, problems with interpreting expert evidence and framing. They are 
by no means the only problems which could threaten a m ore idealised view of deliberative 
rationality. Among others we might also encounter problem s of manipulation, group 
polarization or problems of inequality within the group. These mechanisms w ork against 
the development of communicative understanding betw een deliberators and each of these 
is problematic with regard to at least one of the three claims above.
The First Problem: Conformity
Conformity is a rational reaction in many different situations (Sunstein 2003). Individuals 
sometimes follow others when they do not have enough information to make up their 
mind, when they want to protect their reputation, or when they do not want to  upset 
those they care about. Despite being aware of the dangers of conformity (Elster 1986), 
most deliberative democrats still dismiss the probability that it will cause problems for 
deliberation, without justifying this assertion properly.
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The power of conformity is well known in social psychology at least since Solomon 
Asch’s (1962) famous experiments in the 1950s, where a surprisingly large num ber of 
subjects conformed to confederates of the experim enter in comparing the length of two 
lines even when those confederates were obviously w rong. Only 19% of critical subjects 
stayed entirely independent and 58% yielded m ore than once. Neither can deliberative 
experiments lead us to dismiss the hypothesis that conformity might be at w ork in some 
cases of increased agreement. During a deliberative exercise in the UK, within-group 
preference variance decreased in 53% of cases (Luskin et al. 2002). This might indicate 
that conformity has increased, as the preferences of deliberators have become m ore similar 
to each other22.
Two of the three claims made by deliberative democrats will affect the likelihood of 
conformity significantly: the demand for other-regarding preferences and learning through 
deliberation.
Members of the deliberative body will feel a pressure to hold other-regarding 
preferences and expound other-regarding arguments — this, after all, is a defining 
characteristic of deliberation. Thus, deliberators are already conforming to a certain subset 
of all available arguments through accepting the civilizing force of hypocrisy. O f course 
deliberative democrats will hold that this kind of conform ity is not problematic, as it 
makes the decision-making process m ore moral. However, as I will explain below, it could 
conceal more harmful forms of conformity.
It is rational for individuals to accept the opinion of others if they know little about 
an issue and are unsure as to  what the best decision is. In this case they will use heuristic 
shortcuts, one of which is the opinion of other group members. The use of heuristic 
shortcuts is entirely rational in the face of incom plete and costly information. Deliberation 
decreases the likelihood of conformity due to  insufficient information by providing m ore 
information to group members during discussion and from  experts. W hile conformity due 
to lack of information probably cannot be entirely eradicated, deliberation could go a long
22 It is not possible to determine the cause of these effects, as there has been no qualitative analysis of the 
deliberative discussions.
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way in reducing its effects. This is especially the case if individuals are strongly interested 
in the subject they deliberate on (Baron and Byrne 2002).
Thus, deliberation decreases the likelihood of conformity due to insufficient 
information. But another source of conformity is concern for reputation. W e might be 
concerned about increasing our reputation to  further our aims or about avoiding the 
disesteem of other deliberators. I will consider both of these problems in turn.
Firstly, we may want to  increase the esteem  in which we are held among other 
deliberators. However, if it is obvious that our actions are motivated by a concern for 
esteem, this is unlikely to improve our reputation (Brennan and Pettit 2004). This is 
because we are esteemed for being virtuous, and not for acting in a way that others will 
think is virtuous simply in order to gain their approval. This is called hypocrisy, and if we 
want others to have a good opinion of us, we will very likely want to  avoid being known as 
hypocrites. Therefore, this form of conformity is the less dangerous one for deliberation.
The second possibility is that deliberators are seeking to improve their reputation 
among their constituents. This is quite likely if they are elected to participate in 
deliberation. In this case they will have m uch less incentive to conform to other group 
m em bers. They might have an incentive to conform to the majority opinion or consensus 
among their constituents, but this will not jeopardize the introduction of a wide range of 
arguments to deliberation as long as no group within society is without a representative23.
Overall we can conclude that a concern for improving our reputation is unlikely to 
lead to  conformity. But if a quest for reputation and esteem is not likely to induce 
conformity in deliberation, the fear of disesteem m ight still have that effect. In this case 
deliberators are trying to escape any negative consequences that their actions might have, 
rather than doing something to gain a psychological good.
The group might develop norms from which it will not allow its members to deviate 
without consequences. The obvious example, as I have just noted above, is adherence to 
other-regarding preferences. O f course it can be argued that forcing deliberators to
23 However, as I will argue in chapter seven such representatives’ conformity to constituents can conflict 
with the requirements of deliberative preference change.
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‘launder’ their preferences in order to be m ore other-regarding is beneficial no m atter 
whether it is the result of conformity, communicative rationality or the kind of deliberative 
mechanisms advocated by Gutmann and Thompson. But such conformity can extend to 
include more controversial norms. This is the case if deliberators demand arguments which 
correspond to their definition of reasonableness, defined in a way which does not give 
credit to religious or otherwise ‘unreasonable’ argumentation. In this case rationality 
becomes a normatively loaded concept (Bohman 2003). Thus, reciprocity, presenting only 
arguments that one assumes to be acceptable to others, can reduce free speech and favour 
conformity. It also displays a lack of trust that the deliberative process w ould not make 
choices based on arguments which are somehow immoral or repulsive (Dryzek 2000).
Conformity should make us question whether the preference changes we see during 
deliberation are truly reasoned. It also sits uneasily with the kind of communicative 
rationality advocated by deliberative democrats. It is much less problem atic from the 
perspective of instrumental rationality. If deliberators want to arrive at a decision without 
the cost of acquiring the necessary information or want to fit in with the rest of their group 
they will find it rational to conform to those who already have well developed judgments 
or preferences.
The Second Problem: Interpreting Evidence
In order to become better informed and facilitate learning, deliberative groups will draw 
on experts to provide them  with new information. In some cases the subject of 
deliberation is not something that experts in the traditional sense can com m ent on. There 
are cases where group members need to listen to testimony from  members of subgroups of 
the political community in order to find out about their subjective experiences (Sanders
1997). The crucial assumptions that deliberative democrats make are that expert opinion 
will be presented in a balanced manner, with representatives from both sides of the debate,
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and that it will contribute to the role of deliberation as education by increasing the 
knowledge of individuals (Goodin and Niemeyer 2003).
Presenting expert opinion during deliberation is not w ithout its dangers. In some 
cases experts might have too little impact on individual reasoning or they might influence 
group members in ways which are not consistent with the way the expert would view her 
own testimony. This can happen for at least four reasons.
Firstly, just as the testimony of a minority group m em ber is the result of her 
experiences, equally the way her testimony is interpreted will be the result of the listener’s 
experiences. W e cannot stay open-minded to the extent that who we are and where we 
come from has no bearings on what we think about an issue. To make m atters worse, 
much of this is subconscious, as we do not always have control over our cognitive 
processes. O r even if it is conscious, we are so used to our own specific voice that we 
barely notice the changes we make by interpreting a story. And to understand wdll 
necessarily mean to interpret.
Secondly, m en and wom en relate to experts differently, rate them  according to 
different criteria and trust different ones over others (Davies and Burgess 2004). This 
finding could possibly be extended to other defining characteristics such as class or race.
Thirdly, expert opinion will not have a very large effect on the judgements of 
individuals if the term s and discourse used in evidence presented during deliberation is 
incommensurate w ith theirs (Davies and Burgess 2004), that is, the term s used by the 
experts do not correspond, and are not comparable, to the term s used by the individual.
Finally, when conflicting evidence is presented, we tend to agree w ith the evidence 
that agrees with our judgem ent and dismiss the evidence to  the opposite (Baron and Byrne 
2000). Thus, we may find it much easier to  have our beliefs confirmed than to have them 
refuted.
Another danger is that expert evidence will have m ore impact on individual 
preferences than it should, causing deliberators to update their preferences in ways that are 
against their interests, ways which do not lead to  the best outcome or ways in which 
decisions become based on incorrect beliefs. Again, this can happen for multiple reasons.
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Firstly, the prevailing expert opinion, thought to be correct at the tim e the 
testimony was made, might be falsified over time. A good example of this is the num ber of 
convictions overturned by courts in Britain where m others were believed to have 
m urdered two or m ore infants who in fact died naturally. At the tim e these convictions 
were made the prevailing scientific opinion was that once one child died in cot death the 
chances that her siblings would reach the same fate was negligible. New scientific evidence 
proved that exactly the opposite is true. As time goes on new  theories and new leading 
experts emerge, and these theories might be in complete contradiction to  what we think 
we know now.
Secondly, not all experts are as knowledgeable as they appear to be (Cialdini 2001). 
Appearances might be deceptive, and judging which expert is presenting valid evidence 
might be difficult if we take into account that deliberators possess a limited amount of 
knowledge. The danger is that even if m ore than one side of the evidence is presented, 
deliberators might be swayed by a popular expert who appears to be knowledgeable and 
presents his evidence in a m ore convincing m anner than his colleagues, rather than the one 
whose arguments are correct.
Thirdly, there might also be a bias towards popular theories (Sunstein 2003), while 
unpopular ones could be dismissed outright. This is one of the effects of conformity. 
Global warming is such a commonly accepted theory that theories that contradict it are 
often dismissed outright. The dominance of popular theories can be reinforced by 
informational and reputational cascades where everyone jumps on the bandwagon either 
because they think everyone else believes the theory and they do not have enough 
information to make their own judgment or because they want to be seen to espouse the 
most popular theory (Sunstein 2003). Such cascades can become very hard to break once a 
critical mass is reached.
Finally, choosing what evidence to present also confers pow er to  shape discourse and 
frame issues. If one side dominates the choice of experts then the balance of expert 
opinions might come into question.
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W e possess limited cognitive capacity and live in an age when knowledge is highly 
specialized. Expert evidence presented might be formulated in a scientific jargon that is not 
easily accessible to  outsiders. It might also be the case that in order to judge the 
correctness of a theory we need to possess a substantial amount of knowledge about the 
assumptions behind it. Thus, it is likely that we will not have the cognitive capacity to 
evaluate each expert testimony correctly. W e might rely on simple heuristics instead, 
which will necessarily be prone to error (Kahnemann and Tversky 1984).
Introducing new information through experts can certainly have the educational 
effect that deliberative democrats hope for. It can be an excellent way of communicating 
facts that might be little-known but highly relevant, or perspectives and experiences which 
are only known to  some members of the community. But it might also violate the 
assumption that deliberation will facilitate learning. Even adopting procedures that make 
the process of selecting experts fair and balanced will not be sufficient to eliminate 
problems of different interpretation or limited cognitive capacities. These problems will 
not negate all the advantages of hearing expert testimonies in deliberation, but they will 
affect the way a real-world group will make its decisions.
The Third Problem: Framing
Individuals often reach different judgments when the same choice is presented to them  in 
two different formats. This phenomenon is known as framing and has been studied 
extensively by social psychologists and economists. Citizens will respond differently to 
questions about political issues based on how they are framed. W hile they say in opinion 
polls that the US should seek permission from the UN Security Council before going to 
war, they do not agree that the US needs the permission of Russia or China, which are 
both powerful perm anent m em bers of the Council (Fang 2008).
In a well-known experim ent by Kahnemann and Tversky (1979, 1984) subjects 
preferred different courses of action as a response to  the outbreak of an infectious disease,
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depending on the way in which the scenario was described to them. They preferred 
certainty when it came to saving lives, but accepted a gamble about the num ber of 
deaths24. Kahnemann and Tversky explain this using prospect theory; we have value 
functions that are concave in the domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses. Thus, 
we are risk averse when it comes to gains (lives saved) and risk seeking when we consider 
losses (lives lost). This behaviour is not strictly instrumentally rational as it violates von 
Neumann and M orgenstem ’s (1947) principle of substitution, which would require that if x 
is preferred to y  then an even chance of getting x or z is preferred to an even chance of 
getting y  or z. It also violates the principle of invariancy, as information is processed 
differently and different decisions are reached depending on the way in which a problem  is 
presented. These findings have been further generalized to include the attributes of single 
options25 and goals26. Framing is at w ork too when a problem  can be presented using two 
conflicting sets of concepts or values; regulating pesticides can be seen as an environmental 
triumph or an economic burden.
If, as assumed by its proponents, deliberative democracy is indeed subject to 
reciprocity and enhances other-regarding attitudes and meta-agreem ent, this can lead to 
the emergence of a common framing or paradigm which would displace private arguments 
(Bohman 1996). Accordingly, a new discourse that all sub-groups could use and access 
would create a bridge betw een different moral discourses that have trouble understanding 
each other. This theory was first developed for solving moral conflict (Pearce and 
Littlejohn 1997) and such a process is implied by the deliberative literature. The
24 In the first scenario adopting the first program meant that 200 people would definitely be saved, and 
adopting the second program meant that there was one-third probability that all 600 people would be saved 
and two-thirds probability that no one was saved. In the second scenario adopting the first program meant 
that 400 people would die for certain, and adopting the second program meant that there was one-third 
probability that no one would die and two-thirds probability that everyone would die. It is easy to see that 
the two scenarios are identical, except for the way in which the two programs are described. However 
subjects tended to prefer the first program in the first scenario and the second program in the second 
scenario.
25 We prefer minced meat that is labelled 75% meat to that which is labelled 25% fat (Lewin and Gaeth 
1988).
26 Women are more likely to practice breast self-examination if they are told that the rate of early detection 
of breast cancer is lower without it, rather than when they are told that it is higher with it. (Meyerowitz 
and Chaiken 1987).
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emergence of meta-agreement also limits the issue frames available to deliberators to one 
or two issue dimensions.
The dominance of one way of framing an issue has a serious impact on the decisions 
of a deliberative group. Such a common framing could negate assumptions about the 
openness of deliberation and the use of discussion to  present multiple sides of a debate, as 
there could be a strong pressure within the group to adopt the common framing. Framing 
could also be used to present issues in a way that serves our own preferred outcomes best 
and a way in which we can manipulate the discussion by emphasizing one aspect of the 
issue over others. This clearly does not conform to the expectations of deliberative 
democrats.
O f course, one can argue that framing is just a natural way in which we construct a 
shared understanding that enables us to communicate with each other and with which we 
can make sense of the world. Such a construct would reduce complexity, making it easier 
for us to understand issues which may otherwise lie beyond our cognitive capacities, and 
allow us to make deliberation with each other meaningful. O n its own, framing is value 
neutral; it is neither a good thing, nor a bad thing.
Yet framing still has negative connotations in the cognitive and political psychology 
literatures. The reason for this lies in the original problem form ulated by Kahnemann and 
Tversky; that in some situations it contradicts the invariancy assumption of rationality. 
Thus, rather than a rationality-enhancing resource that helps us in making sense of complex 
issues, it is a problem of imperfect rationality.
Furthermore, framing poses a num ber of special problems for theories of 
deliberative democracy. Firstly, it can exacerbate conformity. Secondly, simplifying issues 
to fit into dominant issue frames can cause deliberators to lose sight of much of the richness 
and complexity of issues, thereby making the procedure of deliberative democracy less 
well informed. Finally, and m ost crucially, claiming that arguments need to  be presented 
in a reciprocal m anner may be used to enforce a common, dominant framing over 
deliberative debates. Thus, preference formation and transformation during deliberation
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may actually serve to limit individual preferences to  a dominant discourse rather than help 
citizens develop preferences which correspond best to their beliefs and interests.
Deliberative Rationality Revisited
For those authors who defend deliberative democracy on procedural grounds and argue 
that its increased legitimacy with regard to other models of democracy depends on its 
ability to make decisions through reasoned and reciprocal debate, it is vital that political 
deliberation would actually have the characteristics that they predict. Crucially, what I am 
interested in, and what many of these authors are interested in, is that political deliberation 
should not only be reasoned and rational in itself, but it should also achieve these qualities 
to a higher degree than liberal representative democracies do.
However, we have reasons to think that this will not be the case. Rational behaviour 
and reasoning during deliberation will not necessarily conform to the norms and 
characteristics that deliberative democrats attribute to it. Instead it is likely to encounter 
the same problems that other models of democracy do as well.
There exists no convincing theoretical argument or empirical evidence that proves 
that deliberative democracy will be immune to the problems just discussed in the previous 
section. And these three are only a selection of the issues that have affected models of 
human behaviour and politics under conditions of imperfect information and bounded 
rationality and which are now equally likely to affect m ore deliberative ideas of rationality.
One must of course recognise that these ‘shortcomings’ of human rationality will not 
only occur in deliberative settings. The use of heuristics, m isinterpretation of expert 
evidence or framing occur frequently in liberal representative democracies as well. W hat 
makes these deviations from the perfect rationality of all knowing individuals m ore 
dangerous for deliberation is that the theory of deliberative democracy often explicitly 
tries to counter the problems that they create for current democratic systems. Thus, if 
deliberation is subject to the same problems and if these problems may even become m ore
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acute during deliberation, then the theory of deliberative democracy will fail to fulfil some 
of its most im portant aims.
Let us first revisit the properties of deliberation that I enum erated in the first section 
of this chapter. W e have seen that reciprocity, other-regardingness, m eta-agreem ent and 
deliberative learning are all affected by the problems discussed above.
Reciprocity could in fact be nothing m ore than the use of a comm on dominant issue 
frame that helps to exclude arguments which w ould contradict it. An increased role for 
other-regarding preferences during deliberation is also questionable. W hile citizens are 
likely to display concern for each other during deliberation, this does not mean that they 
will base their decisions on the good of others, rather than their own interests. Fung 
(2003) argues that rationality, in the sense that actors are aware of their own interests and 
the best methods for meeting those interests, could sometimes be enhanced in deliberation 
to the detrim ent of reasonableness, which he defines as the capacity of participants to 
restrain themselves when their self-interest violates comm on norms such as fairness, 
respect or reciprocity. Empathy and sympathy towards the needs of others does not 
necessarily translate into giving up what is best for us. O ther-regarding behaviour is just 
one of the values activated during social interactions and in complex situations it will not 
necessarily be the most influential one.
The discussion above on the problems of interpreting new information and evidence 
presented during deliberation illustrates how deliberative learning cannot be taken for 
granted as a procedural value. The problem of framing should serve as a warning that 
meta-agreement can at times be dangerous, when dom inant issue frames make it difficult 
for individuals to put forward credible arguments from  a perspective that is different from 
that of the majority.
W e can add to the problems encountered in this chapter the problem  of motivation. 
W e have already seen in the previous chapter that individual motivation to participate in 
deliberation may prove to be a problem. And if citizens are not motivated to attend 
deliberative debates, equally they may not be m otivated to conform to the procedural 
standards set out in the literature.
93 of 257
Chapter Three: Deliberation and Rationality
Besides, if decisions are already made sometimes on other-regarding grounds, if 
issues are already framed to provide some sort of m eta-agreem ent, if citizens already 
possess enough heuristic cues to be able to tell what is in their best interest politically and 
if unreasonable arguments are already largely rejected in public debate, then it is difficult 
to see why the theory of deliberative democracy has a real procedural advantage over 
liberal representative democracy. At the most, it is forcing us to turn  our focus to 
observing aspects of politics that have received relatively little attention in the past. But 
even that is not entirely true, as civil society, social capital, and the attitudes and beliefs of 
citizens have been a subject of extensive study decades before the term  deliberative 
democracy was coined, and participatory models of democracy have existed before 
representative ones. M oreover, by focusing primarily on reasoned deliberation, 
deliberative democrats end up neglecting other aspects of politics, particularly the ones 
that are concerned with pow er and self-interest. It is one thing to say that the deliberative 
element of democracy should dominate the pow er elem ent, but deliberative democrats do 
not provide a clear theory of how this could be achieved. Yet the theory of deliberative 
democracy is clearly not only a normative, ideal theory bu t one which they would like to 
see implemented in practice. Evidence for this is the growing num ber of deliberative quasi­
experiments and empirical studies of deliberative meetings.
In response, deliberative democrats could argue that while participatory processes 
can suffer from problems such as conformity, misinformation or indoctrination (Dryzek 
1996), deliberation could be made m ore immune to them  through appropriate rules of 
conduct, moderation o r a balanced agenda-setting process. Yet it is not obvious how such 
measures could eradicate the problems I have discussed above, as some of them , such as 
framing or conformity can be mistaken for the desirable results of deliberation itself, such 
as meta-agreement.
It has to be rem em bered that deliberative democracy would remain political in 
nature. Even when deliberation would not suffer from the problems of imperfect human 
rationality, deliberators would have an incentive to follow their own interests rather than 
adhering to a more reasoned and other-centred, deliberative democracy.
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Not even deliberative democrats expect all issues to be resolved purely through 
deliberation (Habermas 1996, Gutmann and Thompson 1996). In cases when it is 
impossible to deliberate, decisions could be made through bargaining instead. But 
bargaining is clearly viewed as a second-best, since it does not fulfil the ideals of 
deliberative rationality, in particular reciprocity and other-regardingness.
Yet if bargaining, a procedure which will not have the same characteristics and 
advantages as reasoned deliberation, needs to be substituted for deliberation much of the 
time, political decisions cannot be held legitimate simply on the grounds that they were 
only made through bargaining because a m ore reasoned deliberative process was not 
available.
But to say that deliberation simply will not occur and therefore no democratic 
system can gain its legitimacy from a deliberative decision-making process is much too 
simplistic as a critique of deliberative democracy. W hat needs to  be shown instead is that 
even if individuals sincerely attem pt to engage in deliberation, they would be unable to 
achieve the standard of rational discussion required to make deliberation legitimate.
The argument that deliberative democracy can be justified on the grounds that it is 
based on communicative rather than instrumental rationality also ultimately fails. W hen 
individuals are involved in a political game it would be unreasonable to expect that they 
will only be concerned with understanding and creating shared meaning. They will also be 
concerned with ensuring that they do not lose out in the political process, leading to 
behaviour that falls under the domain of instrumental rationality. This could be relatively 
harmless, like presenting one’s argument in the most persuasive way. Deciding betw een 
different alternatives may have to involve bargaining. Instrumental behaviour at times 
could mean behaviour as extrem e as the m isrepresentation of views, judgments or 
preferences in order to manipulate other participants. These actions conform to the 
deliberative spirit progressively less. But as long as participants have their own judgments, 
preferences and interests we can expect such behaviour to  occur. And even when 
participants aim for communicative rationality, some of deliberation might in the end be
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communicatively irrational instead. This is certainly the case with the three alternative 
mechanisms I have presented earlier.
Thus, deliberative dem ocrats’ interpretation of communicative rationality is not a 
sufficient basis for a theory of democracy. And this is im portant, because even though 
proponents of communicative rationality often claim that it is a theoretical and 
philosophical concept rather than a social-scientific theory, they nevertheless expect it to 
model real-world behaviour in theories such as deliberative democracy.
Communicative rationality might not have been m eant to provide a foundation for 
deliberative democracy on its own, without any reference to instrumental rationality. 
However, it is not even evident that it is the dominant form of rationality that can be 
applied when studying deliberative democracy. Instrumental rationality is just as good, if 
not better, at explaining the processes underlying deliberation. This does not mean that the 
theory of instrumental rationality describes deliberative processes completely or that it is 
an empirically accurate model of rationality. The limits of this approach are numerous and 
well-known. Nonetheless, it is still superior to the theory of communicative rationality 
when it comes to analyzing politics, especially as it is also capable of explaining normative 
behaviour.
However, if deliberative democracy cannot be conclusively justified either on the 
ground that it is based on communicatively rationality or on the ground that it is based on 
reasoned, reciprocal debate, then we cannot base the legitimacy of the deliberative model 
of democracy solely on these procedural properties and its preference forming and 
transforming qualities. This is especially im portant as many of the expectations about 
deliberative democracy currently in the literature are very ambitious. It is assumed that 
deliberation will help us tackle deep disagreements about contentious issues. Deliberation 
often appears as a process able to change the nature of m odem  politics fundamentally. 
Levine (2005) speculates about the possibility of global dialogue about terrorism , bringing 
people from different culture and even victims and terrorists together. But how exactly 
people who are unable to even live together will suddenly be able to  find enough common
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ground to participate in deliberative discussion and learn to understand each other be tter is 
ill defined.
No one is likely to object to reasoned debate among a citizenry that is be tter 
informed. The problem is not that a transformation of preferences or an increase in 
information or understanding is assumed, but the extent of the assumed im provement. 
Actual differences do not provide us with a clear basis of favouring the deliberative m odel 
of democracy over the liberal representative one. And if deliberative democrats take the 
introduction of more face-to-face deliberative processes for citizens as their aim, these 
procedural justifications are not sufficient to  justify the costs of doing so, some of which 
were noted in the previous chapter and to which we will retu rn  over and over again. 
Preferences are already form ed and transform ed under existing democratic political 
processes. Making democracy m ore deliberative will not necessarily mean that this will 
happen in a more reasoned or legitimate way.
Democratic procedures cannot derive their legitimacy solely from the procedural 
standards of deliberation characterised by reciprocity. W hen these standards are not 
reached, the increased legitimacy of deliberative processes becomes questionable. But even 
if deliberation does not provide an added source of legitimacy through reasoned and 
reciprocal discussion, it may still do so through other procedural means, such as inclusion 
and equality. I will now turn  to these values in the next chapter.
97 of 257
Chapter Four: Equality and Inclusion
C h a p t e r  F o u r  
E q u a l i t y  a n d  I n c l u s i o n
If we put a group of people into a room  and asked them  to talk to each other about a 
political issue, what we would get would not necessarily deliberation in the sense that the 
deliberative democracy literature uses the term . W e may get bargaining instead or just 
simply conversations that do not have any specific political aims. Therefore, we have to 
specify the characteristics that set democratic deliberation apart from just any 
conversation.
In the introduction, I have defined deliberative democracy as a model of democratic 
decision-making that relies on uncoerced, reasoned, inclusive and equal discussion. In 
chapter three, I have analysed the idea that deliberative democracy is procedurally 
advantageous because it is reasoned. In this chapter I will examine the idea that deliberation 
is uncoerced and even m ore importantly, inclusive and equal. The concepts of equality and 
inclusion cannot be easily separated from each other; therefore, they are best studied 
together. These three values are necessary together to make deliberation democratic.
Deliberation requires individuals in a society to interact with each other as part of 
the political decision-making process. The nature of this interaction necessarily creates a 
basic tension betw een inclusion and influence. O n the one hand we would want citizens to 
be included on an equal footing in this deliberative process. O n the other hand, it is 
impossible for each citizen to have the same influence on the deliberative procedure. 
Inclusion is one of the most im portant values emphasised by the deliberative literature. 
Uniquely, deliberative theory needs to be concerned w ith the inclusion of both people and 
ideas.
The concept of equality is fundamental to the idea of democracy. The m ost basic 
definition of democracy is that it is a decision-making system where citizens’ equality is 
ensured by giving each person one vote. However, this definition has to  be changed
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significantly for models of deliberative democracy, since deliberation consists of a much 
m ore complex set of actions than just voting.
In the first section of this chapter I will define lack o f coercion, inclusion and equality. 
As ensuring that deliberation is uncoerced is relatively straightforward, I will focus on the 
values of inclusion and equality for the rest of the chapter. In section tw o, I will examine 
tw o types on inclusion: external inclusion, when the group is constituted, and internal 
inclusion during debate. In section three I will look at how formal and substantive equality can 
be ensured during discussion. I question w hether each of these values is possible and 
desirable for deliberative democracy. Finally, I will briefly discuss the problem  of 
manipulation during political deliberation.
Uncoerced, Inclusive and Equal Discussion
Lack o f coercion is easiest to define of the three procedural values discussed in this chapter. A 
deliberative discussion is uncoerced if none of the deliberators face either implicit or explicit 
threats from others. Freedom from coercion also means that no one may be ostracised 
from deliberative politics because of their views. Coercion may lead to  the suppression of 
certain arguments and viewpoints. As we have seen in the previous chapter, a related 
danger is that deliberators may not change their judgments in order to save face or to 
conform.
Non-coercion plays an im portant normative role in deliberative theory. Only if 
deliberators are able to present their own arguments, judgments, political opinions and 
preferences in deliberation will the outcome of such a process be truly deliberative. This is 
because deliberation relies on reason giving, information pooling and learning about each 
o ther’s arguments and beliefs to achieve a transformation of preferences. If deliberators are 
not free to present and justify their judgments in public, this process will be hampered. If 
m inorities are not able to speak freely and without coercion in a deliberative forum, their 
point of view cannot be shared with the rest of society during deliberation.
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Parallel to the threat of coercion is the threat of bribery. Deliberators may be unduly 
influenced not only by sticks, but also by carrots. Deliberators should not be tem pted into 
adopting the arguments of others for material benefit unrelated to the policies that the 
deliberative forum decides on. This is analogous to the idea that citizens’ votes should not 
be bought. Coercion and bribery are morally illegitimate, as they change the incentive 
structures of citizens so that they are tem pted to  trade off short-term  gains against their 
real interests and the interests of the community.
Lack of coercion is such a fundamental ideal of democratic politics that it is often 
taken for granted. However, it is im portant to  make sure that institutional arrangements 
minimise coercion and bribery as much as possible. Secret ballots were introduced exactly 
for this reason. In deliberative democracy, such secrecy is impossible as the nature of 
discussion in politics ensures that individuals’ publicly offered judgments will be known to 
all participants. Publicity plays a crucial role in deliberative democracy, as it is the basis on 
which deliberators are required to justify their judgments and the basis on which 
arguments for final decisions have to be made publicly available. However, publicity is 
only meaningful if it is set against a background of non-coercion.
Non-coercion is a background condition that is necessary to  ensure equality and 
inclusion, the two main procedural values examined in this chapter. These two conditions 
raise new  and interesting questions for deliberative democracy that m ore electoral forms of 
democracy did not have to face. The first of these is who and what should be equal and 
included.
W hen it comes to inclusion and equality, most models of democracy focus on 
people, rather than ideas. Ideas of equality centre on ensuring that citizens’ equal moral 
w orth is assured through allowing everyone to participate in the political process in order 
to  advance their interests. Concerns about exclusion are concerns about denying m em bers 
of minorities their rights, rather than ignoring ideas and arguments. However, this is not 
sufficient for deliberative models of democracy.
Deliberative theories of democracy are not only concerned with people, but also 
w ith arguments and ideas. Deliberative democracy is conceptualised as collective political
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rule through discussion and the literature frequently evokes the pow er the best argument is 
supposed to have in such a discussion. Thus, when it comes to the values of equality and 
inclusion, we need to consider not only what it means for citizens to  be equal and included 
during deliberation, but also what this means for ideas, facts and argument.
Keeping this in mind, we can now attem pt to define inclusion and equality in the 
deliberative context. I will start with inclusion, since just as a lack of coercion is necessary 
to make inclusion and equality meaningful, so equality makes little sense if the conditions 
of inclusion do not exist that allow members of society to make use of it.
The procedural value of inclusion ensures that all those citizens who are substantively 
affected27 by a decision or policy have the right and the opportunity to participate, and all 
relevant arguments have an opportunity to be presented in the deliberative process. One of 
the aims of the theory of deliberative democracy is to give m inorities who are currently 
excluded from political decision-making processes a voice (Barber 1984, Benhabib 1996, 
Young 2000, Fung and W right 2003). In order to do this, deliberative democracy would 
need to include both persons from minority groups and viewpoints and arguments from 
minorities.
Two aspects of inclusion are crucial for deliberative democracy. The first is 
inclusion when the deliberative group is constituted. The second is inclusion during the 
deliberative process itself. Iris Marion Young (2000) calls these tw o external and internal 
inclusion, respectively.
As I have m entioned in the previous chapter, John Dryzek argues that increased 
deliberation can contribute to the democratisation of politics by increasing its authenticity 
(Dryzek 1996). However, in order to lead to a deepening of democratic practice this m ust 
not be to  the detrim ent of democratic franchise, one of the other dimensions of 
democratisation that Dryzek identifies. Thus, deliberation needs to be as inclusive as, or 
even m ore so than, liberal representative democracy.
27 This is an important qualification, as we may be affected by an issue even just by reading about it in 
newspaper, without being affected by it in a more substantive sense.
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Deliberation also needs to be characterised by equality. The most common 
conception of equality in democratic thought is the idea of “one person, one vote”. Even in 
liberal representative democracies this leaves plenty of scope for inequality, as it only 
allows for equality betw een citizens in the act of voting for their political representatives. 
Needless to say, this conception of equality is completely inapplicable to  deliberative 
democracy.
There is no consensus in the deliberative democracy literature on how equality in 
deliberation should be defined (Bohman 1997, Knight and Johnson 1997, Peter 2007). 
Unlike in electoral democracies, the theory of deliberative democracy has to face the 
equality o f what question. Answers to this question include equality of influence, 
opportunities, capabilities or primary goods.
It helps us define equality in deliberative democracy if we differentiate betw een two 
types of it. Firstly, formal equality defines the minimal political rights that all citizens must 
possess in equal measure in order to be real participants in the political process. Secondly, 
substantive equality means that citizens have roughly equal pow er, abilities and opportunities 
to influence political decisions. In liberal representative democracies giving each citizen 
one vote ensures equality in the formal, minimal sense. At the same tim e, large substantive 
inequalities may continue to exist among the electorate. Most prom inently, some may be 
able to provide candidates and parties with substantial financial support, while the vast 
majority of the population will not be able to do so.
The requirem ents of inclusion and equality together make deliberation democratic. 
Equality ensures that each citizen has the right, either formal or substantive, to speak and 
be heard by others. Inclusion ensures that citizens have the opportunity to make use of 
these rights in practice. “W hen coupled with norms of political equality, inclusion allows 
for maximum expression of interests, opinions, and perspectives relevant to the problems 
or issues for which a public seeks a solution.” (Young 2000, 23)
In the rest of the chapter I will explore all types of inclusion and equality as they 
relate to both people and ideas in order to try  to assess what kind of procedural 
justifications based on them  could be provided for deliberative democracy. As we shall see,
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not all forms of equality and inclusion are possible or desirable in all circumstances. I will 
start by discussing inclusion, before moving on to equality.
Inclusion
The External Inclusion o f  Citizens
Political exclusion can be the result of discrimination based on a variety of characteristics, 
such as gender, class or race. Various forms of political exclusion are comm on in liberal 
representative democracies. It can be either the consequence of the design of a political 
system or of poor opportunities for some groups in society to participate in politics 
(Phillips 1995). Examples of the first type of political exclusion include tying voting rights 
to literacy, requirem ents for advance voter registration, electoral systems designed in a 
way that makes the election of m inority representatives difficult (Phillips 1995) or the 
difficulty with which immigrants can receive citizenship in some countries (Sen 2000). But 
even without such obstacles, the second type of political exclusion, a restriction of 
opportunities to participate may be present. Those in the lower socio-economic strata in 
society are less likely to vote as they do not see the significance of doing so (Electoral 
Commission and Hansard Society 2007) and when it comes to m ore active political 
participation than just voting, political exclusion can be even m ore widespread. Lacking 
free tim e, motivation or material preconditions can reduce a person’s likelihood to be able 
to get involved in politics. “Such preconditions are not m et, for example, in the case of the 
unemployed single m other on an out-of-town housing estate who cannot afford costs of 
political equality such as babysitting, transport and meals out.” (Barry 2002, 22)
W hat makes political exclusion so problem atic (Young 2000) is that together with 
individuals entire structural perspectives — such as those of m inorities or w om en — are 
excluded from the political arena. This leads to  an impoverishment of political life and a 
serious disadvantage in public representation for those whose viewpoints are not present. 
Making sure that all such structural perspectives are adequately included in political
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decision-making can certainly be seen as one of the key aims of the deliberative democracy 
project.
In order to be inclusive, deliberative democracy needs to fulfil two key 
requirem ents, which correspond to the two types of political exclusion above. First of all, 
the process of selecting deliberators m ust be inclusive. Secondly, all deliberators must have 
the practical ability to take part in deliberation.
In order to  think about inclusion it is im portant to  identify who is entitled to 
participate in the deliberative process. This question is easier to answer for an informal 
m odel of democratic deliberation, where deliberation would perm eate society and would 
encompass citizens, the media, civil society organisations, politicians and all branches of 
governm ent. Here, the question is less about selecting participants than about identifying 
who should be present as a first step in removing obstacles to participation for different 
groups.
The key participants of informal deliberative democracy are citizens, politicians, the 
governm ent, civil society and the media. All members of society have to have the 
opportunity to become m em bers of each of these categories. This is violated if m em bers of 
some groups have little or no chance of becoming politicians, setting up civil society 
groups or working in governm ent organisations or for the media. Inclusive informal 
deliberation also requires that all citizens of a political community should have 
opportunities to communicate with each of these other participants in the deliberative 
debate. This need not imply universal participation. But as long as key stakeholders who 
wish to participate have an opportunity to do so, informal deliberation will satisfy the 
condition of external inclusion.
In informal deliberative procedures external inclusion is m ore about providing 
opportunities for citizens to participate, rather than actively selecting deliberators. In 
formal deliberation, on the other hand, selecting those who will participate in the 
deliberative proceedings is the key stage at which external inclusion is ensured. If we 
assume that formal deliberation takes place in elected legislatures, inclusive participant- 
selection becomes a question of inclusive electoral representation. A m ore im portant
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problem is posed for deliberative democrats if deliberation takes place among ordinary 
citizens.
Many local deliberative meetings, such as tow n hall meetings or planning permission 
meetings, are self-selecting. As long as they are adequately publicised in advance, inclusion 
can be ensured here by making sure that all those who have an interest in attending have 
the opportunity to do so.
In the deliberative meetings inspired by the theoretical literature, selecting which 
citizens should participate in deliberation is often seen as a question of sampling. Currently 
m ore serious deliberative endeavours use some kind of random sampling m ethod to ensure 
that a representative cross-section of society is present during deliberation (Fishkin et al. 
2007, Gastil 2000). These sampling methods are designed explicitly to make sure that all 
segments of the population are offered a chance to  participate; therefore they satisfy the 
requirem ent for external inclusion. O f course, it is possible that there could be a 
systematic bias in non-respondents in these deliberative polls, that is attendants and non­
attendants are in some statistically significant way different from each other. As I will argue 
shortly, this is unavoidable and need not necessarily pose a serious problem  for these 
projects. An ambitious extension of such cross-sectional representation would be the actual 
involvement of the entire voting-age population, as in deliberation day (Ackermann and 
Fishkin 2004) or in deliberative jury duty (Leib 2004).
But it is not enough to invite all relevant individuals to  the deliberative debate. This 
would remain a meaningless gesture without actually ensuring that people would be able to 
attend the deliberative meeting. This poses a m ore serious difficulty. There are further 
barriers to participation that can lead to political exclusion. N ot all of these can be 
remedied easily through institutional measures.
Firstly, citizens may not have the time or the financial resources to attend. The two 
are often interlinked, as in the case of those who have to w ork long hours or multiple jobs 
to make a living. However, this is not necessarily the case; many professionals also w ork 
long hours that may preclude them from attending deliberative meetings or participating in 
political activities. Those suffering from financial hardship may not be able to afford the
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cost of childcare or transport. This can affect participation in both formal and informal 
deliberation. In formal deliberation, these barriers would stop some citizens from 
attending deliberative meetings. In informal deliberation, some citizens may not have the 
opportunities to participate in politics. In 2007, 32% of British citizens said that they were 
too busy and lacked the time to participate actively in politics (Electoral Commission and 
Hansard Society 2007). Results from participatory projects in Brazil show that working 
women w ere less likely to participate as they had to juggle both work and household 
responsibilities (Baiocchi 2003).
It is possible to lower this first barrier through institutional arrangements. 
Deliberative meetings would need to be held at a tim e and place that was accessible to  all. 
Some schemes envisage offering cash incentives to citizens to encourage and enable them  
to  take part in deliberation. Ackermann and Fishkin (2004) propose offering each citizen 
$150 for attending deliberation day. Gastil (2000) would also offer cash incentives for 
participants to cover costs such as travel or childcare. Both of these schemes also provide 
deliberators with free time to attend either in the form of a national holiday (Ackermann 
and Fishkin 2004) or leave from w ork that is analogous to that taken for jury duties (Gastil 
2000). But these institutional means can only go so far and lack of time and m oney could 
continue to lead to political exclusion.
Furtherm ore, offering cash incentives or national holidays would be very costly. Any 
cash incentives to attend deliberative meetings would first have to be collected from 
citizens through taxation and then returned to them. This process would be 
administratively costly and most likely wasteful, removing m ore money from  citizens than 
returning to them. It is also questionable how many people would sacrifice a new  bank 
holiday in order to attend a political meeting. The framing effects discussed in chapter 
three would indicate that citizens would quickly come to see participating in deliberation 
as a costly activity that would lead them to lose a holiday, even if they did not have this 
holiday w ithout the existence of the deliberative institution.
The second, m ore serious problem leading to  political exclusion is that the m ost 
disadvantaged members of society often lack the political efficacy, interest and motivation
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to participate in politics. And as they withdraw from political life, their views are not 
adequately represented, thereby marginalising them  even further and making their 
participation in politics even less likely. They may also feel that they lack the abilities and 
skills needed for success. O r they may simply be unfamiliar with their rights and feel that 
politics is irrelevant for them. Only 37% of people in the two lowest socio-economic 
groups in the UK say that they are interested in politics, whereas in the two highest socio­
economic groups 76% claim to have such interests (Electoral Commission and Hansard 
Society 2006).
Deliberative democrats could respond to this form of political exclusion by explicitly 
involving disadvantaged groups in society in deliberative decision-making and thereby 
showing them  that they can make a difference. Indeed, this has been the aim of a num ber 
of recent deliberative projects, such as Fung’s (2004) study of school boards and 
neighbourhood policing schemes, the participatory budget procedures in Porto Alegre 
(Baiocchi 2003) or the campaign for democratic decentralisation in Kerala (Isaac and 
Heller 2003). Archon Fung calls this form of deliberation empowered participatory 
governance (Fung 2004, Fung and W right 2003).
How far deliberative democrats would be successful in achieving these aims is still 
debatable, but it is undoubtedly one of the m ost attractive features of the theory of 
deliberative democracy that it explicitly aims to include the m ost politically disadvantaged 
and disaffected groups in society. Their inclusion would increase both the legitimacy of 
democratic political processes and would help the worst-off in society by representing 
their interests m ore accurately and efficiently.
It is impossible to ensure that everyone will participate in deliberative democratic 
processes. Even when we give all relevant m em bers of a political community the 
opportunity to participate, some will choose not to do so. This is true for all forms of 
deliberation, whether informal or formal and w hether the participants are selected by 
organisers or self-selected. Thus, some may be excluded voluntarily from the deliberative 
process. Hence, inclusion has its limits; we cannot include those who do not w ant to  
participate.
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The first reason for this is pragmatic. As Gastil (2000) points out, if we give 
everyone a fair opportunity to participate and they fail to do so, this would indicate that 
their com m itm ent to the process is low; thus even if they were present, they would have 
been unlikely to contribute or benefit much.
The second objection to forcing citizens to participate in deliberation is that this may 
contradict their idea of politics or even their idea of the good life. There may be groups for 
whom participating in deliberation would seem to be simply wrong. For example, a group 
of Trotskyists may believe that change has to come through revolution, rather than through 
changing the system from the inside and that participating in political institutions rooted in 
a capitalist system is morally wrong28. For them , participating in the deliberative process 
and especially accepting its values of mutual respect and toleration towards other points of 
view, not to  m ention other-regarding behaviour towards capitalists would count as a 
betrayal of their entire value-system. W e can say that Marxists and deliberative democrats 
have different conceptions of politics (Gaus 1999). Another example is the case of the 
Amish, who choose to withdraw both from society in general and from political 
participation in particular.
W e can certainly tell people about the benefits of participation, but we cannot go 
further than this, when deliberation is not a value-neutral concept. It requires participants 
to interact w ith other groups in very specific ways, take on other-regarding attitudes and 
tolerate and respect other points of view. Thus, we m ust accept voluntary exclusion, even 
if we feel that this will impoverish the political process by removing some voices from it.
The External Inclusion o f  Arguments
But it is not enough to ensure the inclusion of people in deliberative democracy. In order 
for it to fulfil its function and to provide reasoned and well-balanced debate, we also have 
to make sure that all relevant ideas, facts, beliefs and arguments will be included in
281 would like to thank Philip Cook for this example.
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deliberation. This is especially im portant if not all citizens can take part and we need to 
choose participants through random sampling or representation. And not only should 
every relevant argument be included in deliberation, but it should also be presented as 
competently as possible, in order to ensure that its inclusion is not purely a gesture. This is 
not only important for outcome-based justifications, bu t also for process-based ones, as 
there is procedural value in conducting a balanced discussion, since this implies that all 
members of society are included and respected.
The inclusion of all arguments is even m ore im portant for the theory deliberative 
democracy than the inclusion of all individuals. The reason for this is that deliberation is 
not about the sheer numbers and distribution of preferences in society, but rather about 
reasoned arguments and reciprocity. Thus, it focuses on listening to each o ther’s 
arguments and transforming our preferences and making decisions based on them . If we 
define inclusion in this way, we can say that no individual is excluded from deliberation, as 
long as his or her arguments are presented as competently as possible.
Those who argue for multiculturalism (Kymlicka 1995) or a “politics of presence” 
(Phillips 1995) may object that deliberation conceived in this way may allow all points of 
view to be presented by the m ost dominant group in society, such as white heterosexual 
males in W estern democracies. This goes against arguments that the best way to represent 
women or minorities is to include them directly in the decision-making process instead of 
allowing others to represent their interests, however benevolent these representatives may 
be. Representation is thus descriptive; each representative is a m em ber of the social group 
he or she represents (Mansbridge 1999).
However, note that my definition does not only require that each argument should 
be put forward during deliberative debate, but also that it should be forward as competently 
as possible. It is most likely going to be the case that it is a m em ber of the group whose 
arguments and interests are being represented can put these forward in the m ost 
competent way29. It may be that men are able to put forward arguments in favour of 
women quite competently, just as W ilberforce was able to put forward arguments on
29 Exceptions exist, of course, such as children or the mentally disabled.
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behalf of black African slaves that eventually led to  the abolition of slavery in Britain. 
However, it is quite likely that black African slaves would be able to put these arguments 
forward even m ore competently as a result of shared lived experience, interests and 
beliefs. Thus, descriptive representation is likely to play a large role in deliberative politics 
as well.
This definition of democratic inclusion is in fact a useful counter against essentialism 
in identity politics. N ot all women, blacks, Asians or Latinos have the same interests and 
hold the same beliefs (Phillips 1995, Young 2000). An equality of arguments is thus better 
than a system of quotas in representation. While I may not be certain that my interests will 
be accurately represented by a woman, if the arguments I believe in are put forward during 
deliberation at least as competently as I could have put them  forward, this ensures that 
they will receive due consideration.
One idea for ensuring such an inclusion of arguments in practice is pu t forward by 
Dryzek and Niemeyer (2007). Their theory of discursive representation envisages a 
chamber of discourses where each discourse is represented by someone who has been 
selected especially because they are able to do so competently. In order to achieve this they 
propose a sampling technique that combines discourse analysis w ith Q-methodology. 
Firstly, discourse analysis enables us to put together a list of statements that are 
representative of the major discourses in society over an issue. Secondly, q-methodology 
allows us to identify those members of a randomly selected sample whose beliefs best 
correspond to each of these discourses. Based on the assumption that these individuals 
would be able to  represent the discourses they believe in competently, they could then 
deliberate on our behalf in a chamber of discourses.
However, we can object to such a system on the grounds that deliberation should be 
accessible to all citizens. In the case of organising political deliberation based on random 
sampling or jury duty, each relevant citizen would have an equal probability of being 
selected. In the case of descriptive representation or the politics of presence, deliberators 
would be selected based on their membership of certain groups in society. But this is not
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the case for the chamber of discourses, which favours citizens with strong, maybe even 
biased views.
One im portant qualification regarding the inclusion of arguments that deliberative 
democrats often make is that deliberation should include all reasonable m em bers of society. 
The question then arises what makes an argument unreasonable enough to exclude it from 
deliberation. Thus, one could argue that the Trotskyists m entioned above may be excluded 
from deliberation not only because they want to  voluntarily w ithdraw from  it, but also 
because their political beliefs are unreasonable.
As we saw above, deliberative democracy cannot accommodate coercion and views 
that are hateful or threatening towards others. It cannot accommodate arguments that 
demand the violation of the basic rights of others or that blatantly discriminate against 
others based on gender, race or other characteristics. Such arguments should clearly be 
excluded from deliberation. All of them constitute straightforward cases of repulsive 
viewpoints: no one would want to see deliberative debate as an opportunity for Nazis, 
paedophiles and others who hold repulsive preferences to  publicise and prom ote their 
beliefs.
O ther viewpoints, which are less obviously morally wrong, should, however, not be 
excluded from deliberation. Thus, the rules of deliberation need to  allow some selfish 
viewpoints or arguments which are not universally accepted and may be hotly contested by 
a majority in society. As there cannot be an authority outside and above the deliberative 
process that would determine whether such arguments are ‘acceptable’, ‘reasonable’, 
‘legitimate’ or not, it would undermine the deliberative process to exclude them . An 
important reason for this is that the acceptability of many arguments changes over tim e; a 
hundred years ago homosexuality was not considered to be a publicly acceptable practise.
Young (2000) argues that the reasonableness of deliberative participants is less about 
the beliefs and preferences they hold than about their psychological attitudes, such as 
openness. Deliberation cannot accommodate those who are unwilling to  listen to the 
arguments of others and adjust their own beliefs as a result. “Since reasonable people often 
disagree about what proposals, actions, groundings, and narratives are rational or
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irrational, judging too quickly is itself often a symptom of unreasonableness” (Young 2000, 
24). Such persons would not fulfil their deliberative obligations of other-regardingness and 
a willingness to transform beliefs and preferences. According to Young, reasonable people 
also enter deliberation w ith the intention of reaching an agreement, or in the cases when 
deliberation is used m ore as an exploratory tool, w ith the intention of understanding other 
points of view better and maybe approximating an agreement.
No deliberative democrat would argue that people with such unreasonable attitudes 
should be excluded. But it is not desirable to base a definition of reasonableness on 
attitudes and character-traits, rather than beliefs and arguments. Firstly, such traits can be 
subjective and difficult to measure. There are no ways in which we can define who is too 
stubborn to make a good deliberator. If deliberation works as deliberative democrats 
intended, such individuals would be punished by the process if a m ore other-regarding 
majority would dominate it instead. Secondly, people can change. Deliberative democracy 
is meant to encourage people to become m ore open, other-regarding and tolerant 
(Gutmann and Thompson 1996). Thus, we cannot exclude anyone in advance. Finally, and 
most importantly, we cannot discriminate against people based on their personal 
characteristics, especially as all people will be stubborn and lack other-regarding attitudes 
at least some of the time. Thus, m ost of us would have to be labelled unreasonable 
occasionally if not frequently, no m atter how reasonable a belief or position we hold.
Internal Inclusion
Once the deliberative group is constituted, internal inclusion needs to be ensured. It is not 
enough to guarantee that all possible participants are present during deliberation. All 
deliberators should all be equally included in the debate and no reasonable deliberator 
should be marginalised. It is perfectly possible to  imagine a situation where all of those 
substantively affected have been invited, yet during the actual discussion some are
112 of 257
Chapter Four: Equality and Inclusion
marginalised while the views of others receive great attention. Once again, it is im portant 
that we pay attention both to the inclusion of people and ideas.
Even in small groups, people will take on different roles, such as the leader or the 
scapegoat (Levine and Moreland 1990). Studies of jury deliberations show that white males 
talk more and have a larger influence on the outcome of the procedure (Hastie et al. 
1983). Deliberative democrats need to develop credible mechanisms for levelling the 
playing field in the face of such tendencies of group dynamics.
According to difference democrats, deliberative democrats conceive of deliberation 
in terms that lead to internal exclusion. Young (2000) argues that deliberative norms entail 
dispassionate speech and arguments w ith clear logical structures, which are characteristic 
of the type of speech practised and valued by educated, white, middle-class males. W om en 
and some minorities, on the other hand, might use m ore rhetoric, symbolic and emotive 
language and hand gestures. These might w ork against them  when it comes to taking their 
arguments seriously. Some less advantaged groups might also find it difficult to  present 
their argument in a logically straightforward form at where multiple propositions lead to a 
conclusion. Thus, the logic of their reasoning would be less easy to identify at first sight. 
The dominant group of white middle-class m en would have an advantage having been 
educated to make logically w ell-structured arguments.
Rather than being forced to  conform to such a standard of communication or be 
ignored, Young (1996, 2000) proposes that deliberative democrats need to introduce 
other forms of communication in addition to logical reasoning and presents three of these: 
greeting, rhetoric and narrative. Greeting is about acknowledging each other as m em bers 
of the group and committing ourselves to listening to each other and is thus crucial for 
inclusion. It is also about building relationships betw een group members. Rhetoric allows 
deliberators to attem pt to influence each other through figurative and emotive language. It 
allows for strength of feeling to be communicated. Narrative serves to introduce the 
perspectives of different members of the group on an issue and is also advocated by Sanders 
(1997), who calls it testimony. These three forms of communication help to  increase the
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internal inclusiveness of deliberative democracy, as their practice would confer respect to 
members of minority groups.
However, even including these types of communication will not always ensure 
inclusion. Therefore, m ore practical measures are needed that ensure that no one is left 
out of the debate.
One practical institutional measure that the organisers of deliberation use to foster 
internal inclusion is the use of trained m oderators, as in Fishkin’s deliberative polls. 
M oderators should aim to ensure internal inclusion by making sure that all m em bers of the 
group have opportunities to speak and feel comfortable to do so. In order for this, 
m oderators would need to make sure that no one is intimidated by others and the m ore 
assertive members of the group do not hijack the discussion.
In order for deliberation to function properly, one has to  acknowledge the 
importance of small talk. At the start of a m eeting participants will normally greet each 
other and exchange a few words. The topic of conversation is often different from the 
topic of the actual meeting. This small talk allows people to connect to  each other. Young 
acknowledges that it is possible to exchange formal greetings with someone at the 
beginning of a meeting and then ignore that person afterwards (Young 2000, 61). Small 
talk does not allow us to do this so easily, since it makes our fellow deliberators m ore 
human. Thus, it could be im portant in formal deliberative meetings to  introduce 
opportunities for such small talk, such as coffee breaks and lunches. These would also 
allow deliberators to discuss the main issue of the day m ore informally, w ithout the 
pressure of being seen to take a stand in public.
Requirements of civility can also affect the extent to which deliberators are included 
and excluded. Those who do not behave or talk in a civil manner to others during 
deliberation may exclude others by their actions or may find themselves excluded because 
of them. Unreasonable beliefs or behaviour will cause problems for internal inclusion, just 
as they did for external inclusion.
It is only so far that requirem ents for civility or institutional measures can go in 
ensuring internal inclusion. Even if we allow narratives and emotional talk in a deliberative
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debate, we cannot ensure that these will be taken seriously. Only an increase in group 
cohesion and trust can ensure that this is the case. W hile increasing inclusion is probably 
the m ost inspiring aim of deliberative democrats, they offer limited suggestion as to  how 
such inclusion could be insured and it does not appear that deliberative democracy 
guarantees this value better than other models of democracy.
Equality
Formal Equality
The legitimacy of deliberative procedures relies not only on inclusion, but also on equality. 
The first type of equality I will examine here is formal equality; the minimal levels of 
equality provided for all by the rules of the decision-making procedure.
Over the course of the 20th century, citizens of liberal democracies have become 
equal in the formal sense. Each citizen can cast one vote in elections, regardless of income, 
gender or race. Each citizen has a right to free speech and assembly, the right to contact 
their representatives, to  participate in demonstrations and to  run for office. O f course, not 
all citizens make equal use of these rights; many people do not vote in elections, most 
citizens never contact their representatives and even fewer citizens run for local office, let 
alone participate in national politics. Furtherm ore, there is substantial inequality between 
citizens when it comes to their ability to influence politics, for example through political 
activism or campaign financing.
But before we discuss the weightier issue of substantive equality in politics, we need 
to ask what formal equality in deliberation would look like. Formal equality in informal 
deliberation is uncontroversial. As long as citizens have a right to free speech and free 
assembly, they will have the right to participate in some form of informal deliberation. The 
question is m ore pressing for formal deliberative meetings.
Ensuring both external and internal inclusion is the first step towards establishing 
formal equality among deliberators. By making sure that all substantively affected
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individuals have an equal opportunity to participate, selecting deliberators through a 
procedure that allows everyone a fair chance to be selected or by selecting deliberators in a 
way that ensures that each relevant point of view is represented competently, we give 
citizens an equal chance of influencing the outcom e. The same applies to making sure that 
no participants of deliberation are marginalised or treated without respect.
There are some aspects of deliberative procedures in which formal equality can be 
ensured relatively straightforwardly. If briefing materials are distributed before the 
deliberative debate, we can make sure that every deliberator receives these. If there is a 
vote at the end of the debate, formal equality can be ensured by giving each person a vote.
W hen it comes to actual deliberative debate, we still have some, albeit m ore limited 
options for ensuring formal equality, by designing rules of order which make sure that all 
have a roughly equal share in participation. The m ost obvious way of doing this is by 
introducing a maximum speaking tim e for each participant. In Deliberation Day, Ackermann 
and Fishkin (2004) require that each deliberator should be given five minutes of floor time 
in their group. They set no minimal speaking requirem ents; deliberators are allowed to 
stay silent. Those who have exhausted their five-minute tim e limit can only speak again if 
no one else wishes to do so. If we want deliberation to be slightly m ore informal and strict 
time-keeping would get in the way of doing this, m oderators can also help to ensure that 
individuals have roughly equal amounts of speaking tim e available to them.
Time-constraints are likely to be a significant factor in limiting formal political 
equality in a deliberative democracy. As Dahl (2006, 57) notes:
“As the num ber of citizens who wish to speak increases, the costs in tim e rise 
steeply. In a unit with just twenty citizens, if each citizen w ere allowed to 
speak for ten minutes, the meeting would require tw o hundred minutes, or 
more than three hours. In a unit with fifty citizens, to allow each citizen to 
speak for ten minutes would require a full eight hour day; in a unit of five 
hundred citizens, m ore than ten eight hour days!”
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Thus, it is unlikely that in a tow n of a thousand citizens, everyone would have a say, 
let alone in a country the size of the United Kingdom. Ackermann and Fishkin (2004) get 
around this constraint by dividing citizens into small groups. However, by doing so, each 
citizen’s likelihood of having an impact on the outcome of the procedure becomes 
minuscule, just as it is in the case of voting. Thus, citizens either have to  be included in 
deliberation indirectly, at the most having equal opportunity to be selected to participate or 
will have to see their influence severely diminished.
Imposing formal time constraints would also ensure that arguments are to  the point. 
Difference democrats will surely cry foul at this, as arguments to the point will likely lack 
in rhetoric and emotional language. Those better skilled at public speaking and concise 
reasoning will be able to make much better use of the tim e allotted to  them . Thus, such 
measures tell us little about the substantive equality of deliberators. Some may be able to 
use their five minutes of speaking time much m ore effectively than others.
Once maximal speaking times are set, similarly it might be beneficial to set a 
minimum speaking tim e as well. If participants have agreed to participate in a deliberative 
discussion, it would surely be best to ensure that everyone will actually contribute to the 
debate. Individuals might feel that they do not have much insight to give, but one of the 
main values of deliberation is exactly that everyone’s opinions should be listened to with 
equal attention. And making everyone speak also ensures that they will give the issue some 
thought and thus contribute to a better outcome.
How about ensuring formal equality of arguments? This could be defined as a 
requirem ent that all relevant arguments should receive some equal, minimal consideration. 
While this could be achieved with the help of m oderators and briefing documents, 
assessing w hether this minimal requirem ent was m et would be a m ore subjective 
evaluation than it is in the case of assessing whether each deliberator had an equal 
opportunity to take part in the debate.
Despite the problem  of time-constraints, formal equality appears to be possible 
during formal deliberative democratic meetings. Nonetheless, formal equality on its own is 
a relatively week procedural value that is already satisfied by current liberal democracies.
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In order to justify deliberative democracy on the basis of equality, deliberative democrats 
need to focus on its ability to produce substantive equality.
Substantive Equality
As I have noted earlier, rules that provide formal equality will not ensure that all members 
of a deliberative group are substantively equal. Despite formal equality in liberal 
representative democracies, those who are better educated and better off are able to  make 
m ore use of their rights, such as contacting their representatives or running for office. 
W hile the endorsement of the local sanitation engineer may not carry much weight, those 
of Hollywood celebrities can have an influence on political campaigns. At the much 
publicised extrem e, the m ost powerful and wealthiest individuals and groups may be able 
to fund parties and politicians to an extent that they feel obliged to retu rn  their generosity 
through supporting them  through their policies.
Research on group behaviour shows that status differences are common both in small 
and large groups. Those with high status are likely to behave differently both non-verbally, 
by standing straight and maintaining eye contact, and verbally, by speaking m ore often and 
interrupting others m ore often (Levine and Moreland 1990). N ot only does high status 
alter the behaviour of those on the top, but this also translates into differences of actual 
power and influence. Thus, group discussions, such as formal deliberation amongst 
citizens, will suffer from substantive inequalities betw een group m em bers. Those with a 
higher social status outside the deliberative group Eire likely to be m ore powerful within 
the deliberative group. In the absence of substantive equality, they will have m ore 
influence on the final decisions and their arguments will carry m ore weight.
Scholars working in the area of deliberative democracy recognise the need for 
substantive equality to make democratic deliberation legitimate. However, they disagree 
over the way in which such substantive equality should be conceptualised.
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The first way of answering the ‘equality of what?’ question is by turning to Rawls’ 
concept of primary goods (1972). These are the characteristics of institutions and society 
that are necessary in order to establish a just society and which enable each rational human 
being to pursue his or her conception of the good. These include the social bases of self- 
respect, basic rights and liberties as well as income and basic goods necessary for survival.
The second answer in the literature is to base substantive equality on Sen’s 
capabilities approach (1992). For Sen, living consists of a variety of functionings, such as 
being well-nourished, being happy or having self-respect. O ur ‘“ capability set’ in the 
functioning space reflects the person's freedom to choose from possible livings” (Sen 1992, 
40). Thus, a person’s well-being and freedom are linked to the range of functionings that 
he can effectively choose from.
Bohman (1997) has adopted Sen’s capabilities approach to analyse inequality in 
deliberation. He argues that equality of opportunities, resources and capabilities is needed 
to ensure effective social freedom and through it democratic legitimacy. His analysis 
centres on the capacities citizens have to influence deliberations. He calls the lack of 
developed public capacities political poverty and argues that just like economic poverty, 
political poverty is also subject to a poverty trap.
Knight and Johnson (1997) argue that the kind of equality we should be looking for 
in a deliberative democracy is equal opportunity of influence. For this they borrow  
Dworkin’s (1987) definition of political impact and political influence. Political impact is 
the change that any one individual can affect, such as the vote that each citizen holds. 
Political influence, on the other hand, is the extent to which each individual can make his 
views heard and influence others to agree with him. Knight and Johnson state that equal 
outcomes should never be the aim of democracy, because uncertainty of outcomes is an 
essential part of democratic decision-making. They also choose to equalize capabilities, 
rather than resources to achieve political equality. They define politically relevant 
capabilities as the ability to formulate authentic preferences, the ability to  use cultural 
resources effectively and basic cognitive abilities and skills.
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Thus, the literature favours equalizing capabilities over equalizing prim ary goods 
(Peter 2007). The reason for this is that the capabilities approach offers us a better 
perspective on how far deliberators would be able to use their resources to succeed, 
instead of focusing simply on the existence of those resources, as the prim ary goods 
approach does.
However, it is very likely that such substantive equality of capabilities will no t exist 
in deliberative debates. W hile it is possible to  eliminate the m ost egregious inequalities, 
such as lack of food, shelter or other basic necessities, equalising capabilities for the much 
higher level of human functioning that deliberation requires is not so easy. Part of the 
reason for this is that these inequalities are not only social — stemming from  inequalities 
and injustices in society — but also natural — stemming from the natural abilities of 
individuals. I will now briefly look at two groups or characteristics that deliberators will 
possess to see why equality is difficult to achieve: abilities and resources.
Abilities are characteristics that are part of who we are, part of our personality. They 
include our talents, our strengths and weaknesses. Inequalities in abilities are mostly 
natural inequalities, as they are comprised of the talents we are bom  with. Ability covers a 
wide range of qualities such as intelligence, confidence, being good at public speaking, 
shyness or resourcefulness. These can be positive, such as intelligence, or negative, such as 
stupidity.
Many abilities, such as the ability to play the piano well or having green fingers will 
be entirely irrelevant for deliberation of course. But many others will have a significant 
impact on how likely individuals will be able to formulate an argument that stands up in 
deliberation and how likely that argument will impact the thinking of other group 
members. Shy individuals might find it hard to introduce an argum ent at all. Arguments 
presented m ore forcefully might have a bigger impact, regardless of their m erit on their 
own.
Abilities are not constant and unchangeable. Individuals can work on improving their 
abilities over time. Making rational arguments is something that we can learn. Shy people 
can practice talking to strangers until they feel less uncomfortable in such situations. Some
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abilities, however, cannot be improved. Someone with below-average intelligence might 
be able to improve his learning skills, but he will not be able to change his level of 
intelligence. And some individuals might not want to  change. Someone who is shy might 
feel that becoming m ore confident in social situations is not w orth the trouble, even if this 
puts them at a disadvantage when deliberating. Thus, we can never guarantee that 
everyone, regardless of their abilities, will be able to participate effectively in a deliberative 
process.
Resources are different from abilities. Abilities are innate characteristics of individuals. 
Resources, by contrast, are other advantageous things that individuals might possess, such 
as tim e, social status, wealth, connections or knowledge. Unlike abilities, someone else 
can provide resources for us. W e can be given m oney or information in a way in which we 
cannot be given m ore bravery or intelligence30. Thus, resource inequalities are primarily 
social inequalities.
The resources that are relevant in deliberation are mostly relational goods that only 
become meaningful through interactions with others. O ur social status is dependent on our 
position within society, and money and wealth are only useful if there are others who are 
willing to trade their goods for our cash.
Not all resources are positive ones. Negative resources will detract from  the 
individual's position in the deliberative group. Examples of negative resources include a 
bad reputation or negative stereotypes attached to someone. But sometimes negative 
resources can become positive ones. W hen deliberative discussions give a voice to 
marginalised groups, the potency of their claims very likely depends on the fact that the 
group is currently disadvantaged in relation to the rest of society.
Inequalities in resources and abilities cannot be easily rem edied through the kinds of 
changes that difference democrats propose. Introducing new  modes of communication — 
greetings, rhetoric and narrative — is not enough to counter them. A greeting might 
acknowledge that the other group members exist, but it will hardly convince the greeter
30 However, note that even though we can be given these resources, we cannot be given the ability to 
understand the information or spend the money wisely.
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that the one he is greeting has arguments w orth taking seriously. Even Young 
acknowledges that greeting might serve as an excuse to ignore those less influential for the 
rest of the meeting — after all their presence has already been recognised.
One can also make the stronger claim that substantive equality as a background 
condition of deliberative democracy is not only impossible, but also undesirable. In order 
to make deliberative democracy equal, in the sense that each group m em ber is equally able 
to participate in deliberative discussions fruitfully, requires a redistribution of resources. 
But surely, such redistribution cannot be imposed from the outside, but has to  be arrived 
at through democratic institutions. Thus, remedying inequalities over capabilities would 
remove from the political forum im portant decisions about social justice and the way in 
which society should be organised (Peter 2007).
There is likely to be reasonable disagreement in society over issues such as social 
justice, income distribution, education and so on. Therefore, in a democratic polity these 
issues need to be decided through the political system. In the case of deliberative 
democracy, this would mean to a large extent through deliberative debate. If we p re­
suppose that a ‘correct’ way of organising society, distributing income and educating 
citizens exists, which will ensure an equality of capabilities that leads to political equality, 
these issues can no longer be subject to serious deliberation. However, under conditions of 
reasonable disagreement, this cannot legitimately be the case. Therefore, questions of 
social justice and redistribution need to remain the subject and possible outcome of 
deliberation, rather than one of its procedural values, no m atter how unequal or imperfect 
this process may be. Citizens and representatives spend m ost of their tim e outside a 
deliberative setting and therefore it is not enough to demand that something is desirable in 
deliberation — it has to be shown that it is desirable outside of deliberation as well.
Furthermore, we need to rem em ber that deliberation is about reasons and 
arguments, not just persons. Thus, there is a lim it to the extent that it is necessary for 
deliberators to be equal. Jane Mansbridge argues that equality in deliberation does not 
require equal influence. For “the force of the better argument ( . . . )  should prevail, no 
m atter from whom that argument originates or how  frequently it originates from one or
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m ore participants” (Mansbridge 1999, 225). Thus, it does not m atter if some members of 
the group only infrequently influence the outcom e, because this influence should belong to 
those with the better arguments. But this line of reasoning could still fall pray to 
substantive inequality, as it assumes that the better argument will prevail. The best 
arguments might belong to those group members who are not listened to , marginalised, 
who cannot articulate their thoughts well enough or who are bad at presenting themselves.
Finally, let us tu rn  briefly to the idea that substantive equality should be extended to 
ideas and arguments as well. This clearly cannot be the case. Deliberative democracy 
requires that the best argument should be favoured. Even though equal respect for all is a 
fundamental tenet of deliberative democracy, it is hard to  see how the group could or 
should respect everyone’s arguments equally. Some arguments will necessarily be better 
than others, and nothing is gained from demanding that each of these should be treated 
equally. A minimal condition of formal equality can be posited, asserting that each relevant 
argument should be included and presented as competently as possible and a minimal 
amount of tim e and resources should be allocated to  each relevant argument. However, it 
would not profit deliberative democrats to  argue for m ore than this.
W e can now summarize the above findings about equality and inclusion in 
deliberation. The most valuable aspect of deliberative procedures is that they strive 
towards both external and internal inclusion. At the same time, both of these are 
problematic to secure. Equality causes even m ore problems for deliberative democracy. 
W e can define and enforce formal equality during deliberation, for example by providing 
each deliberator with an equal amount of speaking tim e. Yet this is only a relatively weak 
form of equality that is not a significant procedural value for deliberative democracy. 
Finally, substantive equality, is not only impossible, but also undesirable.
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People Arguments
Formal
Equality
All those affected should have equal 
minimal rights /  opportunity to 
participate. Desirable.
All relevant arguments receive some 
equal minimal consideration. 
Desirable.
Substantive
Equality
All those affected should be equally 
capable of participating competently 
in deliberation. Impossible and 
undesirable.
Equal resources /  capabilities should 
be devoted to each argument. 
Undesirable.
External
Inclusion
All those affected should be included 
in the deliberative process either 
directly o r through representative 
mechanisms. Desirable but 
problematic.
All relevant arguments are 
represented. Desirable but 
problematic.
Internal
Inclusion
No participants should be excluded 
or marginalised during the actual 
discussion. Desirable but 
problematic.
All relevant arguments are 
represented. Desirable but 
problematic.
Table 1: An overview  o f types o f  equality and inclusion.
M anipulation
One final issue I would like to discuss here is the problem  of manipulation. An extrem e 
case of inequality in deliberation would arise if a deliberator was able to manipulate the 
outcome of the deliberative process. In deliberation, just as in other political settings, 
some individuals will possess private information which is not available to others, yet is 
im portant for making a decision. This can give some deliberators an opportunity to control 
the debate. Riker (1986) calls such manipulation heresthetics, arguing that given its 
complexity and skill requirem ents it is m ore of an art form than crude power.
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There is a large literature in political science and social choice theory on 
manipulating the outcomes of decision-making processes. W hile much of this literature 
deals with manipulation through voting, deliberation could become the victim of cheap talk 
replacing genuine exchange of information. Many signalling game models deal w ith such 
cheap talk scenarios (Austen-Smith 1990, Banks 1991, Austen-Smith and Feddersen 2006). 
Cheap, talk refers to communication that has ambiguous informative value. Cheap talk 
models conceptualise communication as costless informative signals or pieces of evidence 
that pass from a sender to a receiver. The sender has private information about the true 
state of the world, but may not have the incentives to communicate this accurately. The 
receiver cannot know with certainty whether the sender’s signals are correct or not and is 
therefore often unable to make the correct or best decision.
One objection made to simple cheap talk models is that in politics there is always 
more than one sender and there may even be m ultiple receivers. The receiver can compare 
the information he receives from senders and can find out if one of them  is not telling the 
truth. This is bad news for those who try to manipulate others through falsehood, as “we 
tend to follow the bright-line rule that a single tru th  does not make someone honest, but 
that a single deception does make someone a liar” (Mackie 1986, 91). In deliberative 
politics other group m em bers or new experts could expose the truth.
However, we do not need to assume that politicians will be outright Bars. 
“Emphasizing favourable information and playing down unfavourable information is 
commonplace in political argument, even if straightforward lying is not” (Austen-Smith 
and Riker 1987, 901). Thus, politicians not only choose betw een telling the tru th  and 
telling a lie, but can instead choose how much of their true information they want to share. 
Thus, the distinction should be made not betw een a tru th  and a lie, but betw een a 
complete truth and a partial or biased representation of the truth.
Calvert (1985) has developed a m odel to show that we are m ore likely to listen to 
others who are biased in the same direction as we are. In a situation such as deliberation his 
model implies that as we place less value on the opinions of those who disagree with us, we
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need to hear m ore arguments from them  to convince us than we would need to hear from 
someone who is biased in the same way as we are.
It is im portant to keep in mind that even these models do not predict that individuals 
will never have the incentive to  share all of their private information honestly with others. 
Indeed, what seems to keep politics from deviating from reasonably good solutions is this 
incentive that individuals have to tell and accept the complete tru th  at least some of the 
time. Thus, the main point is that despite some incentives to conceal information or 
present information in a biased way, politicians will continue to share their private 
information honestly.
So what does this imply for deliberation? First of all, it is difficult to see why 
deliberators would not have the same incentives as members of legislative committees to 
share their private information w ith others only partially. And if this is the case, then 
identifying the best argument becomes that m uch harder.
A major change to these models would occur if deliberators’ preferences changed to 
a yet undefined common good, as opposed to their own personal policy preferences. This 
would have a significant impact, as in this case they will have an incentive to share all of 
their private information, as they would not be prom oting their favoured policy any m ore. 
However, this means that deliberators will first of all need to agree on a normative goal. 
And it is in the area of normative ends where deep conflicts and incommensurability are 
found. If a common normative end cannot be defined, signalling models will hold for 
deliberative democracy in the same way in which they hold for representative politics.
Conclusion
W hile deliberative democracy may not be m ore susceptible to manipulation than other 
forms of democratic politics, basing it on the procedural values of inclusion and equality 
proves to be problematic.
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W hile equality is not the main procedural value that deliberative democrats 
emphasize, deliberation is m eant to give individual voices an equality that current liberal 
representative democracies do not. W hat I hope to  have shown in this chapter is that both 
formal and substantive equality stand on shaky grounds in political deliberation. 
Substantive equality is not only likely to be impossible to achieve, but it is also undesirable 
as a background condition to deliberation, in that the means to achieve this equality can 
only be chosen through the political process and cannot be the preconditions of that 
process itself. Formal equality, on the other hand, is a rather weak procedural value that 
cannot offer a solid foundation for a strong model of democracy. At the same tim e it is still 
a desirable and it is the easiest to guarantee of the different variations o f inclusion and 
equality that I have examined in this chapter.
Much m ore im portant is the emphasis on inclusion in the theory of deliberative 
democracy. Here, deliberative democrats address possible solutions to  an im portant 
procedural value, which is often neglected in the practice of democratic decision-making, 
even if not in its theory. However, it is not clear how deliberative mechanisms can 
guarantee the external and internal inclusion of people and arguments be tter than other 
models of democracy. This makes inclusion theoretically desirable, but in practice a 
problematic value for deliberation. Furtherm ore, deliberative democrats are not unique in 
recognising the need for political inclusion and their solution to it is not necessarily the 
strongest available. Thus, while this focus on inclusion is admirable, it does not necessarily 
make deliberative democracy a better model of democracy than others.
In the next chapter, I will examine one final procedural justification of deliberative 
democracy: that it will aim for a consensus. I will argue that this procedural value is not 
fundamental to the idea of deliberative democracy and indeed it offers a relatively limited 
attraction for deliberation. I will also address the theoretical divide betw een deliberative 
and aggregative models of democracy.
Once I have examined all major procedural values of democratic deliberation, I will 
tu rn  to an epistemic justification of deliberative democracy. This justification will not have 
a serious problem with inequalities in deliberation, as long as those citizens whose
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arguments are better, and will lead to substantively better decisions, will be the m ost 
influential ones.
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C h a p t e r  F iv e  
D e l i b e r a t i v e  D e c i s i o n s
The final aim of any political process must be to reach legally binding decisions. In the 
previous two chapters I have examined the main procedural justifications for deliberative 
democracy: the values of reasoned debate, other-regarding behaviour, inclusion and 
equality. Now I would like to turn to  values related to the final stage of deliberation: 
reaching an actual decision. I argued in chapter one that aiming for a consensual decision is 
not one of the defining procedural values of deliberative democracy. Now I will show in 
m ore detail why this is the case.
The first issue I would like to address in this chapter is the relationship betw een 
aggregative and deliberative forms of democracy. Deliberative democracy developed partly 
as a response to aggregative conceptions of democracy, and unlike them  it calls for a 
consensual mode of decision-making. But the demand for consensus is often not 
empirically viable, which calls into question its desirability. I will argue that 
consensus shares some crucial characteristics with compromise as both require that 
deliberators agree on a policy voluntarily, taking into account the beliefs and 
preferences of others. Hence, a compromise instead of a full consensus can still 
satisfy the spirit of deliberation, as long as it is a reasoned compromise that takes 
into account the views of others. It is needless to call for consensus where really what is 
m eant, or what is necessary, is an agreement. These may not always be consensual, bu t as 
long as they are produced by legitimate procedures, they can be accepted even in the face 
of persistent opposition.
In the second half of the chapter I turn  my attention to the main ways in which the 
demand for a consensus could be relaxed. Once the demand for consensus is relaxed it 
becomes possible to examine mixed forms of decision-making in deliberative democracy. 
These would allow deliberation to be accompanied by voting or would allow for 
bargaining to be introduced into the process. I conclude that, ultimately, relaxing the
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demand for a strict consensus reduces the extent to which deliberative democracy differs 
from aggregative democracy.
Aggregative and Deliberative M odels o f  Dem ocracy
One strong them e in the deliberative democracy literature is that deliberation is a response 
to  aggregative conceptions of democracy which take voting and elections to be the essence 
of politics. Aggregative models of democracy and social choice theory focus on the ways in 
which exogenous individual preferences are turned into social outputs or choices. Most of 
the time, of course, we would conceive of such a mechanism as voting, but this need not 
always be the case. Decisions might be made through lottery as well. Most commonly, the 
result of an aggregation rule is a social preference ordering, or in other words, the way in 
which citizens collectively rank available options. However, according to findings in social 
choice theory, results reached through such a procedure can suffer from problem s of 
instability, impossibility and ambiguity (Riker 1982). Let us now look at each of these 
problems in turn.
The problem of cycling has first been observed by Condorcet in his famous paradox 
(1994). The paradox consists of the fact that pair-wise majority voting can result in a 
collective preference relation such a s ‘x > y > z > x ’, where ‘> ’ stands for ‘is preferred 
to ’. In these situations there is no clear winner, as each of the options will be defeated by 
another in pair-wise majority voting. This makes voting results unstable. And instability in 
turn  opens up opportunities for strategic voting and manipulation.
The problem  of impossibility is at the heart of A rrow ’s theorem  (Arrow 1951 /1963 ), 
which states that there is no aggregation rule which satisfies a few seemingly innocuous 
conditions. These conditions are:
Universal Domain: all logically possible preference orderings are allowed in voting;
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Ordering of Preferences: the aggregation rule produces a reflexive, complete and 
transitive preference ordering;
Weak Pareto-Principle: if all individuals prefer x to y  than society also prefers x to y\
Non-Dictatorship: social preference orderings are not determined by an individual 
dictator; and
Independence o f Irrelevant Alternatives: the social preference over x and y  depends only 
on the individual preferences over x andy  and not on preferences over other alternatives.
These conditions are regarded as necessary for achieving a fair and democratic 
outcom e. Some of them, such as independence of irrelevant alternatives, are m ore 
technical in nature. O thers, such as non-dictatorship, have an immediately obvious 
normative relevance to democratic legitimacy. Independence of irrelevant alternatives is 
also a m ore controversial condition, which can nevertheless be shown to be a necessary 
condition for the avoidance of certain forms of manipulability.
If we avoid A rrow ’s theorem  by relaxing or dropping one or m ore of his original 
conditions, it is possible to find aggregation rules which satisfy the other conditions. The 
condition that could be restricted most easily is universal domain, which ensures that no 
preference orderings can be ruled out in advance. By assuming that m ost of the population 
will not hold counter-intuitive preference orderings, such as ranking the far right party 
first, the far left party second and the centrist party third, we can find a possible escape- 
route from the impossibility theorem . The impossibility theorem  could also be avoided by 
abandoning non-dictatorship, but the normative value of this condition means that this 
route should not be pursued.
But this does not solve the problem that using different aggregation procedures with 
the same set of inputs does not always lead to  the same output (Riker 1982). The output is 
instead dependent on the aggregation rule employed. This means that while the 
Condorcet-winner in pair-wise majority voting might be x, the Borda rule could d e c la re / 
the w inner using the same individual preferences as inputs. There exists no unique result 
and this leads to the ambiguity of democratic decisions. After all, when two different ways
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of counting votes result in different winners, how can we be sure that the decision is the 
right one?
Deliberative democrats criticise aggregative models of democracy for 
conceptualising politics as a problem of making a fair decision based on the distribution of 
preferences among the electorate, rather than a process through which citizens can make a 
reasoned decision that takes into account the relevant facts as well as the beliefs and 
interests of others. For them , the political arena is not primarily the scene of preference 
aggregation, but of preference formation and transformation. Accordingly, they hold that 
rather than seeking a reasoned agreement or consensus, aggregative models use brute 
mechanisms to calculate what the most acceptable decision is, w ithout taking into account 
that if they were exposed to new facts and different points of view, citizens may choose 
differently than they do on their own. In chapter three I have addressed the criticism that 
aggregative models of democracy that use an instrum ental conception of rationality regard 
preferences as fixed, and I have argued that this is only a simplification for modelling 
purposes rather than an indication of a deeper view about the nature of politics and human 
beliefs and preferences. In this chapter I will address the criticism that aggregative models 
of democracy focus on adding up preferences in a fair and democratic way rather than on 
seeking a consensus.
Deliberative democracy is then meant to be a corrective for the instability, 
impossibility and ambiguity of aggregative democracy. Discussions, mutual understanding 
and consensus are m eant to  ensure that results are m ore stable and less arbitrary. The most 
obvious way this can be achieved is through a unanimous or near-unanimous consensus 
over one of the options available. Such a consensus is seen as valuable because it is a 
decision reached through agreement in society, and not just a decision that is the result of 
counting votes or of pow er politics.
Consensus can be defined as agreement over a unique solution that is preferred most 
by every m em ber of the group. A deep consensus will extend to the reasons for a decision 
and not just the decision itself. In deliberation consensus is reached through rational 
argument and mutual understanding of each o ther’s perspectives.
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This is the view of consensus that Habermas prom otes. W hile definitions of 
consensus in the deliberative democracy literature are in general under-specified, his is the 
most developed one (1996, 162-167). He differentiates betw een types of consensus 
depending on the issues at stake. Firstly, pragmatic discourses outline the possible options 
and their outcomes, subject to the information available to deliberators. They do not 
operate on the level of values. They simply state the different actions the group could take 
and their most likely effects. Only in rare cases will a consensus be form ed based on 
pragmatic discourse, as different options will be favoured by different value systems. 
Deliberation will have to penetrate deeper than the simple level of options available and 
their likely outcomes and a consensus will need to be formed on the level of underlying 
values. Therefore, what is at stake is what Elster (1998) calls underlying preferences. 
These are preferences over different values or long-term  goals rather than individual 
actions or policies.
Habermas divides this deeper consensus into two further categories: that of moral 
and ethical consensus. Moral consensus deals with issues which can be generalised for the 
whole of mankind and should be subject to the principle of universalization. Habermas 
cites “questions of social policy, of tax law, or the organisation of educational and health­
care systems, where the distribution of social wealth, life opportunities, and chances for 
survival in general are at stake” (Habermas 1996, 165) as cases where a moral consensus is 
necessary. Ethical consensus is concerned with issues which are based on the interests and 
cultural context of a specific society, such as “ecological questions concerning the 
protection of the environm ent and animals, questions of traffic control and city planning” 
(Habermas 1996, 165).31
31 One criticism of Habermas’ definition of consensus is that the distinction between moral and 
ethical consensus is often unclear. Why is environmental protection an ethical issue and not a moral one, 
for example (Pellizzoni 2001)? Similarly, immigration control, another issue which Habermas classifies as 
ethical has clear implications for “survival in general”, and thus has a moral dimension too. Health-policies, 
which he takes to be moral issues, will also have ethical dimensions that may not be applicable to all 
societies at all times. Therefore it would be more accurate to say that such issues have both moral and 
ethical dimensions and any consensus reached will have to have appropriate moral and ethical components. 
A sharp distinction between the two types of consensus is then unnecessary.
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Should such a consensus be unavailable as different values and interests clash in 
deliberation, a compromise m ust be reached instead. Habermas, however, defines 
compromise in a way which attempts to regulate bargaining and neutralise bargaining 
power. Compromise needs to fulfil three conditions. It m ust be “more advantageous to  all 
than no arrangement whatever” (Habermas 1996, 166) and exclude those who withdraw 
from cooperation, and it m ust not allow the exploitation of one party by the other. Thus, 
compromise can also be agreed to  by everyone, albeit for different reasons. In this way the 
application of the discourse principle limits the extent to  which bargaining pow er can be 
exercised.
The Problem w ith Consensus
Such a unified view of agreement presents significant problems in today’s complex 
democratic societies (Bohman 1996, Young 2000). These societies are characterised by 
pluralism. There is no single over-arching ethical or m oral fram ework that all citizens 
subscribe to. Rather, there exist a very high num ber of different reasonable worldviews, 
many of which feature basic assumptions that are not mutually comm ensurable. Barber 
argues that in most societies consensual democracy cannot be genuinely political as it “wills 
away conflict” (Barber 1984, 150). Consensus in this case is either imposed or reflects the 
fact that intractable conflicts are avoided in political discussions. In pluralistic societies, 
seeking a consensual decision can lead to a lack of solution for just about every political 
problem. A unique consensus is m ore likely to emerge in societies where m em bers have a 
strong shared identity, that is citizens share values and traditions that give them  a sense of 
commonness. Thus, deliberative democracy faces a serious challenge if it attem pts to 
reconcile the possibility of reaching a unique consensus with pluralism.
Deliberation might actually increase dissent as it becomes clear to deliberators just 
how strongly they feel about an issue or how different a problem ’s solutions are from  each 
other (Knight and Johnson 1994). There might be instances when deliberators will realise
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that an issue which they have not given m uch thought to beforehand has an obvious 
solution. But if deliberation is to be meaningful, it will often be concerned w ith deeply 
divisive issues. It is quite conceivable that when they look at their underlying preferences, 
deliberators’ beliefs in the rightness of their preferred options will become stronger.
But it is certainly not desirable that such divisive issues should be avoided simply in 
order to create an illusion of consensus (Johnson 1998). Furtherm ore, in politics, it is 
highly unlikely that these issues can be avoided at all. There are virtually no truly value- 
free decisions. Even the choice of pizza toppings can be subject to moral consideration if a 
group includes vegetarians, Muslims, Jews or Hindus.
A consensus could also mask problems of conformity or informational cascades 
(Sunstein 2003). Conformity can develop because of informal social pressures within the 
group or within w ider society. Informational cascades develop when one individual 
chooses to update his beliefs based on the fact that someone else who appears to be 
knowledgeable holds a certain belief, when that belief might in fact be incorrect. This in 
turn can cause another individual to update his beliefs as well. A critical mass of individuals 
can soon develop who hold beliefs not based on their own private information but based on 
the assumption that if others believe something, it must be true. One o f the biggest 
dangers of informational cascades is that individuals fail to reveal their private information, 
and thus members of the group will not realise that they are in effect holding a false belief.
Thus, the fact that some group members express judgments different from those of 
the majority without any negative consequences for their dissent is an indicator of a healthy 
debate without coercion and pressures to conform.
The above problems should encourage us to think about relaxing a strong demand 
for consensus. In order to discover how this could be done it is useful to  juxtapose 
Habermas’ concepts of consensus and compromise. In his view a compromise can be 
reached when a consensus is not available (Habermas 1996, 165-166). This does no t relax 
the demand for consensus, only acknowledges that consensus will sometimes be infeasible. 
But in practice the tw o might already be fairly close to  each other, especially if bargaining 
powers in reaching a compromise are suitably restricted.
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It is certainly true that a theoretical distinction can be made betw een consensus and 
compromise. This is because the two are different in crucial and defining ways. But the 
extent to which consensus is superior to compromise might be narrow er than it appears at 
first sight. This is because of the similarities in their external appearance and effects.
W e can talk of a consensus when each deliberator’s most preferred policy point is 
identical. Thus, there exists a perfectly harmonious agreement about what should be done. 
In the deliberative context this agreement will come about after sharing inform ation and 
points of view in a discussion. It needs to be stressed that in this case every deliberator will 
be able to choose his or her first-best option, one which she has chosen not because other 
options are unavailable or strongly opposed by other deliberators, but because she believes 
in its correctness. In fact a strong consensus is even stronger than this, as it concerns the 
moral and ethical premises as well as the practical conclusion behind a choice. Needless to 
say, this is an incredibly strict definition of consensus that is not likely to be m et in politics.
An assumption of other-regarding attitudes can play in favour of expecting a 
compromise instead of a consensus. Other-regardingness means respecting and taking into 
account the beliefs and preferences of others. This may not necessarily mean that we 
change our most preferred policy point in order to  coincide with that of others. But we 
will take their preferences into account and sacrifice our own willingly in order to agree on 
a mutually beneficial position. Thus, other-regarding attitudes may be in terpreted  as an 
internalised form of conscientious bargaining betw een my interest and theirs. But if this is 
true, then finding a consensus becomes much less im portant as long as there exists a 
compromise compatible with the assumptions of deliberative democracy.
It could be hard to distinguish a consensus from  a compromise in an actual 
deliberative setting. This is certainly the case if we reach an inner compromise after 
weighing up the preferences of others. If compromise is not the result of an open and 
possibly prolonged period of bargaining, it might be indistinguishable in practice from  
consensus, especially if we do not know about the mental processes of deliberators. After 
all, how do we tell if someone agreed to a proposal because he truly believed it was the
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best one, or because he realised that given how strongly others felt about the issue he had 
nothing to lose by agreeing to it himself.
But practical considerations push us towards compromise as well. If after careful 
deliberation I believe that the option I consider to  be second-best is still viable and I 
observe that given the beliefs, judgments and preferences of others it is the only politically 
viable option, then, unless I am very stubborn, I will accept this outcome despite 
perceiving it to be second-best. One could argue that when those framers of the US 
constitution who were against slavery, yet agreed to  its continued existence, did just this. 
While they would have preferred a union w ithout slavery, a union with slavery was still 
preferable to no union at all (Riker 1986).
For Habermas a compromise is something that needs to be found when the values of 
deliberators clash so much that establishing a consensus becomes impossible. This 
constitutes an internal constraint within deliberation. But how about situations in which a 
consensus does exist among deliberators, yet an external constraint, say a budget 
constraint, stops them from carrying out their optimal choice? In this case each of the 
deliberators would need to  compromise on his or her m ost preferred outcome. Habermas 
only talks about compromise due to internal constraints. But if one is a compromise, then 
so is the other. Settling for a second-best solution, w hether it is because of external 
constraints, or whether it is because of the strongly held views of others, is a common 
occurrence in politics. Consensus is a rarity, not the norm .
If preferences are laundered (Goodin 1986) even before the start of deliberation, this 
might already constitute a form of compromise. If deliberators all agreed that those 
preferences which are laundered are unacceptable, then there would not be a need for 
them to affectively censor themselves in deliberation. Eventually, of course, such 
conventions may turn into a genuine consensus. But, at the beginning at least, the 
possibility of compromise at the point of entry into deliberation is quite high. This is true 
even if afterwards deliberation proceeds according to the highest ideal standards and results 
in a purely consensual decision.
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Consensus means that we collectively choose exactly what we individually want 
most. In a compromise the collective choice and the individual ideal do not overlap and 
instead of saying ‘yes, this is what I really want and we are going to choose i t ’ one needs to 
say ‘this is what I really want, but I cannot have it; therefore I will settle for something 
else’. As long as no strong moral objections can be voiced — I am not agreeing to become 
disenfranchised or let my fellow citizens be m urdered, for example — the superiority of a 
consensus is not clear. It may be superior for the individual, as each citizen will now 
receive her most preferred option, but its superiority for the group is not obvious.
Once we have realised that dissent can be beneficial, that consensus is very hard to 
attain and its existence is not always easy to prove, we can ask ourselves whether reaching 
a consensus is really so im portant in politics. If we agree that the spirit of deliberation 
consists m ore in reaching a decision everyone can agree to through communicating with 
each other, then it becomes obvious that the focus is on agreement rather than consensus. 
And agreement is what makes a compromise so closely related to a consensus.
In politics we face many constraints. Different points of view, moral values and 
personal interests need to  be reconciled. At the same tim e if deliberation occurs in the real 
world rather than under ideal circumstances, there will be a host of external factors which 
constrain our options. It might not always be possible to spend the optimal amount both on 
health care and policing. It will be necessary to make many compromises and the first 
choice of the deliberators will not always be available. It seems therefore necessary to give 
up the idea of a unique consensus or aiming for a consensus and look for other ways in 
which decisions can be made without violating the spirit of deliberation.
Consensus Relaxed
There is a practical need to relax consensus and no normative reason against it. The first 
response to pluralistic cultural complexity is to confine consensual outcomes to the realm 
of political ideals. W e can then admit that real pluralistic societies will not five up to this
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ideal, while asserting that they should nevertheless aspire to  it. Thus, at the same time 
reality is acknowledged and the theoretical ideal of consensus is salvaged. But even in this 
case deliberative democrats need to  relax the definition of consensus to  one that they can 
credibly aspire to in the real world.
This has been done in the literature in three broad ways. Firstly, it can be done on 
the level of content, by allowing for reasoned compromise or agreement on conclusions 
where no agreement can be found on the underlying moral or ethical premises. Here, 
consensus is defined less strictly in order to allow for the co-existence of different 
frameworks of interpretation. Secondly, consensus may be found not on the level of the 
individual decision, but on the level of an overarching fram ew ork within which we can 
think about decisions. Thirdly, it can be argued that the normative demand for consensus 
in deliberative democracy concerns consensus over the procedure itself, rather than the 
content of the decisions in generates. According to this third formulation, consensus serves 
to legitimate democratic decision-making. I shall now look at examples of each of these 
responses in turn.
Content-Based Solutions
Instead of a unique consensus some theorists introduce weaker concepts of agreement that 
attem pt to accommodate multiple worldviews within a society. Relaxing stronger 
definitions of consensus is not only justified on practical grounds in the literature. 
Difference democrats argue that seeking a strong, unique consensus may in some situations 
be harmful. According to Young (2000, 43), seeking a unique consensus or a common 
interest can serve as a vehicle for exclusion. Less privileged members of society might be 
asked to make sacrifices for a common good from which they would not receive any 
benefits. She argues that rather than seeking to find consensual agreements based on 
consensual reasons, the aim of deliberation should be to  find workable solutions and arrive 
at particular judgements for well-defined problems (Young 2000, 29).
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Habermas’s way of relaxing consensus by accepting a compromise has already been 
described earlier. W hile it allows for different reasons for a conclusion, this definition of 
compromise does not violate the spirit of deliberative democracy by regulating bargaining 
in order to make the procedure m ore equitable to all.
One of the most well-known ways of relaxing consensus is Rawls’s concept of 
overlapping consensus (1993). He was not writing specifically in the context of 
deliberative democracy, but his concept has been used by others in the literature to 
underpin deliberation. Rawls argues that citizens can retain their comprehensive doctrines 
or frameworks which they use to explain the world, but as long as these doctrines are 
reasonable they should be able to arrive at a conception of justice in the political sphere 
that is acceptable to all. Thus, he argues that an overlapping consensus is a political 
arrangement which can be accepted by all citizens holding reasonable doctrines as they 
recognise that such a consensus is politically necessary. It is not a requirem ent, however, 
that citizens should start out by agreeing to an overlapping consensus. Over very long 
periods of tim e what was originally a modus vivendi, such as religious toleration, can 
become a constitutional consensus, that is a fram ework everyone is willing to five with, 
and eventually this will develop into an overlapping consensus once citizens recognise that 
it complements their comprehensive doctrine or if it does not com plem ent it, they are 
willing to redefine that doctrine. This last requirem ent makes it stronger than just a 
Habermasian compromise, which does not have such a reflexive quality.
Sunstein’s (1994) incompletely theorised agreement is one of the m ost well-defined 
conditions for agreement without a unique consensus. W hile people are often able to  agree 
on a course of action, they may not be able to  do so on the underlying reasons for it. 
Incompletely theorised agreements allow individuals to  agree on a decision for very 
different reasons, without having to agree on those reasons as well. If there is agreement 
on a decision, then agreement on underlying reasons becomes practically unnecessary, is 
often infeasible to reach and can even be undesirable if it would lead to  further divisions 
(List 2006). This places no demand on decision-makers to abandon their fundamental 
underlying preferences, or in other words their worldview. It allows for the formation of
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unlikely coalitions as long as all members can agree on their preferred outcome. 
Deliberation can then be defined as a procedure which allows deliberators to try  and 
convince each other of the best solution, while leaving their underlying preferences intact. 
Both of these ways of relaxing consensus require an agreement on outcomes, while 
allowing each decision-maker to come to this conclusion for different reasons, just as a 
Habermasian compromise does. The three theories thus have a lot in common.
Bohman (1996) criticises Habermas and Rawls for the use of what he calls singular 
reason, where reasonable or consensual policies are articulated from only one perspective. 
He also disputes the fact that such singular reason should lead to consensual agreement. 
According to  Bohman, “plural agreement merely requires continued cooperation in public 
deliberation, even with persistent disagreements.”
Thus, he introduces the concept of moral compromise. Moral compromises are 
frameworks that allow individuals to accommodate the values of other without necessarily 
having to give up their own. They develop as a result of discussion, as both sides change 
their framework of interpretation in a way that allows them to recognise each o ther’s 
moral values. The aim is not to develop a consensus, bu t to allow the representation of 
both sides and ensure that neither will withdraw from the debate. Moral compromise 
should be both pluralistic and dynamic. However, introducing such a compromise is akin 
to introducing the kind of common framing I argued against in chapter three.
W hat all of the above ways of relaxing consensus have in common is agreement on 
the conclusion while perm itting disagreement on the premises. But deliberation needs to 
function and arrive at decisions when not even a content-based consensus is available. 
Therefore, we need to look at ways in which the definition of consensus can be further 
relaxed.
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Structure-Based Solutions
Structure-based solutions address the way in which deliberative democracy would 
transform citizens’ preferences and indicate that citizens would find it easier to make 
mutually acceptable decisions after deliberation. Looking for a solution at the level of 
preferences allows us to potentially reconcile aggregative and deliberative models of 
democracy.
Meta-consensus is an agreement on the underlying dimensions of the issue under 
deliberation. Meta-consensus — depending on its precise variant — may induce single- 
peakedness, which means that each deliberator can order her preferences along a salient 
dimension, for example left and right, in such a way that her preferences decrease from 
her most preferred alternative along this dimension (List 2004).
M eta-agreement in fact corresponds to the concept of single-peakedness first defined 
by Duncan Black (1948). This is a characteristic of deliberation that is firmly based on an 
instrumental view of rationality and yet contributes to the justification of deliberative 
democracy by arguing that reasoned debate will lead to citizens forming new  preferences 
and transforming old ones in a way that will help us to arrive at be tter decisions.
In order to understand the importance of single-peakedness, first we need to look at 
the social choice theoretic problem  of cycling. As I m entioned earlier, voting cycles have 
first been discussed by Condorcet, and refer to  situations in which aggregating individual 
preference orderings — typically by majority voting — will result in a social ordering of ‘x >  
y  >  z >  x \  where *>’ stands for ‘is strictly preferred to ’. In a case like this it is not clear 
which one the winning alternative is. The theoretical probability that cycles will occur 
increases as the num ber of voters and the num ber of available alternatives increases 
(Gehrlein 2002).
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Figure 1: An overview o f types o f equality and inclusion.
A sufficient, but n ot necessary con d ition  for avoiding cyc les, id en tified  by D uncan  
Black (1 9 4 8 ) , is the p resen ce o f  sin g le-p eak ed ness. P references arc called  single-peaked if  
the options can be arranged along a structuring d im en sion  from  left to  right such that each  
individual has a m ost preferred  o p tio n , and her p referen ce over all o th er op tion s decreases  
w ith  increasing distance from  the m ost preferred  op tion . A ccord ingly , if  th ere arc three  
op tion s, — x, y  and z — arranged in this ord er along a d im ension , then  an in d ividual’s 
p referen ce ordering can take the form  ‘x >  y  >  z ’, but cannot take the form  x >  z >  y .  T he  
nam e ‘single-peaked  p referen ces’ derives from  the fact that in a diagram  all lines have one  
single, clearly identifiab le peak (diagram  1). It is n o t essential to  achieve p erfect single- 
peakedness. W ith  the increase o f  the p rop ortion  o f  sin gle-p eak ed  p referen ce orderings in a 
group, the lik elihood  that cycles w ill appear w ill be redu ced  (N iem i 1969).
This w ou ld  so lve the p rob lem  o f  instability  that A rr o w ’s theorem  im p lies for voting. 
In fact, this is a restriction  o f  the con d ition  o f  universal dom ain  in  the th eorem . If 
p referen ces are structured  along a fe w  co m m o n  d im en sion s, w e  w o u ld  n o  lon ger be  
allow ing all possib le p referen ce orderings, as the con d ition  o f  universal d om ain  dem ands.
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Thus, deliberation could reduce the indeterminacy of voting outcomes to  an extent where 
it poses negligible consequences.
If deliberation does increase the proportion of single-peaked preferences in the 
group, this will mean that it will achieve its objective of increasing the stability and 
coherence of decisions by creating the structural preconditions of agreement. However, 
some of the m ost persistent disagreements occur exactly when such a structuring 
dimension cannot be found. For those disagreements, meta-consensus will be of little help. 
And even if we locate a common issue dimension we still have not made an actual decision.
Procedure-Based Solutions
But maybe what the spirit of deliberation truly demands is not consensus over the content 
of decisions at all. Rather what we should be looking for is a compromise over the 
procedure of deliberation itself; all or nearly all citizens accepting it as the best and 
possibly fairest way of arriving at a collective decision. Thus, for Gutmann and Thompson 
(1996) deliberative democracy is a procedure which has better chances of arriving at 
justifiable policies in the face of moral disagreements than other procedures.
According to Benhabib (1996, 73), “agreements in societies living w ith value- 
pluralism are to be sought for not at the level of substantive beliefs bu t at that of 
procedures, processes, and practices for attaining and revising beliefs.” Thus, citizens need 
to agree that deliberation is the best way to  reach decisions while at times they might 
disagree with those decisions. Therefore, for Benhabib the concept of consensus is linked 
to legitimacy. Deliberative consensus is an agreement that legitimates deliberative 
democracy. This entails a consensus that every individual is entitled to self-respect and that 
deliberation should be based on rational argumentation which is interpreted in an other- 
regarding manner by listeners.
For Barber (1984) the task of politics is also legitimation. For him the political 
process can have three results. Firstly, it can create a decision through bargaining and
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exchange. Secondly, it can reveal an already existing consensus. Thirdly, it can transform 
conflict through a “participatory process of ongoing, proxim ate self-legislation and the 
creation of a political community capable of transforming dependent private individuals 
into free citizens and partial and private interest into public goods” (Barber 1984, 151). It 
is this third result whereby deliberation provides political legitimacy. As for Benhabib, this 
is a reflexive “never-ending process of deliberation, decision and action” (Barber 1984, 
151). W hat is crucial for a deliberative process is not ordinary consensus, but consensus 
over the legitimacy of this reflexive process.
W hat legitimates deliberative democracy for these authors is an agreement on an 
other-regarding, inclusive, reflexive procedure, which, as Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 
43) put it, “contains the means of its own correction”. W hile this view of consensus 
provides a basis of legitimacy for deliberative democracy, it does not tell us much about 
the outcome of deliberation. The first group of content-based solutions gives us a better 
idea of how deliberative democracy could be put into practice.
Such solutions also presuppose that it would indeed be possible to  agree that 
deliberative forms of democracy produce the most legitimate outcomes. If we define 
deliberation in a m ore minimal sense, as group decision-making through discussion, this 
may not be too problematic. However, if we add requirem ents for other-regardingness 
and other m ore controversial values, it may be that no such consensus over a deliberative 
model of democracy will emerge.
Deliberation could also serve to establish a consensus over using other decision­
making methods. Thus, a group could reach a deliberative consensus to use voting or 
strategic bargaining to resolve a problem. This highlights a very im portant point for the 
deliberative democracy literature. W hile deliberative democrats do acknowledge the need 
to accommodate self-interest and to use non-deliberative decision-making mechanisms, 
these are all situated within a deliberative fram ework and their appropriateness needs to be 
determined through deliberative means. Thus, in a m odel of deliberative democracy, 
deliberation is always the primary decision-making m ethod, notwithstanding the use of
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voting or bargaining at times. This is a rather im portant point that is w orth bearing in mind 
for evaluating the model of deliberative democracy.
So far this chapter has been dealing with decision-making at an abstract, theoretical 
level. The rem ainder of the chapter will take a m ore practical approach. The next section 
will examine mixed forms of decision-making, which incorporate significant deliberative 
elements, but complement them with voting in order to  arrive at a decision. After all, 
even if a consensus will exist, how can we tell that it is there? Surely at the very least we 
will need to ask for a show of hands.
M ixed Forms o f  Decision-M aking
Once we have relaxed the assumptions about reaching a strong consensus through 
deliberation, it is possible to focus on mixed forms of decision-making that are 
overwhelmingly deliberative, yet incorporate aggregative elements. By now I have 
established that reaching a unique consensus solely through deliberation m ust be confined 
to the world of ideals and surveyed a variety of theoretical ways in which this can be 
achieved. It is now reasonable to suppose that some form of voting will be necessary even 
in deliberative democracies, even if this is done under a primarily deliberative framework. 
Allowing voting is the main way in which ideal deliberative processes could be relaxed. But 
they could also be relaxed through allowing bargaining, which is based on self-interested 
negotiation. I will now examine mixing deliberative democracy with both voting and 
bargaining.
Combining Deliberation with Voting
There are a num ber of recent theoretical innovations which aim to introduce formal 
deliberation among citizens while preserving the existing fram ework of elections and 
representation. The idea of citizen juries predates the rise of the theory of deliberative
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democracy, but it has nevertheless been connected to  it in recent years. Deliberative 
polling and deliberation day are ideas which have been developed based on deliberative 
theory (Luskin et al. 2002)32. Each of these procedures have phases in which deliberators 
are supplied with new information, and phases in which citizens have a chance to 
participate in a discussion in smaller groups. Yet they are not aimed at replacing voting and 
elections but are rather supplementary mechanisms. Similarly, informal models of 
deliberative democracy would retain elements of voting and representation while putting a 
much increased emphasis on deliberation in the public sphere.
Acknowledging that both deliberation and voting m ust be present in politics offers us 
a way to reconcile deliberative and aggregative models of democracy. Such a way of 
thinking about democratic politics allows room  for the concerns of both models of politics. 
The deliberative part of decision-making would focus on deliberative dem ocrats’ priorities 
of preference change through inclusive, reasoned discussion. Voting would be addressed by 
the concerns of aggregative democrats for finding a fair and democratic way of aggregating 
preferences.
Those citizen juries and deliberative polls which have been nm  as quasi-experiments 
provide us with empirical information about the way in which deliberators change their 
views. They can provide crucial information about w hether consensus or m eta-agreem ent 
have increased, whether deliberators have become m ore informed, o r whether there has 
been an increase in polarized preferences. However, as they do not directly contribute to 
political decision-making, we need to be aware when interpreting results that real-world 
deliberation is likely to be even less close to the ideal than these experiments.
The empirical results I would like to focus on here are concerned with the way 
deliberation aids decision-making. Therefore, I will no t look at possible increases in 
conformity or polarized preferences, as both are concerns which I have already addressed 
in chapter three.
32 Deliberative polls are organised by the Center for Deliberative Democracy at Stanford: 
http: /  /  cdd. Stanford. edu / .
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There is evidence that citizens are better informed on issues after deliberation than 
they were before. Farrar et al. (2003) find that after a deliberative poll the num ber of 
factual questions which deliberators could answer correctly increased from  36.8%  to 
59.1%. People also perceive themselves to be better informed after deliberation. After a 
deliberative poll in Hungary the proportion of those who considered themselves to be very 
well informed or moderately well informed about the situation of the Roma in Hungary 
increased from 74% to 85% .33 The proportion of factual questions answered correctly 
increased concurrently from 28% to 42% .34 Clearly, even after a day or tw o of 
deliberation people will still be unable to answer many of the questions correctly. But it is 
probably safe to say that after a longer period of deliberation, if deliberators took their 
duty seriously we would see a much larger improvement.
There is also evidence that deliberation increases single-peakedness. This might point 
to an increase in agreement about the nature of the issue in deliberation, or in other words 
an increase in meta-consensus. An experim ent using deliberative polling in N ew  Haven has 
found that single-peakedness has increased for both of the topics discussed, albeit to a 
different extent (Fishkin et al. 2007, Farrar et al. forthcoming). Deliberation on the first 
issue, which was concerned with a possible extension of the local airport, only produced a 
marginal increase in single-peakedness. However, preferences w ere already well- 
structured at the start of deliberation, with the proportion of individuals whose 
preferences were single-peaked at 77%, which eventually increased to 81%. For the 
second issue, sharing tax revenues from new  businesses betw een municipalities, the 
proportion of single-peaked preferences increased dramatically, from 52% to 80%. The 
authors explain this with the fact that in the months preceding deliberation airport 
extension was a much m ore prom inent issue; therefore people had m ore developed 
preferences over it and were m ore aware of the underlying issue dimensions. Hence, they 
had fewer opportunities to learn m ore about the issue dimensions involved and they were 
also less inclined to change their preferences. But as single-peakedness did increase for
33 http: /  /  www.magyaragora.org/
34 Ibid.
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both issues, albeit to a different extent, the hypothesis that preferences wall becom e m ore 
single-peaked during deliberation still holds based on this evidence.
Deliberation might induce a level of single-peakedness that virtually eliminates the 
presence of voting cycles. If this is the case, then deliberation wall succeed at its aim of 
reducing the instability and ambiguity that stems from voting. However, as we have seen 
from the above example of the deliberative poll on airport extension, if an issue is salient in 
public discussions, in the media and in private conversation, preferences will already 
display a large degree of single-peakedness and thus meta-consensus is already present to a 
large extent. But as far as the need for some form of consensus in deliberation is 
concerned, we can say that while it is not feasible to assume that deliberation will result in 
a full consensus, an expectation of meta-consensus instead could be a viable alternative.
If through deliberation meta-consensus is increased, this means that we are relaxing 
the universal domain condition of A rrow ’s theorem . Under the universal domain 
condition, all logically possible preference orderings are admitted. But once preferences 
are single-peaked, this is no longer true. All logically possible preference orderings may 
still be perm itted, but they would not always occur naturally anymore. Deliberation might 
also restrict preferences through filtering out undesirable, such as racist, preferences and 
maybe even by reducing the num ber of viable options to choose from. Thus, deliberative 
democracy may offer us a way out of two of the problems identified by social choice 
theory; instability and impossibility.
Bargaining
If we allow deliberation to be accompanied by voting, the question arises w hether we 
should relax the conditions of deliberation further and allow bargaining as well. W hile in 
the ideal model deliberation is assumed to be superior to bargaining, those authors who do 
mention it admit that it is a necessary part of politics. But this is very much an issue which 
many authors have not paid adequate attention to. In reality, deliberation is always situated
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among other political actions, such as voting, bargaining, protesting or even expression 
through politically inspired art.
Habermas argues that decisions will be based on a “complicated netw ork of 
discourses and bargaining and not simply on moral discourses” (Habermas 1996, 452), 
even in a primarily deliberative democracy. In Between Facts and Norms (1996) he adopts the 
point of view that bargaining can complement deliberation when the situation permits. 
Bargaining can be im portant because it places a higher importance on private interests, 
something which cannot be kept out of the political arena. Bargaining also becomes 
necessary, even in situations when deliberation would be optimal, if one side in the debate 
refuses to deliberate. Thus, bargaining can be a first-best or a second-best option, 
depending on the context.
According to  Elster (1989), bargaining is an inefficient form of decision-making. 
Among the contributing factors to  this inefficiency, he fists the cost of bargaining, the cost 
of trying to improve one’s bargaining position, the danger of making excessive claims that 
cannot be m et half-way, the tendency to  disbelieve information that does not support one’s 
position and the cost of establishing credibility (Elster 1989, 94). He also argues that both 
social norms and self-interest play a role in bargaining.
Integrating bargaining into the fram ework of a deliberative compromise might 
eliminate m ost of these inefficiencies. For example, informational biases — only listening to 
those who support our position — are m eant to be ruled out in deliberation. Bargaining 
power ought to be checked by other-regardingness in deliberation. Following the 
conditions that Habermas (1996) sets, we can define bargaining under a deliberative 
framework as a decision-making mechanism that has an outcome which is acceptable to 
everyone and better than no agreement at all, excludes those who withdraw from 
deliberation completely and prohibits the exploitation of one part of the group by the 
other.
An im portant reason for supporting bargaining under a deliberative fram ework is 
that while we can find a moral dimension in m ost political issues, it may be possible to 
decide some of them  primarily on grounds of self-interest. Gutmann and Thompson
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(1996) give trade negotiations as an example. But even in these cases the moral merits of 
the outcome have to be properly considered and bargaining should be guided by the 
principle of reciprocity (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 72). W hile trade negotiations 
might have an obvious moral aspect, there is a range of options which are morally 
acceptable, but which nevertheless benefit the tw o parties to different levels. These 
morally acceptable options could be identified through deliberation. Thus, once we make 
sure that a trade agreement is not exploitative and does not jeopardise human rights, one 
cannot object to reaching a decision through bargaining.
The problem  with this distinction is that it requires us to  draw a line betw een 
primarily moral and all other disagreements. Gutmann and Thompson argue that disputes 
over redistribution and welfare should be resolved by deliberation, while trade agreements 
such as the NAFTA can be negotiated through bargaining. But trade agreements could 
easily be re-fram ed in term s of moral arguments. Barriers to free trade affect the life- 
chances of those in poorer countries significantly. Therefore, trade negotiations can be said 
to  have a significant moral component. O f course, trade negotiations have the added 
complication that they are conducted betw een countries. But similar examples can be 
found in domestic politics as well, such as negotiations betw een employers and trade 
unions in corporatist countries. In these cases theorists need to evoke democratic 
deliberation as the fram ework within which it can be decided whether an issue can be 
legitimately resolved through bargaining.
All the above arguments see bargaining as subordinated to the supposedly morally 
superior, other-regarding deliberative procedure. This is not a realistic assumption. In the 
cases where bargaining would take place, it would exist alongside deliberation, rather than 
being subsumed under its m ore demanding standards of behaviour and attitudes.
Some would question whether it is bargaining at all if all agreed on a common goal, 
even if it were as vague as agreeing on a policy for health provision, but could not agree on 
the way in which this goal can be reached. Bargaining is usually seen as a mechanism for 
dividing goods, rather than choosing betw een decisions that will give everyone equal pay­
offs. It is clear that one can bargain over different ways to  divide $100. It is not so clear
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that one can bargain over whether healthcare should be provided privately or publicly. 
Brennan and Goodin (2001) and Goodin (2003) argue that the latter scenario can still be 
called bargaining as each individual has different views on the pay-offs which the 
community receive from different decisions. One person might believe that we would all 
be better off if healthcare was provided privately and another person might believe that we 
would all be better off if it was provided publicly. In this case there is room  for bargaining 
over our beliefs, as we both have different expectations about the pay-offs that the two 
different policies would generate. Thus, for each participant the expected pay-off from 
choosing his preferred policy will be different from the expected pay-off of choosing any 
other policy.
Deliberative democracies will no doubt have to deal with situations where goods can 
be bargained over and divided the same way as we can divide $100. W elfare policies would 
be an obvious example for this, but the example of trade negotiations above would also fall 
into this category. There will also be instances where different individuals or groups will 
favour different ways of proceeding to reach a certain goal. In these cases bargaining in the 
sense that Brennan and Goodin use the term  will be possible.
However, there will be cases where the choices available are so different that it is not 
possible to bargain over them. Abortion is a classic example. There is a binary choice 
betw een either allowing abortion or not. There is only a possibility of bargaining once one 
allows for the possibility of abortion, where there is space to argue for anything between 
making abortion legal for the first few weeks or up to the end of pregnancy. But when two 
options are completely divergent bargaining is not possible. Another example is whether 
we should allow pictures of Mohammed to be published or not. It is unlikely that those 
who argue against it will settle for depicting the prophet partially or in a positive light. 
There will be cases where there will be disagreement over the nature of goal we should 
reach — in these cases bargaining may not help us even under a deliberative setting.
Not all theorists agree that bargaining is a necessary elem ent of deliberative politics. 
Bohman (1996) argues that bargaining reduces deliberative democracy to a modus vivendi. 
Furtherm ore, bargaining asks the impossible in the case of deep conflicts, when it treats
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deeply held beliefs as something negotiable. As he does not agree with the viability of 
Rawls’s overlapping consensus, he does not share Rawls’s optimism that over time such a 
modus vivendi can become something that will satisfy his democratic requirem ents m ore 
closely.
O ut of necessity, bargaining has to remain a part of politics even in a deliberative 
democracy. But just like voting, it will introduce further complications for the theory of 
deliberative democracy. Since it cannot always be subsumed under the deliberative 
fram ework, deliberation has to co-exist w ith other decision-making processes, which do 
not follow the standards set down by deliberative theorists.
Aggregat i° n and Deliberation Reassessed
The above discussion indicates that while a deliberative consensus, in the sense of a 
unanimous decision reached through deliberation, is unlikely to  be feasible in general, 
other, mixed forms of decision-making that utilise both deliberation and voting should be 
our main area of focus when we consider improving the deliberative quality of 
democracies. This means that aggregative and deliberative forms of democracy will need to 
co-exist.
It is true that the problems of aggregative democracy can to  a large extent be solved 
by public discussions. But the assumption that aggregative democracy aggregates votes in a 
vacuum is false. W e do not currently live in an aggregative democracy in this sense. Public 
discussions already occur and most people hold preferences which are aligned along a 
relatively limited num ber of issue dimensions.
In large populations, such as the electorates of m odern democracies, we will see a 
considerable restriction of the universal domain condition and a wide-spread existence of 
single-peaked prferences. W e can always expect some outliers to  be present, voters with 
an exotic combination of preferences, but given the sheer num ber of voters they are not 
going to have a significant impact.
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However, many issues have m ore than one salient issue dimension. In pluralistic 
societies we can expect that different groups might indeed hold single-peaked preferences 
within the group, but focus on very different issue dimensions from other groups. 
Distinctive minorities will exist in all societies.
Sometimes deliberation might resolve such cases when it becomes clear to group 
m em bers from  new information and discussion that some issue dimensions are not as 
im portant as they have originally assumed them  to be. But many of the m ost intractable 
issues in politics are ones that have already received a lot of public attention. People’s 
preferences and judgments over these issues will be m ore deeply held and m ore difficult to 
change through deliberation. And in any case, deliberation will not necessarily lead people 
to  change their views after reasoned discussion. They might continue to hold the same 
views while at the same time being able to justify them  better (Bohman 1996).
In pluralistic societies some problems will be incommensurable, because each group 
will assume that different issue dimensions are salient and it is not possible to  utilise these 
dimensions at the same time to reach an agreement. Bohman’s (1996) moral compromise 
would be difficult to implement for this exact reason, as the dimensions that are available 
for us to construct a deliberative framework are incommensurable.
One option may be to rank the dimensions along which issues can be decided 
through voting and then find the winning alternative along the m ost im portant dimension 
(Miller 1992). But such a solution is only meaningful if everyone agrees which dimensions 
are im portant and there are only disagreements about which dimension is the most 
im portant. That is, no one will believe that an issue dimension which some others list as 
m ost im portant is in fact not relevant at all. In many conflicts ranking issue dimensions 
might be the hardest problem to resolve.
The prim ary problem is not that of aggregation, but value pluralism w hen we are 
trying to find consensual agreements. In fact, if we restricted universal domain to an extent 
that pluralism would be reduced to a minimum, social-choice-theoretic problems would 
be to a very large extent eliminated. But this is no t desirable, as pluralism would be 
replaced by the dominance of one single value system, whether everyone accepts it or not.
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Therefore, the value of deliberation will no t necessarily lie in the resolution of 
disagreements which representative democracy cannot resolve. Both epistemic 
justifications of deliberative democracy and the procedural ones examined in earlier 
chapters offer a better basis for the deliberative model than reaching a consensus does. 
Deliberation could also have a strong expressive function, as those who have lost could 
accept decisions m ore easily if they felt that they had been allowed to  voice their concerns 
adequately. W hile this expressive function may potentially be stronger under deliberative 
democracy it is already perform ed by many elements of representative democracies, for 
example by legislative committees.
It is also unclear that we need a deliberative democracy to  reach the weaker forms of 
consensus I looked at above. Deliberation might help us in reaching them , but it is not the 
only way to reach them . They could also be induced by other means, such as propaganda, 
cultural factors or simply the availability of a free national media. Dem ocratic systems may 
produce such agreements m ore often, but do we necessarily need deliberative democracy 
for this?
Aggregative democracy, in its limiting case w ithout public discussion or social 
interaction, would frequently be subject to the emergence of cycles and ambiguous results. 
Deliberative democracy, on the other hand, would be subject to deadlocks and indecision 
if we always expected that a unanimous consensus will emerge. Thus, the two forms of 
decision-making are mutually dependent on each other. It should not be surprising then 
that liberal representative democracies by necessity already incorporate deliberative 
elements.
Deliberative and aggregative democracies also have m ore conceptual similarities than 
it is normally assumed. If, as I have argued earlier in this chapter, deliberation will demand 
that in our search for a decision we not only look at our own information, preferences and 
values, but also at those of our fellow deliberators, it becomes possible to reduce the 
conceptual distance betw een aggregative and deliberative democracies. If being other- 
regarding means that we take into account the views and preferences of others w hen we
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make decisions, then accepting the result of democratic elections becomes similar to 
reaching a compromise in deliberation.
W hen the w inner of an election is not the party we prefer, we still accept the result, 
as we respect the preferences and choices of other voters. Unless we judge the result of the 
election to be somehow immoral — such as the victory of a fascist party — we are going to 
accept a compromise. W e will m ost likely find the winning party acceptable, even if not 
nearly as good as the party we have voted for. W e do this because accepting the result is 
be tter than no agreement at all. This holds even despite the fact that results might 
sometimes be unstable and that different voting rules might produce different results.
Thus, the results of an election bear a significant resemblance to a Habermasian 
compromise — not least because the decision reached through them  is one that m ost people 
can agree with, albeit for different reasons. The winners will accept it because they have 
won, and the losers because the decision was made using a representative and legitimate 
decision-making process35. And accepting that everyone should have a vote and that every 
vote should have an equal weight is tantamount to acknowledging that everyone’s views 
need to be taken into account.
W e can also have a procedural consensus about the way in which votes are counted. 
But this agreement should not be because of the inert forces of tradition — because we have 
always counted votes this way. If there does not exist a voting mechanism that is obviously 
better than all others, then this consensus would not even arise from the fact that this is 
obviously the best option. W e might accept a voting procedure because it is not as bad as 
others. But even if there is no best m ethod for counting votes, as A rrow ’s theorem  
suggests, we will ultimately need to  decide on counting the votes one way or another.
In the end, what is needed in order to reach a decision is agreeing on a way to do so. 
And whichever m ethod we choose, as long as everyone has a say and everyone’s views 
count, we can say that we are taking others into consideration when we reach a decision. 
W hether we arrive at our preferences individually, maybe after some interned deliberation,
35 Accepting a decision does not mean that we need to be happy about it. We just need to accept it as 
legitimate and, should the decision require any kind of action from us, comply with this requirement.
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without consulting others face to face, or whether we arrive at our decisions after social 
deliberation, the im portant thing is that we make our choice through a mutually acceptable 
mechanism.
Deliberation therefore adds less legitimacy and validity to decisions than usually 
assumed. It might potentially add other values, such as being better informed or being 
m ore aware of one’s underlying values. But it is not an intrinsically better mechanism for 
reaching decisions, as these values could be brought forward through other means as well.
It is a different issue that giving m ore weight to deliberative elements in democracy 
than we currently do might be desirable in order to increase the quality of democratic 
participation. The individual cost of acquiring information and deliberating on a society- 
wide level will of course remain high enough, so that many people will remain rationally 
uninformed. But the quality of public debate could certainly be improved, both in politics 
and the media. Better representation of points of view and less bias in the media would 
then lead to a be tter quality of debate among the general public.
But we do not need to introduce a purely deliberative democracy in order to  do this. 
If anything, the above discussion should show that too much of a good thing can be harmful 
and neither aggregative nor deliberative democracy can function without incorporating 
elements of the other. Deliberative democracy will struggle to produce a consensus or 
even a compromise purely through discussion and a purely aggregative democracy will fall 
pray to social-choice- theoretic problems.
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C h a p t e r  S i x  
A r e T w o  H e a d s  A l w a y s  W i s e r  T h a n  O n e ?
In the previous three chapters I have assessed various procedural justifications for 
deliberative democracy and found that they are not as solid as the theoretical literature 
argues. In this chapter I will focus on a specific outcome-based justification of the 
deliberative model of democracy36, namely that it will generate good decisions. It has been 
argued that small-group deliberation in general will arrive at be tter decisions than 
individuals on their own. However, this does not necessarily apply to  political 
deliberation, which might be better justified on procedural grounds.
Under procedural justifications, decision-making processes are judged according to 
how well they fulfil democratic values, such as inclusiveness, right to  representation or 
fairness. The satisfaction of those values is a property of the procedure itself, rather than an 
outcome that the procedure can contribute towards (Coleman and Ferejohn 1986).
But we can also judge democratic procedures w ith regard to the correctness of the 
choices they generate. Cohen (1986, 34) identifies three elements which need to be 
present for this epistemic interpretation of democratic decision-making37. Firstly, an 
independent standard for correct decisions has to exist; secondly, decisions need to express 
beliefs about this independent standard; and thirdly, beliefs about the state of the world are 
adjusted during decision making in response to evidence from others about the correct 
answer. This third point makes Cohen’s definition especially relevant for deliberative 
democracy, as its crucial defining characteristic is exactly this process of arriving at a 
decision through a deliberative exchange of knowledge and ideas. An epistemic conception 
of democracy focuses on one value of democracy — its ability to track the tru th  or help us 
make good decisions. This value makes democratic decisions legitimate independently of
36 Other outcome-based justifications include consequentialist and welfarist justifications of democracy.
37 Cohen applies these three elements to an epistemic interpretation of voting, but these can be extended to 
a deliberative form of decision-making as well, especially as deliberative democracy is most likely to take 
the form of voting preceded by deliberative discussion.
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the procedure used to reach them  (Estlund 1997). This makes it crucially different from a 
procedural justification of democracy. If we w ant to prom ote deliberative democracy on 
epistemic grounds, we need to show that the procedure of deliberation — most likely 
followed by voting as I have argued in chapter five — has better epistemic properties than 
other possible democratic procedures.
I shall argue that epistemic justifications for deliberative democracy rely on the 
procedure’s ability to raise the competence of citizens in recognising the best arguments. 
However, there is no clear explanation in the current literature when and why this will be 
the case. I will therefore examine the ways in which deliberation can change citizens’ 
competence in order to assess whether an epistemic justification can offer a better 
grounding for the theory of deliberative democracy than a procedural one. I find that 
individual competence will not reliably increase as a result of participating in political 
deliberation, making the procedural account of deliberative democracy a m ore compelling 
alternative.
O f course, it is not necessary to support deliberative democracy exclusively based on 
one of these justifications — in fact most authors would find both epistemic and procedural 
reasons to endorse it. It may ultimately be impossible to divorce epistemic and procedural 
reasons for supporting deliberative democracy from  each other. Inclusive procedures, 
procedures that give voice to each m em ber of the community may be the procedures 
which are needed to maximise the potential of deliberative democracy to track the tru th  or 
to find the common good. It is indeed m ost likely that the two grounds of justification are 
mutually dependent on each other, even though it is still im portant to know which 
justification we want to stress when prom oting deliberative democracy. This is reflected in 
recent work that attempts to combine the procedural and epistemic approaches by using 
procedural claims to support the epistemic justifications of democracy, such as Estlund’s 
epistemic proceduralism (2008) or P eter’s pure epistemic proceduralism (2008).
In this chapter I do not assess the epistemic and procedural justification of democracy 
in general. My aim is instead to examine w hether deliberative democracy should be 
prom oted above other forms of democracy on epistemic or procedural grounds. For the
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purposes of this chapter it does not m atter exactly what form deliberation will take. Most 
of the arguments apply equally to informal deliberation in the public sphere, deliberative 
polls or tow n hall meetings.
In section one I will recapitulate the procedural case for deliberative democracy. In 
section two I will address theories about tru th  in democratic politics. Section three will 
deal w ith how we can assess the epistemic qualities of deliberation.
Procedural Justifications for Deliberative Democracy
As we have seen in previous chapters, there is certainly no shortage of procedural 
justifications for deliberative democracy. Its ground-breaking nature depends less on what 
kind of outcomes it produces than on how those outcomes are produced, through open 
and inclusive discussion. Elster (1986) argues that the political forum  calls for different 
standards of behaviour than the economic m arket, ones that are less self-interested and 
m ore deliberative. Cohen (1996) defines ideal deliberation in such procedural term s as 
free, reasoned, equal and aiming for a consensus. These are all values which should be the 
properties of deliberation itself, rather than of the outcome which the process will lead to. 
W e value inclusion and equality in decision-making procedures for their own sakes and not 
simply because they may produce a just outcome or find the truth.
Theorists stress the values of deliberative democracy that current liberal 
representative democracies appear to be failing at. These systems are seen as plagued by an 
emphasis on what is good for m e as an individual, rather than what is good for all. 
Electorates are apathetic, know little about politics and are disengaged from the political 
process, which is left to  representatives. Minorities are underrepresented or ignored unless 
they are in marginal constituencies. Reasoned debate is displaced by bargaining and interest 
group politics. Deliberative democracy is offered up as a cure for these ailments.
In chapter three I have examined the procedural values of reasoned and other- 
regarding debate. These procedural conditions of deliberation point m ost clearly to
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possible epistemic advantages. But one could attribute value to a reasoned debate in itself, 
regardless of w hether or not it leads to better decisions. Offering arguments properly 
justified by underlying reasons improves the quality of civic life even if the outcomes 
rem ain the same. Making the reasons for individual preferences and group decisions public 
during deliberation also increases transparency (Gutmann and Thompson 1996) and 
legitimacy.
Deliberation also demands of participants that they should couch their arguments in 
term s that will be acceptable to others and do not solely refer to their private interests 
(Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 2004). Participants also have to listen to  the arguments of 
others and take these into account when making decisions. This helps to make decisions 
m ore legitimate, as well as to display mutual respect during discussion. W hile private 
interests should be admissible in deliberation (Mansbridge, 1996) as they play an im portant 
part in solving problems in a way which is acceptable to  all, they should not be the sole 
determinant of individuals’ debate with others as they are in bargaining.
But it is not only discourse which deliberative democrats aim to transform. Once 
discourse is transformed, the judgments, preferences and beliefs of deliberators themselves 
will follow, shifting from partial to  public (Barber 1984, Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 
43). In a less demanding form, deliberation requires mutual respect of participants. Its 
transformative pow er would then involve moving from respectful discussion to a m ore 
deep-seated respect for the views of others.
However, as we have seen in chapter three, democratic deliberation does not 
necessarily guarantee these procedural values to a greater extent than other forms of 
democracy. Neither can we accept that a communicative concept of rationality will 
underpin these values sufficiently. Instead of ideal, reasoned deliberation other phenomena 
such as framing or conformity could occur.
The first procedural property of deliberation I examined in chapter four was 
inclusiveness (Young 2000) in the sense that deliberation not only gives everyone a vote, 
but also enables everyone to voice their views. This also carries with it the obligation to 
listen to others’ arguments and be open-minded towards them . Inclusion needs to be
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secured w hen the deliberative group is constituted and during deliberation itself. 
Inclusiveness fosters equality and fairness and makes decisions m ore legitimate. If 
everyone’s voice is heard in the discussion leading to a decision, then those whose 
argum ent did not prevail will find it easier to accept their defeat. Thus, deliberation can 
have an expressive function.
The second procedural value examined in chapter four was equality. W e can 
differentiate betw een tw o types of equality: formal and substantive. Formal equality is a 
m ore limited condition that ensures basic procedural fairness. Substantive equality, on the 
other hand, ensures that citizens not only have the same rights when it comes to 
deliberation or voting, but that they are also equally capable of exercising those rights.
In chapter four I have argued that while inclusion is one of the m ost attractive and 
desirable aims of the theory of deliberative democracy, it is likely to prove problematic in 
practice and deliberative democracy offers few guarantees that it would actually be 
realised. W hile formal equality is the most feasible of these values, it is also the least 
demanding one. Finally, substantive equality is both infeasible and undesirable as a 
background condition and value for democratic deliberation. W hile democratic decisions 
might increase substantive equality, we cannot im plem ent the kinds of policies needed for 
it without having subjected those to the deliberative decision-making process.
In chapter five I looked at the procedural value that some deliberative democrats 
attribute to  aiming for a consensus (Cohen 1996). This embodies the importance of aiming 
to find the common good or a decision that all can fully endorse. This value, however, 
adds little to  a model of deliberative democracy. Consensus need not be favoured over 
compromise in any political decision-making process.
Thus, as we have seen in earlier chapters, these procedural accounts are not 
unproblematic. Other-regarding attitudes may not emerge. Inclusiveness may be negated 
by the effects of pow er and differing abilities. Aiming for consensus can become 
meaningless if such a consensus is never achieved. These potential pitfalls endanger the 
procedural justification of democracy. Yet even if a non-ideal deliberative procedure
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would fall short of some of these aspirations, the values of inclusion, reasoned debate and 
respect for others can still be inspiring objectives for a political process.
Truth and Dem ocratic Politics
Truth Claims in Politics
W hile many of these procedural aspects of deliberative democracy are valuable in 
themselves, numerous authors argue that they also lead to  better decisions (Gutmann and 
Thompson 1996, Goodin 2003, Habermas 2006, Estlund 2008). In epistemic justifications 
it is the substance of the decision that makes deliberation and democracy valuable. If we 
judge deliberative democracy on its epistemic m erit, we are judging it on its potential to 
arrive at a correct judgm ent which exists independently of the actual decision made by the 
deliberating group. W hether such an independently correct judgm ent exists at all in 
politics is a contentious issue in itself.
There are a large num ber of political decisions based at least partly on facts rather 
than moral reasons. From the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq to the most 
efficient way to collect the rubbish, factual questions need to  be answered on a regular 
basis in politics. Facts of the m atter are not lim ited to natural phenomena but can also 
apply to social ones. It may be possible to establish, for example, w hether one group in 
society is systematically discriminated against.
But often collective decisions will not be concerned with clear-cut facts for which 
there is an observable right or wrong answer and will be of a moral or ethical nature 
instead. Questions such as w hether the death penalty is just can be argued either way and 
unlike in the natural or social sciences we cannot use experiments to  prove a particular 
normative claim right or wrong. W e can ask factual question about some aspects of these 
questions — let us say whether the death penalty reduces crime — but we cannot decide the 
underlying moral issues based purely on facts.
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Moral realists would assert that objective moral truths exist independently of our 
judgments and that it is possible to discover them  just as we would discover scientific 
truths. O n the other end of the spectrum, non-cognitivists reject that moral judgments can 
have any tru th  value at all and argue instead that they are m ore closely related to  emotions 
than to truth. This position denies that moral and ethical decisions in politics could be 
judged on epistemic grounds at all.
An interm ediate position, often advanced in political philosophy, is constructivism, 
according to which moral and ethical truths are constructed by societies and do not exist 
independently of them . Rousseau’s (1997) account of the general will is one of the most 
well-known versions of this position. According to Rousseau, the general will works 
towards achieving the common good, which is constructed out of the interests of 
individuals in society. The decision arrived at by the people might not always correspond 
to the common good, but the decision of the majority is the best possible indicator of it. A 
common good will not exist for every political issue and some may instead be decided 
based on personal interests.
A contructivist position has also been taken by Rawls and Habermas, the two m ost 
prom inent advocates of deliberative democracy.38 Rawls sets out his constructivist theory 
m ost clearly in Political Liberalism (1993). Here he is m ore concerned w ith finding a 
workable solution in a society where reasonable disagreement exists betw een groups 
subscribing to  different comprehensive doctrines than with the existence of true m oral 
judgments. The solution endorsed is one which all reasonable individuals would accept, no 
m atter what comprehensive doctrine they subscribe to. At the same tim e this theory of 
political liberalism practices epistemic abstinence as far as m atters of tru th  and falsehood 
are concerned and leaves these in the domain of comprehensive doctrines.
Habermas (2003) argues that normative truths cannot be established based on our 
observations of the objective world. Instead our points of reference are beliefs held by 
others, revealed through discussion. Thus, while Habermas does not claim that moral
38 The following is a brief overview of their positions, which in no way claims to be an authoritative 
interpretation of the authors’ work. I am fully aware that other interpretations are also possible.
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judgements are true, he argues that they are analogous to tru th  instead, as their validity is 
established with reference to other competing or supporting claims. The construction of 
tru th  takes place through the discursive processes of communicative action (1996, 2003) 
where the best argument is revealed and recognised for what it is. Moral judgments can 
only be established through such a process and little or no role is left for individual 
reflection. Thus, moral tru th  is both constituted and discovered through the process of 
deliberation. W hat makes it independent of the society that it is produced in is the 
requirem ent for universality. Hence, a moral judgm ent is accurate if it can be applied to 
other groups as well. Those judgments for which this is not true are ethical instead of 
moral.
Carlos Nino (1996) also holds a constructivist position, although he goes to great 
lengths to distinguish it from the positions of both Rawls and Habermas. His ontological 
claim is that moral truth is constituted by discussion directed at attaining cooperation and 
avoiding conflict and his epistemological claim is that the m ost reliable procedure for 
accessing moral truths is through discussion, even though it might sometimes be possible to 
do so through individual reflection (Nino 1996, 112-113).
W hichever position we take on moral tru th , epistemic justifications for democracy 
remain im portant. Non-cognitivists may reject the idea that there exists an independently 
correct judgm ent on moral issues and should therefore disregard the debate on how well 
democracy or deliberation track moral truth. Yet they still need to consider how well 
these procedures track factual truth.
Epistemic Proceduralism
The most powerful epistemic justifications of deliberative democracy take the form of 
epistemic proceduralism. These accounts acknowledge that epistemic and procedural 
accounts of democracy are impossible to  divorce from each other entirely. According to 
Estlund’s (1997, 2008) epistemic proceduralism, laws or decisions which we believe to be
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wrong should still be obeyed because they w ere brought about by a procedure which, 
while im perfect, is still epistemically valuable. Thus, the legitimacy of decisions derives 
from the procedure through which they were made, where that procedure, however, has 
certain epistemic qualities. Procedures are legitimate if they can be accepted by all 
qualified or reasonable individuals in society. W hile there may be other decision-making 
procedures which would be even better at tracking the truth, such as decisions by some 
kinds of experts, these would not be acceptable from all qualified points of view. 
“[Democracy] is not an infallible procedure, and there might even be m ore accurate 
procedures. But democracy is better than random  and is epistemically the best among 
those that are generally acceptable in the way that political legitimacy requires.” (Estlund 
2008, 8)
For Estlund (2008), democracy’s epistemic value is derived from the fact that we 
will make better decisions if we deliberate together. Real-life deliberation, which Estlund 
calls the ‘real speech situation’, can be compared against an ideal model of epistemic 
deliberation, but it will not and should not m irror it. Estlund argues that democratic 
decision-making procedures that use such deliberation will not only arrive at decisions 
which are better than random at avoiding the w orst disasters that can befall humankind, 
such as war, famine or genocide39, but that it is not too much worse at doing so than non- 
democratic epistemic procedures would be (Estlund 2008, 168). This makes democratic 
decisions authoritative, meaning that they have the moral pow er to require obedience. As 
these epistemically valuable decisions also fulfil the constraints of legitimacy, democratic 
processes fulfil the dual role of arriving at good decisions through a procedure that is 
acceptable to all reasonable persons.
Peter (2008) criticises Estlund’s model of epistemic proceduralism for relying on an 
independently available, objective standard of correctness. She wants to show that 
justifications based on epistemic proceduralism can be established without requiring such 
an independent standard. For this she uses a social epistemological approach that places the
39 Estlund focuses on these ‘primary bads’ since all qualified persons would agree that they must be 
avoided, thereby providing a good approximation of an independent standard of correctness.
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emphasis on the knowledge-producing practices that lead to  a decision and defines 
knowledge and knowing in the context of these practices. She argues that Young’s (2000) 
model of deliberative democracy implicitly uses such a model of social epistemology by 
requiring that all groups in society should be given a voice in the deliberative procedure. 
These different voices are a resource that leads to knowledge producing practices that take 
a fuller account of differing views and knowledge-bases in society. Thus, these processes 
can be argued to  be epistemically valuable w ithout drawing on an independent standard of 
correctness that they will identify.
W hile these models provide a good fram ework for arguing for the legitimacy and 
authority of decisions made through deliberative democracy, they do not analyse directly 
the epistemic dimension of deliberative processes and the way in which it changes citizen 
competence. W hile Estlund (2008, 233-234) argues explicitly that communication 
between citizens will improve group competence, he adds the following:
“Obviously, I have not given any detailed account of how and when 
reasoning together will improve group competence. In many settings there are 
dynamics such as ‘groupthink’, and polarization effects that can undo the 
epistemic potential of thinking together.” (Estlund 2008, 234)
Thus, there is currently a gap in these theories and this is precisely the gap that this 
chapter is trying to fill. For epistemic proceduralism to provide a solid basis of justifying 
deliberative decisions it has to  be shown that democracy, and in particular deliberative 
democracy, will actually possess these competence-enhancing epistemic properties or, in 
other words, that the knowledge-producing practices found in deliberative democracy will 
actually live up to the requirem ents of epistemic proceduralism.
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Truth-Tracking in Democracies
The question arises w hether we could base the epistemic justification of deliberative 
democracy on the same grounds as that of democracy in general. W hen the epistemic 
properties of democracy are discussed, the Condorcet Jury Theorem  is usually invoked 
(Condorcet 1785 in McLean and Hewitt 1994, Grofinan, Owen and Feld 1983). This 
theorem  offers an epistemic justification for democracy based on voting rather than 
deliberation and it arrives at a striking conclusion. If some basic conditions are satisfied, a 
group of individuals is m ore likely to arrive at the correct decision by majority voting than 
any of its members would be on his own. Group competence increases rapidly as we 
increase either the size of the group or the competence of its m em bers, and as group size 
tends to infinity it approaches infallibility.
The theorem  in its original form made three basic assumptions (Grofinan, O w en and 
Feld 1983), which have since been relaxed. Firstly, there must be two alternatives, one of 
which is true while the other is false or one of which is better than the other. Secondly, 
individual group m em bers all have the same level of competence p, which is greater than 
0.5, meaning that they will choose correctly betw een options m ore than half the time. 
Finally, group members must vote independently of each other. The fact that one person 
has judged the proposition to be true cannot have any impact on the judgments of any of 
her fellow group members.
It may not necessarily be a problem that the theorem  is based on finding the tru th  
through voting rather than deliberation. W e can safely assume that in most cases 
deliberative democracy will need to consist of discussion followed by voting. But the 
process of deliberation before voting can change the results of the theorem  significantly. 
Votes are never cast by isolated individuals, uninfluenced by each other. This is even truer 
for deliberative democracy. The assumption that individuals will make their decisions 
independently of each other is impossible to fulfil when the entire decision-making process 
is motivated by an exchange of views and ideas. And if the independence assumption is
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violated, group size is reduced to the num ber of truly independent voters and all others 
need to be disregarded. Thus, if 500 individuals vote, but they all follow the views of one 
of 5 parties, than the effective num ber of voters for the purposes of the Condorcet jury 
theorem  is reduced to 5.
Estlund (1994) argues that deliberation does not necessarily violate the independence 
condition. W hile each individual has to submit his or her independent judgm ent, it is not 
necessary that she should have arrived at this judgment in isolation. Discussion with others 
can be one of the pieces of information that the judgm ent is based on. W hat is necessary 
for the theorem  is that individuals should not vote a certain way or express a judgm ent 
simply because another individual in the group is doing so. This means that conformity, 
voting along party lines and coercion will violate the assumption of independence, but not 
arriving at our own independent decision through reasoned discussion. If this is true, then 
following opinion-leaders who are m ore com petent than us would in fact increase overall 
group competence.
But this argum ent assumes that individual competence will increase as a result of 
learning from others, and that voters are com petent enough to know who is m ore 
competent than they are and how far those individuals are advocating their personal 
interest. This is quite a demanding assumption, which cannot be fulfilled easily. Neither 
does this reasoning take into account that deliberators are not only choosing to trust the 
judgments of opinion leaders, but that the judgments of all deliberators are changed 
systematically as a result of arguments put forward during discussion. Thus, deliberators 
are likely to change their judgments in the same direction. Furtherm ore, we might be 
convinced by others during deliberation for reasons which invalidate the jury theorem . W e 
might be swept along by their enthusiasm and sheer persuasive pow er and change our 
beliefs m ore as an emotional reaction than as a reasoned one.40
40 Of course these objections apply in the case of liberal representative democracies as well. The 
Condorcet jury theorem does not apply to legislatures when representatives vote along party lines. But this 
is not a problem which I need to address here and I will only look at the way in which the independence 
assumption restricts the application of the theorem to deliberative decision-making.
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The independence assumption implies that we cannot apply the Condorcet jury 
theorem  to deliberative democracy without any problems. Just because we may be able to 
justify democracy on the basis of the epistemic properties of voting does not mean that this 
justification can be extended to deliberative democracy as well. But the jury theorem  can 
still give us im portant clues as to how we can evaluate the epistemic potential of 
deliberation.
Dietrich and List (2004) make an adjustment to the Condorcet jury theorem  which 
points to why we run into difficulties when we apply it to deliberative democracy. In their 
model jurors do not directly observe the true state of the world. Instead their judgments 
are based on a shared pool of evidence. As a result their jury theorem  predicts how  likely it 
is that the group will in terpret the evidence correctly, not how likely the group is to 
identify the true state of the world correctly. If the evidence corresponds to the true state 
of the w orld perfectly, then group competence will be the same as it would have been 
under the standard version of the theorem . But if the evidence is misleading, then group 
competence will have to be adjusted downwards.
W e have already seen that deliberators will no t assess the state of the world 
independently of each other. But what is m ore, they will not assess it independently o f the 
process of deliberation either. After deliberation individuals will make choices based on 
their observations of the true state of the w orld — information which is exogenous to the 
deliberative process — and what passed through a deliberative filter about the tru th  — 
information which is endogenous to the deliberative process. The latter consists of the 
information which has been introduced into the deliberative process, either by experts or 
other group m em bers, as well as the arguments about this information have taken during 
the debate. This deliberative filter could improve the competence of participants or it 
could decrease it. W hat needs to be established is that it would lead to  increased 
competence m ore often than not.
The competence assumption is perhaps the m ost crucial one for the Condorcet jury 
theorem , because if individual competences are less than 0.S, the original result will be 
reversed. And this result will be equally striking, as a group would be less likely to arrive
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at the correct answer than any of its members and its competence would approach zero as 
the group size tended to infinity. Cohen (1986) points out that different political 
institutions change the competences of citizens systematically. The question is whether 
deliberative democracy would change them  in a positive or a negative direction.
The Power o f  the Best Argument
Deliberators might become m ore com petent after deliberation, if they were all convinced 
by the force of the better argument. But if they happened to be convinced by wrong 
arguments, then individual competences would have to be adjusted downwards. Thus, 
what we need to  be concerned about when we evaluate deliberation on epistemic grounds 
is whether the best argument will actually prevail during discussion. If the best argument 
tends to prevail, then the competence of individual deliberators is improved. Before we 
can assess whether this hypothesis is true, we need to have a theoretical understanding of 
how deliberation could achieve this result.
There is plenty of evidence that individuals are not very informed about politics (as 
an example see Delli Karpini and Keeter 1996). Given the cost of getting informed, 
rational voters will stay ignorant (Downs 1957). As a result, political campaigns are mostly 
fought with sound-bite rhetoric rather than reasoned argument. And yet, while most 
citizens are woefully bad at keeping up with the news, they seem to be able to make 
reasonably com petent judgments about politics based on sparse heuristic cues that the 
world around them  is full of (Popkin 1993). Even if they do not follow the economic news 
very closely, they notice inflation and changing interest rates when they pay their bills. 
And not only do people rely regularly on sparse heuristic cues, but m ost of their 
knowledge is received from others, introducing the problems of relying on testimony.
Hence, the knowledge of individuals reflects the kind of knowledge found in 
epistemological discussions only very imperfectly. Hardin (2002, 2003) refers to  our 
everyday knowledge as street-level epistemology. His is an economic theory of knowledge
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where the likelihood of someone possessing a piece of information depends on the cost and 
benefit of acquiring and storing it. This individual knowledge is often incoherent as it has 
been acquired over our life from different sources. O r at m ost it is block-coherent, as the 
knowledge of academics about their area of expertise.
Habermas (2003) argues that in our day-to-day lives we treat our knowledge as 
certain and act as if our beliefs were true. W e need to have such a non-epistemic concept 
of tru th  in order to accomplish the tasks that we are faced with. But there are times when 
such unproblematic, naive beliefs need to be challenged through dialogue. Discursive tru th  
is established at such times of deliberation. For Habermas this is how non-epistemic or 
everyday tru th  is connected to a m ore coherent and epistemically m ore rigorous version of 
truth.
Deliberative democracy could increase individual levels of competence by bringing 
about such a discursive process. It is easy to hold incoherent or unjustified views if citizen 
participation in the democratic process is reduced to  voting. This would give people little 
incentive to  seek out the views of others, reducing the extent to which they talked about 
politics with those with different beliefs and preferences (Mutz 2006). If citizens only talk 
to people who hold the same views as they do, then they will always go unchallenged and 
will indeed be confirmed in their beliefs. But if they take part in deliberation, provided 
that all views are properly represented, they will necessarily be confronted by viewpoints 
which are different from theirs. They would also be obliged to present and justify their 
arguments to others, who will be allowed to question and critique what they have said 
(Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 2004). This can be aided by introducing new  information 
and learning new facts during deliberation (Manin 1987). Discussion also enables 
individuals to learn m ore about each other. W ithout deliberation people know much about 
their own preferences and interests, but little about those o f others (Nino 1996).
This process should lead us to recognise the inconsistencies and weaknesses in our 
arguments. And not only would it help us to revise our own arguments, but it would also 
introduce us to new arguments which we and others could investigate freely. This, it is 
argued, would surely lead to the discovery of a be tte r argument than voting on its own.
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According to this picture, if voting follows deliberative enquiry we can expect the 
competence of voters to be much higher than it would have been otherwise. O f course one 
would assume that arguments would need to be subjected to such a process repeatedly, 
echoing the position of Barber (1984) or Benhabib (1996).
In order for this ideal picture of deliberation to exist we would need to ensure that 
good arguments would also be persuasive arguments and, furtherm ore, that the best 
argument would be the m ost persuasive argument. W hat needs to be established is that the 
deliberative process will conform to the pattern of individuals updating their judgments 
based on rational enquiry.
The easiest way to establish whether these theoretical processes are really at w ork 
during deliberation is through empirical analysis. There is some evidence from  deliberative 
polls (Farrar et al. forthcoming) that individuals are m ore likely to answer factual questions 
correctly after deliberation than before it. W hile there is a growing empirical literature on 
deliberative democracy (Luskin et al. 2002, Goodin and Niemayer 2003, Fung 2004, 
Gastil and Levine 2005, Reykowski 2006), the question whether deliberation leads to 
improved outcomes has not been sufficiently addressed in these studies. Yet the question 
can also be answered on the theoretical level. Is the epistemic basis of deliberative 
democracy strong enough to offer a solid justification for it, or should we look at its 
procedural values instead?
Competence Change and Deliberation
In order to assess the epistemic justification of deliberative democracy I will examine cases 
in which political deliberation improves competence and those in which it fails to do so. I 
shall differentiate betw een instances of factual and moral competence, as the two can raise 
quite different challenges. Through this process we will be able to identify the possible 
threats to the epistemic justification and to evaluate whether this justification is strong
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enough. Firstly, I shall look at competence-enhancing mechanisms, and then look at 
mechanisms where competence decreases or remains unchanged.
Improved Competences
The first and m ost obvious case when we can expect deliberative democracy to enhance 
competence is when it provides participants with new information which will lead them  to 
realise that their beliefs are incorrect. In the case of factual beliefs this is quite 
straightforward: by learning new facts it is possible to  correct mistaken beliefs. In the case 
of moral beliefs it is also possible to realise that we w ere in the wrong when we are 
exposed to new arguments, especially if we only hold weak beliefs over an issue.
The m ost well-known theorem  of belief revision is Bayes’s theorem , according to 
which individuals will adjust their beliefs over the tru th  o r falsity of a proposition based on 
their prior convictions about it and new evidence that points to  w hether the proposition is 
true or false. In the case of politics the votes or arguments of others can be taken as such 
evidence. Thus, if many reliable people declare that a proposition is true, then I will have 
grounds to presume that it is indeed true. Incidentally, this theorem  supports convergence 
towards majoritarianism just as the Condorcet jury theorem  did, as our reasons for 
accepting that a proposition is true are stronger if a large majority of people have asserted 
that it is true, as long as we believe them to be sufficiently com petent (Goodin 2003).
For moral beliefs the theory of deliberative democracy can also make a case for a 
very weak form of coherentism, according to which individuals with a m ore consistent set 
of moral beliefs are m ore competent. Firstly, we can make the claim that individuals who 
strive to have a consistent set of moral beliefs and are willing to change any judgments 
which cause an inconsistency will be m ore inclined to arrive at those judgments through 
truth-sensitive processes. Secondly, it can be argued that if belief inconsistencies are 
corrected as a result of a reliable process, such as deliberation, individuals may become 
more com petent (Bovens and Olsson 2002).
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Accordingly, deliberation will improve the competence of individuals over moral 
issues when they realise through discussion that their position is inconsistent with their 
other factual or m oral beliefs. Many people have only weakly reasoned moral positions and 
they may realise upon closer examination that these are in fact untenable. In these cases 
they need to decide which of these conflicting beliefs to revise. As a result of this revision 
they will become m ore com petent, as the argument that their final decision or belief will 
be based on will be stronger. Note that deliberators will not necessarily be convinced by 
the arguments of others; they may change some of their other beliefs to  support the 
position they were defending. O r they may realise that their position on the issue under 
discussion, over which their belief is not very strong, is inconsistent with other stronger 
beliefs they hold. In this case deliberation would convince them  to change their position on 
the issue under debate.
Against this view one could make the following objection. O ne could imagine a 
simple-minded individual with a set of beliefs that tells him to treat everyone decently. 
However, this individual then could come to live under a regime which prom otes 
discrimination or even violence against some of its subjects. O ur simple-minded person 
could approve of these values superficially in order not to get into trouble with the regime, 
without thinking much about it or changing his original well-intentioned belief. If he then 
deliberates with supporters of the regime he may come to realise that his beliefs are 
inconsistent and revise his original beliefs to allow him to m istreat the regim e’s victims 
with impunity.
However, this example is inconsistent with the theory of deliberative democracy. 
One could hardly call a debate in which followers of a cruel authoritarian regime convince 
their citizens that it is acceptable to m istreat others deliberative in the sense that the theory 
of deliberative democracy uses the term . Deliberation would instead be a m ore reliable 
process for discovering moral tru th , during which no participants would be coerced or face 
the threat of future coercion and all relevant points of view would be represented in a 
com petent fashion. The procedural values of inclusion, reasoned debate and other- 
regardingness would support an improvement in moral competence.
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Thus, if our simple-minded person was to  participate in a deliberative forum where 
m embers of the regime as well as its victims and independent observers participated on an 
equal basis, he could easily correct his beliefs instead by rejecting the position of the 
regime. And one m ust note that given that arguments during deliberation are required to 
be other-regarding and that they will be laundered (Goodin 1986) to eliminate 
objectionable preferences, supporters of the regime would be required to put their beliefs 
in term s which are also acceptable to their victims, which is likely to be impossible.
When Competences Fail to Improve
Now let us look at cases when deliberators’ competences either remain the same or are 
reduced. I will first look at the issue of cognitive capacities, which might affect our ability 
to update factual beliefs. Then I will look at the motivational problems that influence our 
ability to change our moral beliefs. Finally, I shall look at the biases and self-interest that 
can have a detrim ental effect on competence change for both factual and moral beliefs.
Firstly, factual beliefs would remain unchanged if deliberators did not understand the 
new information they received and as a result would fail to act on it. Receiving new 
information may even reduce our competence if we misunderstood it and changed our 
beliefs in the wrong direction. This can be either a result of cognitive limitations or a result 
of the fact that the incorrect belief is put forward m ore convincingly and with greater 
ability. Given that much of the time deliberators would have to debate highly complex 
issues, the chances of failing to improve competences over factual issues are potentially 
high.
Lupia (2002) argues that much of the literature is too optimistic about our ability to 
reach better decisions through deliberation, as it relies on a false folk theory of learning. 
All of us rem em ber examples of holding an incorrect belief, learning relevant new facts 
and correcting this belief. But we will not rem em ber many instances when we failed to 
correct an incorrect belief because we paid inadequate attention to or forgot relevant new
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information, or because at the end of the day we decided that there was nothing wrong 
with the incorrect old belief. In fact we are only likely to  find out about our mistake once 
it has been corrected. Thus, when we informally ‘te s t’ the theory, perceived successes will 
far outnum ber failures.
Deliberation calls for a very high level of cognitive functioning. Participants need 
highly developed capacities for rational analysis, understanding the viewpoint of others, 
making themselves intelligible and recognising commonalities and differences betw een 
arguments. Findings from psychological studies indicate that such high levels of functioning 
will be uncommon (Reykowski 2006). As a result, the demands of deliberation may need 
to be lowered, lest it becomes an exercise in elitism. Thus, we cannot automatically expect 
deliberation to lead to  increased competence over factual beliefs.
In the case of moral beliefs we face a problem  of motivation. It is less likely that 
deliberators will change their beliefs based on the arguments of other deliberators on 
moral issues than they would on factual issues. Goodin (2003) argues that the reason why 
opposition persists and we do not always accept that the judgm ent of the m ajority is true, 
despite Bayesian and Condorcetian models, is that we are willing to  update our judgments 
based on new facts, but not so much based on the value judgments of others. This might 
explain why a quasi-experiment has found that members of a citizen jury w ere m ore likely 
to change their views based on new  factual information than based on discussion w ith other 
group members (Goodin and Niemayer 2003). And the stronger moral beliefs are, the 
more difficult it is to  change them.
Deliberators could also change their moral judgments in a way which was 
inconsistent with their system of moral beliefs, for example by adopting the position of 
other deliberators without considering w hether it violated consistency w ith their other 
beliefs. This would make them  in a sense less com petent, since even if their new  belief is 
the correct one, they will not hold this belief as a result of truth-sensitive reasoning, but 
will do so by sheer luck instead.
Apart from the cognitive problems affecting competence over factual beliefs and the 
motivational problems affecting competence over moral beliefs there are also problem s
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that affect individual competence over both types of beliefs. It might be that deliberators 
are not convinced by facts and arguments, but would be swayed by emotions instead and 
thereby become less competent. This is often the case when it comes to policies on crime, 
drugs, abortion and pornography (Pettit 2004). But deliberators’ competence could also 
be affected by a num ber of biases which I will now discuss.
The first source of bias that affects both factual and moral beliefs is the limited 
argument pool available during deliberation. The best argument may in fact not be in this 
pool or not appear strong enough against arguments which were elaborated m ore 
forcefully, eloquently or recently. An example of how this can lead to issue framing, when 
one formulation of a problem dominates others, and priming, when m ore recent 
arguments are considered to be stronger, is that the political issues citizens consider to be 
im portant are to a large extent dependent on which issues the media presents to them 
(Kinder 1998). A parallel process could develop during deliberation if issues became 
framed by the media or the organisers and m oderators of deliberative events.
Group polarisation is a clear case of bias that affects individual competences in 
deliberation and Sunstein (2002) identifies a limited pool of arguments as one of the main 
causes of it. This occurs if arguments reinforce each other and group m em bers become 
m ore biased by the end of the discussion. A group made up of individuals who oppose the 
death penalty will put forward arguments which will reinforce and amplify that view. 
Similarly, if the group consisted of individuals who supported the death penalty, their 
views would also be strengthened. Thus, the group as a whole becomes polarised towards 
one side of the issue. Jury experiments show that jurors favoured larger punitive damages 
after deliberation than they did before (Sunstein 2002).
A second reason Sunstein identifies for group polarisation is social comparison, 
which is at work when individuals adjust their positions in order to  fit in with the rest of 
the group better. If their position is already biased in one direction and they find that the 
position of others is even m ore biased in the same direction, then this is not an 
inconceivable move.
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There is conflicting evidence about group polarisation from empirical studies 
(Fishkin 2002), but nothing suggests that deliberative groups would not engage in such 
behaviour at least some of the time. Group polarisation may or may not be good 
epistemically. If group members become polarised in the direction of the correct 
judgm ent, then this will increase their competence and they are very likely to be right as a 
group. But if the opposite is true, then the group will actually become less likely to  be 
correct after deliberation.
A different form of bias was identified by Pincione and Teson (2006) who argue that 
deliberation will fail to increase individual competence, as it fails to eliminate the 
systematic discourse failure in politics which consists of decisions made as a result of truth- 
insensitive processes. Discourse failure often takes the form of a bias towards vivid 
arguments that consist of imagery that is easy to understand and assigns causality to specific 
actors, when the true state of the world is best described by opaque arguments, which are 
difficult to  understand and make use of invisible-hand mechanisms. As an example, when 
petrol prices go up, vivid arguments blame greedy oil companies, whereas opaque 
arguments refer to forces of supply and demand. Individual citizens are likely to accept 
vivid arguments even when they are honest and well-intentioned, as they are not rationally 
motivated to  learn enough to understand opaque ones. Politicians use vivid arguments as 
they are m ore accessible to citizens and have a greater emotional appeal, as well as 
allowing them  to appear as agents of change in situations when they are in reality powerless 
in the face of impersonal forces. Finally, discourse failure is fuelled by the fact that politics 
is about redistributing resources, whether pow er or money, and interest groups will refer 
to vivid arguments to claim their rights to  them . Pincione and Teson argue that 
deliberation is unable to solve discourse failure and thus cannot be justified on epistemic 
grounds, as it fails to solve the underlying motivating factor of resource redistribution and 
does not to do enough to combat rational ignorance and prom ote opaque theories. Thus, 
the best argument is likely to be defeated by an emotionally appealing, easy to understand, 
vivid one. Once again, this form of bias affects both factual and moral beliefs.
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W hilst one can argue that deliberation may alleviate discourse failure somewhat if 
participants will learn enough to overcome the issue of rational ignorance in at least some 
cases, deliberation will not solve the problem  that individuals are m otivated in politics by 
capturing resources. Assuming away interest-based politics makes deliberative democracy 
strangely apolitical. It is also questionable how accurate such an apolitical view is.
According to Pettit (2004), depoliticisation through deliberation, that is removing 
issues from the adversarial political arena, is consistent with the ideal of democracy 
interpreted as public valuation of reason. From this perspective depoliticisation is the only 
option for issues where politicians would have an electoral incentive to respond to citizens’ 
passion, moral aspirations and sectional interests, when better results could be achieved 
through finding the best argument or trying to  identify the common good. Depoliticisation 
could take the form of disinterested deliberative groups, separated from the electoral fray 
and not subject to interest group influence. One example of this is the existence of 
independent central banks to  regulate interest rates. Thus, while deliberative 
depoliticisation removes decision-making pow er from politicians and puts it into the hands 
of m ore neutral bodies, it also improves the quality of democratic decision-making.
Depoliticisation through deliberation would lead to a decision-making process that is 
m ore similar to judicial decision-making. Yet political deliberation is very different from 
jury deliberation (Schroeder 2002). To begin with, political and judicial deliberation differ 
in that legal decisions are bipolar (the defendant is either guilty or innocent), whereas 
political decisions are polycentric, w ith many possible decisions encompassing m ultiple 
issue dimensions, and thus very complex. Furtherm ore, unlike injudicial proceedings, in 
deliberation the role of advocate and judge are not separated from each other. Participants 
are expected to  both advance arguments in support of their position and to  make a final 
decision as to the best argument. Thus, unlike judges and juries, political deliberators will 
not be blind to their own best interests.
In trials judges and juries are not personally interested in the outcome. W hether a 
defendant is guilty or innocent or the way in which a divorcing couple’s possessions are 
spilt up has no immediate effect on their lives. This is not the case in political deliberation
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where they have a substantial direct interest in achieving one outcome over another, 
whether that is for moral or for material reasons. If we did succeed in removing this 
element of politics, democracy would be stripped of its m ost salient characteristic. If who 
gets what, when and how ceases to m atter, the average citizen will be even less interested 
in and m ore disillusioned with politics than he is now. Further depoliticisation would only 
increase the problems experienced with unelected, electorally unresponsive deliberative 
decision-makers.
Self-interest in politics can affect competences over both factual and moral issues. If 
citizens have a personal interest in supporting one belief over another then they may be 
unwilling to change those beliefs publicly, even if under different circumstances they may 
accept that they were wrong.
Factual issues M oral issues
Competence
improved
New information leads to increased 
competence.
(1) A new argum ent leads to 
increased competence.
(2) An individual realises that his 
position is inconsistent with his 
other beliefs.
Competence
unchanged
(1) Deliberators do not receive 
sufficient information or are unable 
to understand the information they 
receive.
(2) Self-interested motives.
(1) Deliberators are unconvinced 
by the moral reasoning of others.
(2) Right argum ent is not put 
forward.
(3) Self-interested motives.
Competence
decreased
(1) Deliberators receive false 
information or misunderstand 
information.
(2) Deliberators are swayed by 
passion or vivid arguments.
(1) An individual’s position 
becomes inconsistent with his other 
beliefs.
(2) Deliberators are swayed by 
passion or vivid arguments.
Table 2: Competence change in deliberation.
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Thus, there are three problems with the assumption that deliberative democracy will 
induce individuals to move from their everyday street-level epistemology to  a position of 
reflective equilibrium. Firstly, it needs to be clear what our motivation for such a shift in 
thinking would be. Secondly, even if deliberators would be willing to  engage in reflective 
equilibrium, our cognitive processes may not conform to ideal models. Thirdly, biases, 
emotions and self-interest might distort the process entirely. The table below  summarizes 
the different cases in which competences change or remain the same as a result.
Procedural Justifications Reconsidered
Results, such as the Condorcet jury theorem , provide us with a fairly robust epistemic 
justification for democracy under certain conditions. There are also epistemic justifications 
for deliberation in many different settings, such as in science. Yet putting democracy and 
deliberation together will not necessarily lead to  increased epistemic competence. Adding 
deliberation means that standard epistemic justifications for democracy become 
inapplicable. Making deliberation political will introduce personal interests and a lack of 
motivation to change moral beliefs, making it unlike its non-political counterparts. Thus 
democratic deliberation will not necessarily increase individual competences to arrive at 
the correct choice. It could also decrease them or it could leave competences unchanged, 
in which case an epistemic argument for deliberative democracy would no t be enough to 
justify the costs of such a procedure. O n the other hand, there are three reasons why we 
should favour procedural justifications of deliberative democracy over epistemic ones.
Firstly, procedural justifications for deliberative democracy may be stronger as they 
rely on qualities which the procedure can provide for participants, rather than speculation 
about epistemic im provem ent which can never be m easured directly. Some of the 
problems I have identified can help us embrace a procedural justification. The fact that 
deliberators may not enter a deeply reflective discussion on moral beliefs due to a lack of
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motivation points to the value of deliberation as a means of providing an equitable 
procedure where all views can be voiced in order to make decisions m ore legitimate. 
Ultimately, the difficulty in verifying whether the result of a democratic process is correct 
is that the result itself is the only way of measuring the independent standard which we 
want to achieve. Procedural norms, on the other hand, can be evaluated against p re ­
determined guidelines, without having to refer to the knowledge-producing dimension of 
these procedures and without relying on controversial social epistemological theories.
Secondly, the gap between procedural and epistemic evaluations closes if we 
consider that procedural measures can be used to improve the epistemic performance of 
deliberative democracy. In order for political deliberation to be successful, solid 
procedural foundations need to be established. As we have seen, the epistemic promise 
hinges on the power of the best argument improving individual competences during 
deliberative discussion. While this can never be fully ensured, as far as it does occur, it will 
very much depend on procedural measures. Thus, it seems that deliberative democracy can 
only be justified on epistemic grounds if at the same tim e it can also be justified on 
procedural grounds. Procedural values, such as inclusion, equality and reasoned debate are 
intimately interlinked with epistemic performance.
As an example, it is possible that individual cognitive behaviour varies according to 
the environment and context (Reykowski 2006). If deliberation is structured 
appropriately, for example through m oderation that encourages participants to re-evaluate 
their positions based on arguments presented by others, this could to some extent 
counteract cognitive weaknesses. The problem of polarisation highlights the importance of 
presenting a balanced set of expert opinions and arguments, as well as ensuring that 
deliberation is a fully inclusive process. In deliberative polling great care is exercised in 
preparing the material that is distributed to participants before the poll (Ackerman and 
Fishkin 2004). In actual political processes agenda-setters would need to  be subjected to 
strong checks and balances.
Equally, the procedural standards chosen for deliberation could themselves 
contribute to a lowering of overall citizen competence. Cohen (1986) cites the example of
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a democracy where citizens receive all of their information from  the same self-interested 
media source in order to illustrate how voter competence could be influenced by the 
system of politics itself. The deliberative procedure could lead to  a reduction in 
competence if the pool of acceptable arguments is reduced. If all decisions relied on 
supposedly heavily regulated discussions, then the rules of these discussions themselves 
could have a negative impact on individual competences.
Can real-life deliberation live up to the procedural ideals which we need in order to 
support its epistemic justification? It is easily possible that this will not be the case. This 
reduces the potential for achieving a state of deliberative reflection that would truly 
support the best argument. Power structures, the ability to  present persuasive arguments 
and manipulation will also affect the outcomes. Cognitive weaknesses and the possibility of 
bias when only a limited pool of arguments is present pose a problem  even if deliberators 
are genuinely comm itted to deep moral enquiry. A lack of balance in deliberation could 
seriously affect the competence of deliberators to  make correct judgments. According to 
this scenario deliberation would affect individual competences negatively.
A fined reason for favouring procedural justifications of deliberative democracy over 
epistemic ones is that they will be valid even if we are sceptical as to the existence of an 
independent standard of correctness. Decisions have to be made in politics no m atter what 
our position on the moral tru th  is. Procedural justifications can provide a solid basis for the 
legitimacy claims of deliberative democracy irrespective of what we believe of its epistemic 
qualities. This final advantage is stronger against Estlund’s epistemic proceduralism than 
against Peter’s pure epistemic proceduralism. However, even the latter is vulnerable to 
more procedural criticisms as a result of relying on the procedure’s knowledge-producing 
values than other procedural justifications of deliberation are.
Neither procedural nor epistemic perfection can be attained. The question is which 
approach we should give priority to when we justify decisions reached through deliberative 
democracy. As deliberation requires both time and com m itm ent, it needs to be weighed 
whether the level of benefits offered by either justification above liberal representative 
democracy outweigh these costs. There is certainly a case for justifying democracy on
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epistemic grounds and there is something intuitively appealing in the claim that “two heads 
are better than one” (Estlund 2008, 177). But we cannot assume that simply adding 
deliberation will increase the epistemic quality of democratic decisions. After all, 
deliberation can adjust individual voter competences just as easily downwards as it could 
do upwards. Given that deliberative democracy can be m ore better justified on procedural 
grounds and it is possible to measure how far these procedural values have been attained in 
practice, procedural justifications are a be tter basis for this cost-benefit analysis. But as we 
have seen in earlier chapters of this thesis, these procedural justifications do not offer a 
particularly strong basis for deliberative democracy either.
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C h a p t e r  S e v e n  
T h e  L i m i t s  o f  D e l i b e r a t i o n
In this chapter I will look at the limits that need to be set for deliberative democracy to be 
successful. I will do this by addressing a num ber of ‘descriptive’ questions. The first 
question is what we should deliberate about; which issues can be successfully decided 
through discursive procedures. The second question is how deliberation should be 
conducted, what kind of rules and procedures should be introduced. The third question is 
where deliberation should take place. Most authors place deliberation at the local or 
national level, but global deliberative democracy (Dryzek 2006) could also be a possibility. 
The fourth question is who should deliberate, that is how we choose the participants of 
deliberation. The fifth and final question is when or, m ore accurately, how often 
deliberation should be our main democratic decision-making process. I believe that by 
answering these questions we can gain a better understanding of the proper role of 
deliberation in politics, and of the boundaries of successful deliberative procedures.
Another im portant question, why we would want to  deliberate over political issues, 
has already been addressed by the chapters of this thesis that looked at procedural and 
epistemic justifications of deliberative democracy. But the question will re-surface in this 
chapter as well, as it affects the answer to all the other questions covered here.
O f course the answers to all of these questions are interconnected. W ho should 
deliberate depends on what topics are discussed and where that discussion takes place. 
How often we should (and can) deliberate will depend on where deliberation takes place 
and what is being discussed. For example, Ackermann and Fishkin’s (2004) deliberation 
day — consisting of a debate on who should be the next US president — will by necessity 
take place every four years.
In answering these questions I will rely on the findings of earlier chapters. The limits 
of deliberative democracy are shaped by its potential to be reasoned, equal, inclusive, 
other-regarding or good at tracking the truth. Thus, we can see this chapter as a
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culmination of the analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of deliberative democratic 
processes. It allows us to  confront what deliberative democracy would look like in practice 
and what its limits would be. This allows us to offer a final evaluation of the model of 
deliberative democracy against other models, m ost importantly that of liberal 
representative democracy.
I will only seek to  give definite answers to some of the questions in this chapter. 
O thers, such as the status of long-term  residents who are not (yet) citizens, I will address 
only tentatively and bring up here as examples of the kinds of questions that any real-world 
deliberative system would have to take seriously.
What Should We Deliberate About?
The first question we need to ask about practical deliberation is what its topic should be. 
Political questions encompass many very different issues which impact on how  citizens live 
their fives together. Starting from day-to-day practical issues, such as setting the legal 
speed limit for cars, through serious ethical questions, such as euthanasia, to constitutional 
m atters fundamental to the functioning of the state, many issues could potentially be 
subject to deliberation. In addition to these, citizens could also deliberate about the 
candidates that will represent them in the law-making process. There are many 
constraints, such as time or issue complexity, that will affect which problems should be 
decided through deliberation, rather than other decision-making procedures. Another 
important question is how controversial and how open-ended the issues that we deliberate 
on should be. My aim here is to examine w hether there is any limit to the type of topics 
that are suitable for deliberation.
Because informal deliberation is very open-ended in nature, possibly takes place over 
longer periods of time and does not have a pre-defined set of participants, it can encompass 
all issues suitable and relevant for the public realm. Thus, it will not deal with issues that 
are only relevant for the individual. For example, where I should go on holiday next is not
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a publicly relevant question, but whether I should be allowed to travel freely is. Such 
widely relevant issues are already debated in the public sphere. W hich issues are salient for 
public discussion will emerge as part of the informal deliberative process. O f course, not 
all issues discussed in the public sphere fall under political deliberation. There are other 
topics, such as celebrity gossip or sports news which are once again not a proper subject 
for political debate. Thus, we need to add that the topics of informal political deliberation 
should be widely publicly relevant, salient for citizens and moral or political in nature.
By contrast, the topic of formal deliberative procedures has to be predeterm ined. 
N ot only is the question or issue under deliberation pre-selected, but also the possible 
arguments and evidence that could be presented during deliberation, as well as the possible 
options deliberators will be able to choose between.
The most obvious way in which we can ascertain what subjects are suitable for 
deliberation is by looking at the context in which it takes place. The design of a local 
library might be a perfectly suitable topic for local tow n hall meetings (Karpowitz and 
Mansbridge 2005), while it would be a waste of tim e at the national level. W hether 
Australia should be a monarchy can be debated at the national level (Luskin et al. 2002), 
but it would make little sense to decide on this at the local tow n hall level. O f course 
which issues are discussed at each level also depends on the political organisation of each 
country. Some countries are m ore centralised than others, which leave m ore decisions to 
be taken at the local level.
In democratic countries legislative assemblies have for a long tim e been the most 
visible formal deliberative meetings and have a well-defined set of issues that they make 
decisions on. They have a clear purpose in making laws over issues that affect the whole 
country deeply. Legislatures employ a large num ber of politicians, bureaucrats and 
advisors and thus have the resources to deal with many complex issues each year.
At the same time legislatures often appear to be scarcely deliberative. In multi-party 
parliamentary democracies whatever deliberation exists often takes place among party 
leaders and outside of the legislative arena (Manin 1997). It appears that political decision­
making is m ore often dominated by power politics, bargaining and logrolling. Even if
188 of 257
Chapter Seven: The Limits of Deliberation
legislatures could successfully become m ore deliberative, deliberation would likely 
continue to exist alongside these other decision-making mechanisms, such as logrolling or 
bargaining. This is not least due to its resource-intensive nature.
Schroeder (2002) contrasts the resources needed for deliberation with those needed 
for judicial litigation. He argues that deliberation is even m ore resource-intensive as the 
issues on the agenda are polycentric (there are numerous options to choose from) rather 
than bipolar as in a trial (the choices are “guilty” or “innocent”) and the range of possible 
issue dimensions is also higher. The US Supreme Court only deals with about 80 cases a 
year and these require numerous employees apart from the nine judges. At lower levels of 
the judiciary 90% to 95% of civil cases are settled before they go to trial. Following the 
same framework, relatively few issues could become the subject of deliberative decision-
Indeed we can see this practical limitation even in the resource-rich quasi- 
deliberative setting of legislatures. During the 2004-2005 session, the House of Commons 
in the UK handled only 88 public bills and 3 private bills. O ut of these, 21 bills passed in 
both Houses of Parliament. In order to deal w ith the fact that only a lim ited amount of 
resources are available for national legislatures and supreme courts, many day-to-day 
decisions in government are taken by the executive, both by politicians and civil servants.
But how about deliberation that takes place betw een citizens, rather than elected 
legislators, officials and other political actors? This is where the main focus of the literature 
lies. W e can categorise such meetings according to their purpose. Each of these purposes 
will imply a different set of topics that will be considered during deliberation.
At its most ambitious, the purpose of formal deliberation among citizens is to make a 
decision. For such deliberative processes, a very specific issue with well-defined options to 
choose from is most suitable. Examples of these could include decisions on whether or not 
a road should be built through a forest (Goodin and Niemeyer 2003), decisions on 
healthcare budget priorities (Gutmann and Thompson 1996) and decisions on how a school 
should be run (Fung 2004).
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Deliberation could also serve an exploratory purpose. It could help us gain a better 
understanding of issues and possible solutions to  them , or it could help us to  understand 
those holding different viewpoints from  ours better. An example of the latter could be a 
series of deliberative meetings betw een pro-life and pro-choice activists, which could lead 
to greater respect and better understanding of each others’ views. Deliberation before 
elections could also be seen as such an exploratory process. Such deliberation could serve 
as a preparation for decision-making, as well as allowing citizens to become acquainted 
with, learn to tolerate and even emphasize with different viewpoints and arguments.
But not all of these topics are equally likely to lead to successful deliberation, as 
defined by the procedural values in the literature. Some topics are not appropriate for 
given deliberators and a given time-frame and objective. Thus, while the context of 
deliberation can give us im portant guidelines to the suitability of issues, it does not answer 
the question fully. W e need to ask ourselves: whatever the setting is, what kind of 
questions is deliberation m ost likely to be successful in answering? There are two criteria 
which make formal deliberation among citizens m ore likely to be successful: issue 
complexity and issue salience.
The complexity of issues that can be discussed in a deliberative meeting betw een 
ordinary citizens is relatively limited. Issue complexity increases both with the necessary 
knowledge that is required to make well-informed judgments and with the num ber of issue 
dimensions involved in making the decision. Citizen juries have deliberated on some m ore 
complex issues, such as the use of nanotechnology, but this can only be undertaken wdth 
the help of expert witnesses and at a level of complexity and understanding that reflects the 
abilities of the deliberative group. Thus, for technically complex problems citizens should 
only be required to understand the basic principles of the issues at stake to the extent that 
they will be able to make informed judgments about their social, economic and moral 
implications.
The more complex the issues are the m ore time is required to acquire the necessary 
knowledge to make informed judgments. Just as some technically complex legal cases are 
ruled on by judges rather than juries, some complex questions may be better left to
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expert, rather than citizen deliberation. The cognitive demands of such issues may make 
deliberation too costly for average citizens, in terms of both time and effort.
The complexity of an issue is reduced if the options that deliberators can choose 
from are pre determined and their num ber is limited. It can also be reduced if the problem  
does not have a significant moral dimension, as this is likely to lead to less, or at least less 
intense, disagreement. Complexity is also lessened if deliberators are already familiar with 
the issue at stake. Stakeholder groups, who are already familiar with many aspects of a 
problem, may be able to  deliberate on relatively complex m atters m ore easily. As an 
example, parents of school-age children may be better aware of options to improve a 
school’s performance than other citizens are.
Thus, deliberation is m ore likely to be successful if issues are not too complex. 
Fewer issue dimensions, a lower requirem ent for highly technical knowledge and a 
familiarity with the issues will reduce the time and effort required in coming to  a reasoned 
decision. However, no general rules exist that will always predict the success of 
deliberation; this will instead be highly context-sensitive.
Some authors argued in the past that deliberation is only necessary in the case of 
highly significant events, such as constitution building. However, the literature has moved 
away from this view. For example, while Ackermann held this view in We the People 
(1991), he does not do so anymore if Deliberation Day (2004). But even Deliberation Day 
urges us to use public mass deliberation infrequently: only at times of elections. The reason 
for reducing the num ber of issues we deliberate on is usually a lack of resources, most 
notably time and motivation. Thus, while deliberation may be successful for less salient 
issues, its cost will not necessarily be justified by the personal and collective benefits 
received from deliberation.
W hether deliberation takes place on the local, national or global level, the num ber 
of instances in which this process can be used will be limited. One way of determining 
whether we should decide on an issue using formal deliberative meetings is by establishing 
whether there is a demand for them. If an issue is uncontroversial, then existing political 
arrangements, such as decisions reached by the legislature or the executive, can take care
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of it. The num ber of issues people will actually want to deliberate on will be lim ited, since 
much of the time citizens just want politicians to  get on with governing without involving 
them (Hibbing & Theiss-Moore 2002). But there are also issues where there appears to be 
at least some public demand for m ore debate and consultation, as in the case of abortions, 
wars or rubbish collection, a recent example from the UK, which will be discussed in a 
moment.
To summarize, issues need to be clearly defined, appropriate to the level at which 
the forum operates and be salient enough in order for us to employ such a resource­
intensive procedure. Let me illustrate this conclusion with two examples from recent 
informal public deliberation in the UK. The first is the debate surrounding the frequency 
and method of rubbish collection and the second is the debate surrounding the war in Iraq. 
Both issues proved to be highly controversial, elicited intense emotional responses from 
people, were highly publicised in the media and everyone seemed to have an opinion on 
them. O f these two, rubbish collection appears to be m ore suitable for face-to-face formal 
deliberative meetings among ordinary citizens, as this issue could be resolved on the local 
level, affected people directly, the num ber of issue dimensions were limited and there 
were clearly defined choices available, one of which may even have been the correct one. 
The war in Iraq, on the other hand, had a serious moral dimension, was m ore complex and 
answers to the problem were less easy to  come by. However, this does not mean that the 
war was not suitable for nation-wide informed deliberation as well as deliberation in the 
legislature and the executive. Thus, the topics m ost suitable for deliberation vary by 
context, depending on whether deliberation is formal or informal and w hether it takes 
place between ordinary citizens or politicians.
How Should We Deliberate?
There are likely to be both significant differences and similarities betw een how  formal and 
informal deliberation should be conducted. Formal deliberation is subject to a set of formal
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rules, such as Robert’s rules of order (Roberts et al. 2000), which may also have evolved 
over time informally. Informal deliberation may be subject to some rules as well — the 
media is likely to be regulated, for example — but the only real restrictions to  it are the 
ones we would enforce on free speech. This means excluding hate speech, slander or 
‘fighting words’. At the same tim e we would expect that both informal and formal 
deliberation are guided by norms of respect, other-regardingness, tolerance and civility, 
since these are defining characteristics of deliberative discussions.
The rules of formal political deliberation can and m ust be m ore detailed. These are 
concerned with issues such as when and for how long participants are allowed to  talk, how 
evidence is presented and what kinds of speech and actions are allowed. Here I will not 
talk about the institutional design of formal deliberation, but am rather going to  talk about 
the kinds of arguments, tone and speech that are acceptable.
Young (2000) argues against conceptualising deliberation as strictly rational debate. 
She believes that other forms of talk should be included as well and emotional speech 
should play a role too. There are three forms of speech that she advocates in deliberation: 
greetings, rhetoric and narrative. The function of greetings is to acknowledge others and is 
thus crucial for inclusion. Rhetoric allows strength of em otion to be communicated and 
narrative allows the individuals to present their particular points of view, including, again, 
their emotions.
Both formal and informal deliberation need to be characterised by civility (Estlund 
2001, 2008) and respect. W hat counts as civility or respect is likely to differ from culture 
to culture. In general, extreme utterances should not be part of deliberation. By extrem e 
utterances I understand speech that is generally not considered polite regardless of culture: 
shouting, rudeness or swearing. For example, the lyrics of many, if not m ost, rap songs or 
their equivalent would be inadmissible in m ore formal deliberative settings and m ost likely 
in informal ones as well. The reason for this is that the language they use, while it may be 
considered acceptable by a small sub-group of the population, is generally considered 
unacceptable, as it is Uttered with swear words and abusive language. Thus, we can find 
reasons for excluding the language of one specific group or at least censoring that language;
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this is the case if that language is generally considered offensive and does not prom ote 
respect. Incidentally, by using such language the group can exclude itself; other 
participants are less likely to find arguments expressed in this form acceptable. There are 
also extrem e utterances in the public sphere that are no t acceptable in a m ore formal 
deliberative context. Shouting is one example. W hile shouting can be considered normal at 
a demonstration, it would not be acceptable at a deliberative poll. Thus, the most 
im portant limits on conducting deliberation are that speech m ust be respectful towards 
others and must no t be extrem e in the sense outlined here. Informed deliberation may 
break the second rule at times, but there is still a requirem ent of respect.
It is more difficult to define the tone permissible in informal deliberation. Given its 
disaggregated nature, it is likely that many utterances which would not be permissible in a 
formal deliberative meeting would still be acceptable in informal deliberation. And this is 
true not only for utterances, but also for other forms of public behaviour.
Informal deliberation would encompass numerous settings and different forms of 
communication. Discussion betw een friends, politically charged documentaries, the letters 
pages of newspapers and statements by public officials are just some examples of w ider 
deliberative communication in the public sphere. It is difficult to define what could still 
count as deliberative in such diverse settings; where deliberation ends and other forms of 
political action or self-expression begin in the public sphere. W ould the rap lyrics I 
m entioned above form an acceptable part of deliberation or would these lack a necessary 
elem ent of reason? Is the Turner prize entry that re-created the posters of a dem onstrator 
part of rational debate or only controversial conceptual art? Are demonstrations part of 
informal deliberation or are they forms of action that in tu rn  affect democratic deliberation 
by bringing the strength of some constituents’ feelings to our attention?
If these forms of behaviour do not m eet the requirem ents of civility and reason, than 
they are not deliberative. Thus, the Turner prize entry is not deliberative, since it is at 
m ost an emotional appeal, rather than a reasoned argument. As far as demonstrations are 
insular and often uncivil, these cannot be considered deliberative either. However, they 
both contribute to and inform informal deliberation. For example, since attending a
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demonstration is a costly action, it is a means by which participants can express just how 
strongly they believe in the issue they are championing.
W hen the requirem ent of civility is broken, we are faced with two options. W e can 
uphold the requirem ent, but acknowledge that it cannot be sufficiently enforced in the 
w ider public sphere. Alternatively, we can say that some behaviour or statem ent simply 
cannot be part of the informal deliberative process. Both of these answers are problematic. 
The first is problematic because we would then need to  question whether breaking these 
informal rules allows us to call a system deliberative democracy at all. The second is 
problematic because these statements or behaviours would still take place and we would 
need to explain their status with respect to informal deliberation. In extrem e cases a third 
option is open to us: limiting free speech in public in order to eliminate the m ost insidious 
forms of behaviour that correspond least to  the deliberative ideal, and which could be 
argued to pose a direct threat to  some m em bers of society. Examples of this kind of 
regulation of the informal public sphere include the incitem ent to religious hatred act in 
the UK or the banning of Nazi works and symbols in many central European countries.
Where Should We Deliberate?
The third question we can ask about deliberative democracy is at what level it should take 
place. In the literature all kinds of spheres are pronounced to be suitable for deliberation. 
At the national level some ideas for implementing deliberation encompass the whole 
population, either formally (Ackermann and Fishkin 2004, Leib 2004) or informally 
(Benhabib 1996). For other authors, national-level deliberation is focused on elected 
legislatures (Steiner et al. 2004) or specialist deliberative assemblies (Elstub 2008). But 
deliberation can also take place at the local level (Fung 2004), in tow n halls (Mansbridge 
1980) or in consultative bodies made up of citizens (Baiocchi 2003, Souza 2001). Finally, 
deliberation is seen to be suitable for extending outside the nation state, to a globed level 
(Dryzek 2006).
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Probably the m ost controversial of these is the idea of global level deliberation. In a 
globalised w orld, opportunities exist for both formal and informal international 
deliberation. Formal deliberation could form part of the decision-making methods of 
international organisations as well as negotiations betw een nation states. As a result of 
globalization, informal deliberation is by necessity to some extent global. Information and 
opinions are exchanged betw een citizens of various countries - just think of the classrooms 
of many universities - much of the w orld’s population is increasingly globally mobile and 
media and telecommunications allow information and discourses to travel and spread 
across the w orld. Even demonstrations and protests can be global events nowadays, 
drawing participants from many countries.
Dryzek (2006) argues that today’s world is characterized by conflict betw een 
discourses, rather than conflict betw een rival states. Thus, he constructs a discursive 
theory of contem porary conflict, while rejecting the theory of a clash of civilisations 
(Huntington 1996) or a realist model of international relations. Globalisation, sustainable 
development, counter-terrorism  or Islamic fundamentalism are all examples of such 
discourses. In today’s world hegemonic discourses are questioned m ore and m ore, leading 
to the developm ent of new discourses through reflexive modernisation and stronger 
adherence to old ones through reflexive traditionalisation.
Dryzek uses this framework to argue for international discursive democracy, a model 
of global politics where actors recognise the importance of rival discourses and aim to 
develop dialogue betw een groups. Engagement betw een discourses is assumed to lead to 
reconciliation or at least an easier coexistence betw een them , even in deeply divided 
societies.
Dryzek conceptualises global deliberation as an ongoing, largely informal process 
that takes place within a netw ork of international groups. Global civil society actors are 
more suited to  this task than nation states and large international organisations, as they are 
more flexible and can introduce and use new discourses m ore freely. This model of global 
deliberation partly corresponds to the model of informal deliberation.
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Global deliberation, however, often introduces distance and heterogeneity that can 
be a profound challenge for deliberation in the theoretical sense of the w ord. It is of course 
possible to communicate across the globe, but how much of this communication will be 
deliberative? As we have seen above, informal deliberation may necessitate some minimal 
state regulation to ensure that it does not violate the m ost basic requirem ents for public 
discourse. This would be impossible to  secure on the global level.
And even if politics on the global level may become m ore deliberative, this does not 
mean that it will become m ore democratic. M ore powerful or resource-rich states will still 
dominate international relations. N ot all countries will be equally able to set global 
discourse, especially as m ore powerful countries also have a w ider range of international 
actions available to them , such as the capability to start wars, and their own domestic 
politics will also have m ore negative and positive externalities that will affect the citizens of 
other countries
Furthermore, it will be well-organised groups, w hether they are NGOs, pressure 
and protest groups or even terrorist organisations, that will be m ost able to shape the 
deliberative discourse to  their own advantage. But these groups will not necessarily be 
representative of global discourse in general. They may receive high pay-offs from the 
issues they represent, such as those farmers who even willing to  set themselves alight at 
W TO  meetings in protest against a lowering of tariffs, or they may have a special 
ideological comm itm ent to  a cause, as many com m itted anti-globalisation protesters do. 
Groups with diffuse costs and benefits will find it much less easy to set up effective 
collective organisations. Even though nearly all humans are consumers of rice and as such 
they are much more num erous than those involved in farming rice, the costs and benefits 
of participating for each individual are relatively low and therefore it is likely that the 
minority of rice farmers will be m ore successful activists than the majority consumers.
The poor and those who have limited access to new  communication technologies, 
such as the internet, will not be able to  participate in global deliberation either, as they will 
not have access to it. This blatantly violates the principle of external inclusion I set out in 
chapter four.
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Thus, while there may exist a deliberative or discursive, rather than purely power- 
driven elem ent in international politics, this will be neither fully deliberative nor fully 
democratic. Therefore, if we want to introduce deliberative democracy, it is m uch m ore 
fruitful to focus on national and local level deliberative processes.
Deliberation on the national level is the topic of some of the m ore ambitious projects 
on formal deliberative democracy, such as Ackermann and Fishkin’s deliberation day 
(2004). National deliberation, however, introduces problems of scope and representation 
(Parkinson 2003) that are not nearly as acute on the local level. Even if it was possible for 
all citizens to  deliberate on national-level issues occasionally, such as on deliberation day, 
some form of representation would need to be adopted for most national-level decisions.
Deliberation on the local level, on the other hand, is often regarded to  be the most 
authentic form of deliberation. Most deliberative studies deal with local-level deliberation: 
tow n hall meetings (Karpowitz and Mansbridge 2005), school board meetings (Fung 
2004), participatory budget procedures (Baiocchi 2003, Souza 2001).
Local deliberation fulfils the requirem ents for the topic of deliberation that I have 
discussed above. The issues discussed are relevant and close to individuals. They are clearly 
defined and tend to be relatively easy to understand. They are usually also practical in 
nature — for example, whether a new community centre should be built - rather than 
involving complex moral and ethical issues. Possible solutions to the problem  are also 
clearly identifiable. Deliberators often have a common interest that is stronger than it 
would be in the case of national deliberation. The results of the deliberative procedure are 
usually immediate, thus residents feel the direct benefits of participating. Deliberation can 
even have the beneficial effect of building up community cohesion.
Thus, deliberative democracy may be an ideal tool for solving local problem s in a 
way that includes and mobilises rather than alienates residents. Local level deliberation 
allows for homogeneity and familiarity with each other which cannot be achieved on the 
national and global level. Hence, to a large extent, local-level deliberation is closest to the 
ideal model.
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It is also much m ore feasible to organise face-to-face deliberative meetings at a local 
level than it is at a national or regional one. But even in a relatively small tow n, problems 
of scope re-surface, as it would not be possible to get all adult residents to participate 
simultaneously. Even if a tow n or city was small enough, so that all adult residents could fit 
into a stadium together, they would not be able to deliberate together, unless participants 
were divided into smaller groups.
One challenge for formal models of deliberation is how these different levels could 
be fused and connected. Deliberation on multiple levels would most likely be necessary if a 
culture of deliberation was to be established.
Informal deliberation spans multiple levels and spheres of politics. It connects 
everyday political talk betw een citizens, local politics and national governm ent. Formal 
models of deliberation tend to focus on one level or sphere of deliberation, such as tow n 
hall meetings on the local level or legislatures on the national level. Condorcet (1968, 
cited in Urbinati 2006) offers a way in which local and national level deliberation could be 
combined. On the local level, citizens would m eet regularly to discuss politics. The results 
of these local level meetings would then be communicated to other local groups as well as 
national assemblies.
If the theory of deliberative democracy is to fulfil its purpose of increasing the extent 
to which there is a society-wide increase in the exchange of reasons and a transform ation of 
beliefs and preferences that will profoundly affect politics, this would need to  take place 
both on the local level among ordinary citizens and on the national level among citizens, 
activists and politicians. Thus, a complete model of deliberative democracy would need to 
combine informal and formal, local and national deliberation for a blueprint of an entirely 
deliberative polity.
Thus, we can say that the site of democratic deliberation will rem ain the nation state. 
But here, there is still significant w ork to  be done on developing a model of deliberation 
that spans both national and local levels of politics. Only in this way can we guarantee that 
a pervasive deliberative culture would have the opportunity to emerge. O f course such a
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deliberative system would not be easy to  design, as it would have to balance and motivate 
deliberation on different levels against other forms of decision-making, such as bargaining.
Who Should Deliberate?
Informal Deliberation
The next question is who the participants of democratic deliberation should be. This 
question is easier to answer for an informal model of democratic deliberation that would 
permeate society and would encompass citizens, the media, civil society organisations, 
politicians and all branches of governm ent. Deliberation would provide the context of all 
other political actions: elections, the w ork o f the legislative assembly, the actions of 
bureaucracies. But exactly because deliberation could be seen as intertw ined w ith everyday 
life, it is difficult to identify who its participants are and the extent to which they are able 
to participate.
First of all, by definition, political deliberation must centre on the governm ent, 
broadly conceived. Therefore, elected politicians as well as bureaucratic agencies need to 
take part in the society-wide deliberative dialogue, by deliberating among each other, 
seeking the views of ordinary citizens and giving public justifications for their actions.
Secondly, while ideally all citizens should participate in democratic deliberation, it 
may be useful to  focus on the key stakeholders for issues. These are relatively easy to 
identify for many policy areas: parents, teachers and children in the case of education, local 
residents in the case of local planning or policing, and patients for local healthcare 
provision questions. But there are issues for which it is m ore difficult to identify who 
should be included in the deliberative debate. These include controversial m oral issues that 
most citizens have an interest in, such as abortion, as well as issues that will affect the 
whole population, such as pensions reform.
Thirdly, the media and civil society connect the debate betw een citizens and the 
government. Civil society acts as a mediating force betw een citizens and politicians in the
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public sphere. W hile ideally citizens would wish to take part in the deliberative process 
directly, in practice their resources to do so are often limited. Civil society groups can fill 
this gap. However, there is a danger that these groups do not reflect the balance of views 
and interests in society accurately. W hen costs are diffuse and benefits are concentrated, 
the beneficiaries of policies, such as agricultural subsidies, are much m ore likely to form 
groups than those who bear its burdens, such as consumers (Mueller 2003). Relatively 
small, vocal groups can also have a disproportionate influence in politics.
Probably the m ost controversial actors in informal deliberation are the media, which 
can be agents of deliberation as well as impediments to it. On the one hand, the media 
provide information that is available relatively cheaply both in term s of financial cost and in 
term s of investment of tim e and effort. They also fulfil a watchdog function, alerting us to 
issues and problems in governm ent and in society. W ithout the informal information- 
disseminating function of the media, informal nation-wide deliberation in large societies 
would be impossible. In fact, the emergence of mass media is argued to have been crucial 
for the development of the nation (Anderson 1986) and the public sphere (Habermas 
1996). O n the other hand, the media often employ tactics to  grab headlines which do not 
appear to correspond to the kind of politics deliberative democrats are after. Divisive ‘us 
versus them ’ reporting, exaggeration and sensationalist reporting do not usually foster 
open and inclusive debate. At its w orst, the media can contribute to ethnic and political 
tension, as in the case of the controversial elections in Kenya in 2007 and Zimbabwe in 
2008. Deliberative democrats would in fact argue that such tactics are some of the less 
desirable elements of current democracies (Gastil 2000). Thus, in order for democracies 
to become m ore deliberative, the media would need to focus on its information- 
disseminating, mediating function and avoid divisive communication.
Those schemes which regard deliberation as voluntary present us with an additional 
question, as it would be very difficult to determ ine what percentage of the population 
would need to participate in public deliberation and how often, in order to allow us to  call 
a democracy truly deliberative. W hile arbitrary figures could be provided, these could 
scarcely be justified and they would be nigh impossible to measure in practice.
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To conclude this section, participation in informal deliberation would be difficult to 
measure o r enforce. W e already see most of the actors discussed here participating in 
liberal representative democracies. Participation could of course be deepened and 
extended, but the question is whether this could be induced from the outside.
Formal Deliberation
Identifying participants becomes an even m ore im portant question for formal models of 
deliberation. As these consist of face-to-face discussion, identifying who needs to 
participate is crucial for ensuring inclusion and through that, legitimacy. W e can think of 
two broad categories of formal deliberation based on its participants: deliberation in 
legislatures and deliberation betw een citizens. O f course there may also be mixed 
deliberative meetings between citizens and politicians, for example at tow n hall meetings, 
but the aim of these is usually to seek the considered opinion of citizens, therefore these 
are not dramatically different from the second category.
Selecting which citizens should participate in deliberation is often seen as a question 
of sampling. Currently m ore serious deliberative endeavours use some kind of random  
sampling m ethod to ensure that a representative cross-section of society is present during 
deliberation (Luskin et al. 2002, 2006, Gastil 2000). An ambitious extension of such cross- 
sectional representation would be the actual involvement of the entire voting-age 
population, as in deliberation day (Ackermann and Fishkin 2004) or in deliberative jury 
duty (Leib 2004). In many cases deliberators may be self-selecting, as in the case of an 
average tow n hall meeting. Alternatively, we could once again make sure that all key 
stakeholders are properly represented.
Citizen participation in formal deliberative settings would be primarily determined 
by the level at which deliberation takes place and the topic that is discussed. Such 
participation should be freely available or randomly distributed, but should not be 
controversial in order to avoid charges of inequality or bias.
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If we abandon the idea that deliberation should be held among the general 
population, or want to mix informal representation among all citizens with m ore formal 
deliberation among representatives, we are faced with the problem  of representation in 
deliberation. The problem  is as follows. Citizens are usually thought to elect 
representatives in order to make sure that their preferences and interests receive proper 
weight in the legislative process. However, deliberation requires preference change and 
probably also belief change from deliberators. It is this transformative quality that is one of 
the key defining features of deliberative democracy. Yet, this transformation will only take 
place in the representatives and not in their constituents. W e can take it as a reasonable 
demand of appropriately deliberate processes that they should be transparent and that 
representatives are required to make every effort to give reasons for their preferences, 
beliefs and decisions to those they represent. This, however, may not always be enough to 
convince their constituents that their choice was the right one. Thus, we are faced with a 
fundamental paradox. O n the one hand, representatives are required to represent their 
constituents faithfully. O n the other hand, deliberators are required to be open to a 
transformation of beliefs and preferences. These two ideas need to  be reconciled somehow 
in order for formal deliberation betw een representatives to be normatively defensible.
There has not been a satisfactory answer to  this paradox so far. To argue that 
representatives should attem pt to justify their positions reached through deliberation to 
constituents, w ithout taking their views further into account (Gutmann and Thompson 
1996), is an unsatisfactory answer from the point of view of constituents. Therefore, we 
must ask ourselves what model of representation deliberative democracy would imply and 
what accountability means in a deliberative context (Mansbridge 2003).
Most models of representation view the selection of representatives either as an 
evaluation of the promises of prospective policies candidates will carry out if elected or as a 
retrospective evaluation of candidates’ past performance in office (Mansbridge 2003).
The idea that representatives are the delegates of their constituents is not new. It has 
been widely studied in political science in models such as the median voter m odel (Downs 
1957). According to this concept of representation, parties or candidates prepare
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manifestos or other statements as to their intentions during their tim e in office. Voters 
make their decisions about which candidate to elect based on these stated intentions. Once 
representatives are in office they are seen to possess a mandate to carry out these policies 
and are held accountable if they fail to do so. This is clearly an inappropriate model of 
representation for deliberative democracy. W hile representatives in truly deliberative 
processes may be able to  promise their constituents to put forward certain arguments 
which are im portant to them  during the debate, they cannot promise to  push forward 
certain policies without being willing to change their position.
According to the second conception of representation, voters do not vote in 
elections based m erely on the stated intentions of candidates. Rather, they evaluate the 
past performance of incumbents and use voting as an opportunity to ‘throw  the rascals ou t’ 
and ‘keep the good ones in’. Thus, voting is retrospective (Fiorina 1978, 1981). The 
electorate perceive the outcomes of politicians’ actions in office, together w ith a random 
noise. If they believe that someone could do better than the incum bent, they get rid  of 
him. This m odel of representation may be reflected in politicians’ efforts to  keep 
themselves informed of their constituents’ preferences through public opinion polls and 
focus groups. Again, this is not a suitable model of representation for deliberative 
democracy, as it constrains the actions of representatives during deliberation and would 
not allow for belief transformation if this did not correspond to the preferences of the 
electorate.
Neither of these models allows enough independence for deliberative representatives 
to  participate in a fully deliberative assembly. There is, however, another model of 
representation that may be m ore applicable to the deliberative setting. The origins of this 
model lie in the idea that representatives are trustees, not delegates (Burke 1774/1999). 
Here representatives need to be given free reign to vote for policies which they perceive to 
be fit, as their constituents may not have as good an understanding of problems and as good 
an idea of the comm on good as they do. Representatives are seen as worthy individuals 
who can be trusted by their constituents to do the right thing. Early m odern democracies 
approximated this model m ore closely than later ones (Manin 1997).
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Jane Mansbridge (2003) calls a broader version of this model gyroscopic representation. 
In this model constituents do not simply try to identify the candidate whose manifesto is 
closest to their preferences or who adhered to their wishes m ost closely while in office. 
Rather, voters try  to identify the representative that is a ‘good type’, someone whose 
interests and judgements coincide w ith those of their constituents and w ho has sound 
principles. Fearon (1999) argues that voters often see elections in this light. They prefer 
principled candidates to ones who follow public opinion like a weathervane. W hat is 
necessary is what Mansbridge (2005, 521) calls deep predictability — voters w ant to  elect 
representatives whose actions and decisions they can predict based on their past behaviour, 
character and so on.
This seems to  be a much m ore appropriate model for representation in a deliberative 
assembly. Thus, constituents would choose representatives who would behave during 
deliberation in a way similar to how they would behave and whose preferences are 
transformed the way their preferences would be transformed. If they feel confident that 
their representatives are deeply predictable in this way, then they will trust their decisions 
m ore than they would otherwise.
O f course, even under this model of representation we would have to accept that 
constituents would sometimes find it difficult to understand why their representatives 
made certain decisions in the deliberative assembly. Here transparency and communication 
betw een constituents and representatives become supremely im portant. Thus, there 
would need to exist a layer of deliberation betw een representatives and their constituency. 
Constituents m ust be able to communicate their concerns to the representative and 
representatives m ust justify their decisions to their constituents under deliberative 
conditions, particularly under conditions of reciprocity.
The second question is how citizens would be able to recognise good types. There is 
a large literature that argues that citizens use heuristic cues in choosing which candidate to 
elect (Grofman 1993). However, one could question whether this information is sufficient 
for citizens to identify which politicians would be able to  represent them  best in a 
deliberative procedure. Due to extensive media coverage, there is usually a great deal of
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information available about politicians in high-profile positions. Yet citizens may need to 
invest a great deal of tim e into becoming sufficiently informed to make up their minds 
about the character of candidates. Shortcuts and sound-bites are less costly sources, but 
could be misleading as they can be easily manipulated to present politicians in a certain 
light. In the end no amount of information will compensate for not personally knowing a 
candidate, which is inevitable in large electorates.
A bigger problem  is making sure that representatives’ preferences are not 
transformed in a way that will harm their constituents’ interests. After all, they are not 
identical to each other and therefore the representative may not be aware of all aspects of 
his constituents’ beliefs and preferences. This highlights a fundamental tension betw een 
interests and deliberative belief transformation. In m ost cases it is the interests and beliefs 
of citizens that should be privileged by representatives, if they cannot go through an 
identical belief or preference change themselves. Otherwise the legitimacy and validity of 
democratic representation can be called into question by citizens. Thus, even if we employ 
a trustee model of representation, the initial paradox betw een representing specific 
constituents and deliberative transformation is still not fully resolved.
The Inclusion o f  Those Who Normally Do Not Have a Say in National Politics
A final issue that needs to be raised regarding the participants of deliberative democracy is 
the problem of those who are not traditionally included in politics. Here I am primarily 
thinking of those residents of a country who are not citizens, but this category could also 
include future generations, animals and the environm ent or the governm ent and citizens of 
other countries that are affected by policies with significant externalities, such as pollution 
control. W hile I am not able to offer a solution for this problem  here, the issue is w orth 
highlighting. The section of this chapter on global deliberation has given us some insight 
into including foreign countries in deliberative procedures. Here I will briefly examine the 
problem of immigrant populations.
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The kind of stable liberal representative democracies that can be seen as good 
candidates for the introduction of deliberative democracy often have relatively large non­
citizen immigrant populations. In the United Kingdom, 5.2%  of the population is 
comprised of foreign nationals41. These immigrants do not have the same political rights as 
other m em bers of society. In EU countries a hierarchy of residents has developed where 
citizens hold full political rights, citizens of other EU countries hold partial rights and other 
residents hold some residual rights (Cohen 1987). Furtherm ore, in the UK, due to  an 
anachronism in electoral law dating back to 1918, nationals of Com m onwealth countries 
are allowed to vote in the national election, while non-British immigrants from  other 
countries are not.
Medium and long-term  residents are affected by political decisions just as m uch as 
full citizens are. The question is whether they should be excluded from deliberation just as 
they are excluded from voting or indeed whether it is possible at all to exclude them .
Under an informal model of deliberation non-citizens would also be able to 
participate, as there would be no formal way of excluding anyone from the public sphere. 
Under a formal model of deliberation it would be possible to exclude non-citizens, but one 
could argue that an intermediate stage of political rights could be developed w here non­
citizens could put forward their arguments and could serve the role of expert witnesses, 
but would not be able to  vote on a final decision. As I have argued in chapter five, 
deliberation would ultimately be supplemented by voting, therefore it may be possible to 
include non-citizens in some formal deliberation, while leaving final decisions to  citizens. 
This would allow non-citizens to have a voice and present their arguments about policies 
which would have significant effects on their fives. Yet the status of non-citizen immigrants 
raises a significant question as to where the line of deliberative inclusion should be drawn.
41 International Migration Outlook, OECD, 2007 edition.
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When Should We Deliberate?
Finally, I would like to briefly discuss when deliberative meetings should be held. Much of 
the answer to  how frequently and for how long we should deliberate is already given by 
the answers to the previous question about the limits of deliberation. Another way of 
interpreting the ‘w hen’ question in the case of deliberation betw een politicians is: ‘when is 
deliberation a better way of resolving problems than other methods available, such as 
bargaining?’ However, this question has already been answered in the section above where 
I discussed what topics are most suitable for deliberation.
Informal deliberative democracy is an ongoing, cyclical process that is no t subject to  
time-constraints. Thus, when informal deliberation should take place is less problem atic 
and im portant than the questions of who should deliberate how about what. If we include 
discussions between friends and family on political and moral issues in informal political 
deliberation, than it is likely that m ost people will participate in deliberation in the public 
sphere regularly, without any undue demands being imposed on them.
Just as in the case of choosing what topics are m ost suitable for deliberation, the 
questions of how often and for how long we should deliberate are m ore pressing for 
models of formal deliberation. If formal deliberation takes place betw een politicians, this 
process should be regular and ongoing, as it is in legislatures. Compared to  ordinary 
citizens politicians, bureaucrats and interest group activists will have m ore resources and 
greater motivation to participate in deliberation on a regular basis. A bigger constraint for 
professional politicians exists regarding the time at which deliberation should end. Formal 
political deliberation faces practical constraints, as it is often im portant that new  policies 
are introduced in a timely manner. These constraints will be given by the context of the 
issue under discussion and are thus fairly uncontroversial.
As we have seen in chapter two, one of the greatest constraints to participation in 
deliberation by ordinary citizens was time. N ext to  full-time jobs and family commitments 
free time becomes a precious commodity. In general people do not want to participate in
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politics frequently (Hibbings and Theiss-Morse 2002) and any realistic deliberative system 
will take this into account and will not impose demands on their time which citizen may 
regard as excessive.
Formal deliberation among ordinary citizens is likely to be m ore successful if citizens 
are only required to participate occasionally and not for great lengths of tim e. Ordinary 
citizens w ith relatively limited interest in politics will be m ore motivated to participate if 
their attendance is required relatively infrequently. At the m om ent citizens in m ost 
countries are only required to  vote every few years and they seldom make decisions 
through referendums.
There are also ways in which deliberators could be given incentives to devote tim e to 
participating in deliberation. These could include introducing new national holidays 
(Ackermann and Fishkin 2004) or setting up deliberation along the lines of jury duty 
(Gastil 2000, Leib 2004). However, these are exactly the kinds of wide-ranging and costly 
reforms which I have argued earlier were unlikely to  be introduced by our elected 
politicians.
The length of deliberative meetings betw een ordinary citizens may also need to  be 
regulated for three reasons. The first is the pragmatic consideration I have already 
m entioned with regard to formal deliberation betw een politicians. Decisions have to  be 
made and in a non-ideal world deliberation cannot go on forever. As we have seen in 
chapter five, this is also a compelling reason for combining deliberation w ith voting. 
Reaching decisions through a vote taken after deliberation allows us to choose policies 
m ore quickly than if we deliberated until a full consensus emerged.
The remaining reasons for limiting the amount of tim e ordinary citizens would spend 
on deliberating has to do with their motivations (Gastil 2000). Deliberators may be less 
motivated to participate or less able to free up tim e for participating if they expected the 
procedure to take a long time. Finally, it is m ore difficult to  hold people’s attention if 
deliberation goes on for long periods of time.
One final question is whether there should be a minimum amount of tim e that 
citizens spend deliberating in order to be able to  call a democracy deliberative. This would
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ensure that no one would be fully excluded, allow m ore viewpoints to  be represented and 
possibly make the informal public sphere m ore deliberative by exposing all citizens to the 
rules and standards of civility in formal deliberation.
However, there are some compelling reasons against defining such a minimum. 
Firstly, individuals may participate in deliberative meetings without either contributing 
much or getting much out of the process. Again, motivation can be a big culprit. Secondly, 
individuals may participate in a mix of formal and informal deliberative activities. As 
informal deliberative activities are difficult to quantify, some may be penalised for 
preferring these to m ore public settings. There may exist people who are very active in the 
informal deliberative process but eschew the formal one.
Conclusion
Thus, we can conclude that formal deliberation is likely to  be m ost effective w hen its scope 
is relatively limited. Both the goals and the participants of deliberation need to be clearly 
defined. And not only do these goals need to be clearly defined, but they also need to  be 
m odest enough, so that the problem can be understood and solutions evaluated over a 
reasonably short period of tim e. Neither should formal deliberation be something that we 
expect citizens to participate in frequently and on an ongoing basis. Some citizens may be 
willing to do this, but most will not be motivated enough to do so.
How about the m ore ambitious idea of informal deliberation in the public sphere? 
The problem  of informal deliberation is that it escapes attempts to define it, measure it and 
evaluate it. W e can never be sure who participates and whether informal deliberation 
fulfils and leads to demands of civility and other-regardingness. One of the problems of 
informal deliberation is that it is so closely intertw ined with other actions w ith a political 
content which we do not necessarily want to regard as deliberative. This makes it difficult 
to study theoretically, as it becomes difficult to define, as well as difficult to  study 
practically, as it is difficult to measure and evaluate. Thus, the role of informal deliberation
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in democratic politics can be elusive. As a result, it is then also difficult to determ ine how 
such informal deliberation is different from present liberal representative democracies. 
Yet, deliberative democrats aim to create a new model of democracy, rather than re ­
examine existing democratic practices. This is why m ost theorists will endorse some kind 
of formal deliberative procedure as the vehicle for deepening democracy. These models 
offer us a clearly defined forum within which individual behaviour can be both  prescribed 
and evaluated.
In this chapter I have addressed broad questions of the actual design of deliberative 
democratic institutions and sought to answer them  based on the findings presented in 
earlier chapters. W hen it comes to designing deliberative democracy, one final, intriguing 
question remains. W ho and how would design actual deliberative forums?
In the current, limited deliberative practice that exists in the real world it is clearly 
‘deliberative practitioners’, for want of a better w ord, who do so. Organisations such as 
America Speaks or the Kettering Foundation as well as m ore academically m inded ones, 
such as the Center for Deliberative Democracy at Stanford are responsible for running 
m ost overtly deliberative meetings. However, if deliberation was to  become a truly 
influential political event, it is unlikely that scholars of deliberative democracy would be 
able to control this process indefinitely. The design of democratic procedures would be 
influenced by politicians and - what should be seen as very desirable - by citizens.
Formal deliberative procedures in legislatures have evolved over long periods of 
time, sometimes centuries. The same would have to  be the case for deliberative 
procedures. The design of deliberative institutions should ideally be a circular, open-ended 
process. There would have to be necessary safeguards to  ensure that the deliberative 
character of meetings remained intact, just as there are constitutional safeguards to ensure 
that the majority cannot elect to forfeit its democratic rights.
However, this might prove m ore difficult for deliberation, especially of the informal 
kind, than for electoral democracy. Freedom of speech and assembly provide the basic 
foundations of democracy. The public sphere and the communication they foster are 
essential to the functioning of democratic regimes. Such a public sphere then becomes
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impossible to regulate or police w ithout damaging the basic structure of democracy. W hile 
such regulation may contribute to  making the public sphere m ore deliberative and may 
eliminate certain harmful biases and inequalities, it is only permissible in the most extrem e 
cases when free speech may be proven to lead to  harm, such as when someone publicly 
calls for the death of certain individuals or groups.
Yet unregulated discussion betw een citizens will no t necessarily be deliberative or 
may lose its deliberative character over time. The only active way available for deliberative 
democrats to  make the informal public sphere m ore deliberative is by involving citizens in 
m ore formal deliberative decision-making procedures and hoping that this will then impact 
the wider public sphere.
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C h a p t e r  E i g h t  
C o n c l u s i o n
The theory of deliberative democracy is not only popular, but also reasonably well- 
developed. But as we have seen over the last seven chapters, it is not without its problems. 
While it is well-developed as a self-contained theory, its foundations are not secure enough 
and its focus is too limited. In this final chapter, I will draw the different strands of my 
critique together and argue that it is time for democratic theory to move beyond the 
deliberative phase.
In this thesis I have examined various aspects of the theory of deliberative democracy 
in detail. I have drawn on empirical evidence both from  deliberative studies and other 
political and social psychological results in order to  evaluate it. I have also contrasted the 
assumptions behind the theory with the predictions of social choice and rational choice 
theory and have evaluated deliberative democracy against existing liberal representative 
democracies.
There are tw o main types of criticism that we can make against deliberative 
democracy: pragmatic and normative. Pragmatic criticisms centre on the problems of 
implementing and sustaining deliberative democracy in real-w orld politics. Deliberative 
democrats acknowledge that we can never achieve ideal political deliberation, where 
deliberators face no time constraints, all have equal pow er and influence, citizens reason 
perfectly and are perfectly well-informed. Nevertheless, they also hold that this ideal can 
be approximated sufficiently in real-world political processes in order for us to  enjoy the 
normative benefits of deliberation. Practical criticisms of deliberation suggest that this is 
not the case and, furtherm ore, even if it was, the costs of im plem entation would far 
outweigh the benefits.
Normative criticisms, on the other hand, state that not only do we face pragmatic 
problems in achieving the kind of deliberation that the theory calls for, but that even if we 
could achieve this, it would in fact not be normatively desirable. I want to  raise a num ber
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of criticisms of the normative theory of deliberative democracy in this chapter. Firstly, 
despite the large literature that has developed, the concept of deliberative democracy has 
still not been defined clearly (Mutz 2008). Secondly, justifications for a deliberative form of 
democracy are weak, which should make us question whether it is m ore legitimate than 
other forms of democracy. Finally, the conception of politics used by deliberative 
democrats is not neutral and will favour some groups and outcomes over others.
I will discuss practical criticisms of deliberative democracy only relatively briefly and 
will mainly focus on normative ones. Practical criticisms are m ore comm on and less 
controversial and in order to  establish the value of deliberative democracy it is ultimately 
its normative w orth that needs to be tested.
In the first section of this chapter I will address the reasons for the dominance of 
deliberative democracy in political theory. In the second section I will discuss some of the 
pragmatic criticisms of deliberative democracy. In section three I will re-iterate and 
summarize some of the substantive criticisms about the justifications of deliberative 
democracy that I have presented in earlier chapters. In the following sections, I will deal 
with three m ore substantive criticisms. Firstly, deliberative democracy, and especially its 
informal model, is not sufficiently clearly defined. Secondly, deliberative democrats face a 
trade-off betw een making deliberation compulsory and making it biased. Thirdly, the 
theory deliberative democracy has a very specific conception of politics. In the final section 
I will discuss alternatives in democratic theory to  the current dominance of deliberation.
Why Deliberation is Ultim ately Desirable
So what is the real normative appeal of political deliberation? I have looked at procedural 
justifications based on the fact that deliberation transforms preferences through reasoned 
argument, that it makes people and policies m ore other-regarding, that it fosters equality 
and inclusion and that it helps to generate a consensus. Ultimately, all of these justifications
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are lacking and even if we add them  all together, we do not get a strong enough normative 
justification for a new model of democracy.
One of the major normative appeals of deliberative democracy is that it captures our 
intuitions that political decisions that affect a large num ber of people, if not the entire 
society, need to be considered carefully. W e must devote sufficient tim e and attention to 
such policies. W e should discuss them and not make hasty or arbitrary choices.
This is because political decisions are unavoidably collective. Political decisions deeply 
affect the lives of many citizens. They have to be made collectively, because the goods that 
the decisions are concerned w ith are also collective (Christiano 1996, 2004). It makes no 
sense for individuals or groups in society to decide on welfare policies, policing and 
security policies or environmental policies on their own. Christiano (1996, 59-62) sets out 
four conditions that goods need to satisfy in order to count as a collective property  of 
society. Firstly, they need to be non-exclusive; it is not possible for them  to affect a person’s 
life without affecting the lives of others. Pollution, the condition of roads or wars are all 
non exclusive in this sense. Secondly, collective properties are public; that is, they only 
include issues that affect the welfare of everyone. Some citizens may hold meddlesome 
preferences over some issues even if these do not affect their welfare, but this does not 
suffice to make these the subject of collective decision-making. Thirdly, sharing these 
collective properties is inevitable; we all live together on a relatively small area of the globe, 
breathing the same polluted or clean air. Finally, the properties of a collective good need 
to be alterable; it makes no sense to try to  make public decisions about them  if they are not.
The fact that these decisions have to be made collectively and will affect our lives 
collectively, for better or for worse, makes them  very different from private decisions. As 
they often affect a large num ber of people w ith diverse interests, we need to consider their 
effects on others carefully. Furtherm ore, collective decisions m ust not be arbitrary, 
benefiting some and harming others w ithout good reason.
These collective decisions have to be made under conditions of pluralism. Citizens 
will hold a variety of reasonable, but often conflicting beliefs and preferences. These 
viewpoints need to be reconciled in any political decision in a way that is ideally acceptable
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to all, or nearly all reasonable persons. Some of these decisions may need to be made 
collectively at the national level, some may even need to be made at the global level, but 
many of these collective issues can be decided on the level of the local community.
Thus, the primary value of deliberation may be that it allows for deep, meaningful 
reflection before collective decisions are taken. This has m ore to do w ith the tim e and 
effort that we spend on deliberation than expectations that it will transform preferences in 
a certain way or that it fosters equality or inclusion. At the same tim e, many of the 
procedural values of the theory of deliberative democracy may still be necessary if we want 
to give collective decisions the necessary weight and importance across the entire society.
But the fact that such collective decisions are of a special importance and that they 
should be considered carefully does not yet necessarily point us towards deliberative 
democracy. After all, Rousseau argued against long, drawn-out discussion as he believed 
that it would encourage factionality, partial interest and dissent (Rousseau 1997, Urbinati 
2006). It is only yet another intuition that leads us to talking to each other in a reasoned 
m anner in order to reach a decision. This is the intuition that political discussion will lead 
to a better understanding of each other and of issues, a greater willingness to be other- 
regarding and to do the right thing, as well as leading to decisions that are acceptable to all, 
even the losers.
Deciding collective m atters through deliberation also seems to be a very academic 
intuition, applying similar standards to  weighty decisions in the public sphere that we 
would apply to weighty m atters in the seminar room . Thus, we need to  consider whether 
this intuition really applies. Having examined the different justifications of deliberative 
democracy as well as many of its practical and theoretical limitations, we are now  in a 
position to do just this.
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The Pragmatic Limitations o f  Deliberative Dem ocracy
There is no doubt that the theoretical literature on deliberative democracy is concerned 
with an ideal model. Therefore, one could argue that practical concerns about deliberation 
are not of primary relevance when we evaluate it. However, the model is an aspirational 
one that argues that while these ideals may never be fully realised in actual political 
systems, they can nevertheless be sufficiently approximated to  deliver m ost of the 
normative benefits of the ideal. One way of arguing against such a theory is by showing 
that this is no t the case and that the ideal cannot be realised to  a sufficient extent to justify 
the costs of attempting to do so. The pragmatic limitations of deliberative democracy have 
been highlighted many times in the literature and have also played an im portant role in the 
previous chapters of this thesis.
O n the m ore normative side, Estlund (2008) points to the impossibility and the 
undesirability of trying to m irror ideal deliberative situations in real-life politics, due to the 
lack of conditions commonly posited by ideal theories: full and equal access to the forum, 
an equal chance to speak, honest communication, equal bargaining pow er, and so on 
(Estlund 2008, 175-176). Instead, we should use these ideals as benchmarks to  evaluate 
the epistemic qualities of actual democratic processes, which he calls ‘real speech situation’ 
after Habermas’s (1996) ‘ideal speech situation’. Thus, while Estlund stresses the 
importance of norms of civility in democratic politics, he argues that we should not apply 
ideal principles directly to everyday political life and expect the same normative outcomes 
as we would get in an ideal situation.
As we have seen in earlier chapters, the complexity of deliberative interactions can 
lead to many practical pitfalls. The requirem ent for reasoned discussion will not necessarily 
be fulfilled in deliberation among citizens. Sunstein (2003) pointed out the dangers of 
group polarisation and informational cascades. Deliberative democracy could founder on 
the large num ber and complexity of public issues (Schroeder 2002). Discussion might lead
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to tensions flaring as opposed to a mutually acceptable decision (Karpowitz and 
Mansbridge 2005).
I addressed some of the m ost fundamental pragmatic problems in chapter two: the 
lack of political will to make democracy significantly m ore deliberative on the part of 
politicians and the lack of motivation to participate on the part of citizens. A lack of 
political will to make democracy m ore deliberative will make it difficult to introduce m ore 
formal deliberative measures. W hile politicians have utilized both citizen jury and 
deliberative polling procedures, their use is far from wide-ranging. A few high-profile 
deliberative polls endorsed by politicians and employed as part of the decision-making 
process in China and Greece are not yet an indication that such procedures will be held 
m ore widely in the future rather than being used as a one-off political gimmick. I have 
argued in chapter two that increasing deliberation is most likely to be successful through 
local schemes that build on traditions of community meetings and school boards to  engage 
citizens in political deliberation.
But when it comes to  engaging citizens in deliberation, we immediately have to  face 
the second problem , that of motivation. Theories of deliberative democracy assume a 
much higher level of civic participation than we currently observe. However, it is unclear 
what incentives citizens have for this. In their influential study of American politics 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) find that m ost citizens do not want to  take a m ore active 
role in politics and would rather leave governing to  the politicians.
But just getting citizens to talk about politics is not yet democratic deliberation in the 
theoretical sense. Ideal deliberation is characterised by reciprocity, tolerant, other- 
regarding behaviour, reasonable and reasoned discussion, inclusion and equality. Thus, 
even if we succeed in getting citizens to  talk about politics, these procedural requirem ents 
still need to  be fulfilled in order to make democratic politics and democratic discourse 
m ore deliberative.
Following her observation of informal small-group discussions about political issues 
that occurred as a by-product of group social interaction, Cram er Walsh (2004) argues that 
we cannot expect that deliberation will always produce tolerant citizens who aim to
218 of 257
Chapter Eight: Conclusion
identify the common good. Instead, she found that discussion helps people to  construct 
what it means to be black or white, Dem ocrat or Republican. As a result, talking about 
politics can reinforce stereotypes about those of different race, gender, socio-economic 
status or political beliefs. She argues that we cannot assume that deliberative meetings or 
informal deliberation in the public sphere will automatically overcome these issues. If 
deliberation is to be used to further tolerance it needs to  be carefully structured to focus 
on getting to know people who are not ‘one of us’ and exploring what we have in common 
with them  rather than aiming to find consensual solutions. Thus, introducing deliberation 
in itself is unlikely to generate the kind of results that are necessary to  fulfil its normative 
value.
A clear pragmatic problem  with making democracy m ore deliberative is that it 
would be very costly to do so. In the case of formal deliberation it is easier to  calculate 
such costs. These include the substantial transaction cost of organising deliberative events, 
the costs of participation to citizens and the cost of the political changes that such 
procedures may result in. But an active deliberative democracy would also carry large 
opportunity costs as citizens would spend their tim e and efforts deliberating instead of 
working, socialising or engaging in leisure activities. Such a costly procedure is only w orth 
introducing if it will offer clear benefits over present democratic arrangements. Studies of 
deliberative democracy have yet to prove that this is the case.
Yet these practical critiques of deliberative democracy are ultimately not enough to 
undermine the m odel’s dominance in democratic theory. Firstly, we do not have sufficient 
empirical evidence about real-world deliberation to answer these questions once and for 
all. W ith further advances in the empirical literature it may become clearer whether 
deliberation really delivers the results expected by theorists. So far relatively little 
attention has been given to the circumstances under which deliberation fails. In order to 
help us evaluate the potential of deliberative decision-making, further research in this 
direction is necessary, rather than the usual sympathetic treatm ents of deliberation (Cohen 
and Rogers 2003, Mutz 2008).
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Secondly, even if empirical evidence shows us that citizens do not currently behave 
in the way that the theory predicts, deliberative democrats can argue that introducing 
m ore deliberation into politics will cumulatively generate the behaviour and values that are 
necessary to make it a success. Thus, if citizens are now poorly informed and unm otivated 
to participate in political meetings, they will over tim e become m ore m otivated and better 
informed. If we find citizens to be intolerant and selfish, we cannot yet say that they will 
not become tolerant and other-regarding over tim e as a result of participating in 
deliberation.
Thus ultimately, critiques of deliberative democracy have to be normative. They 
have to show that the problem  is not that deliberation is unattainable. Instead, the problem  
is with the theory itself, w ith its normative aims. The greatest hurdle that any such 
criticisms m ust overcome is the overwhelming intuitive appeal of citizens holding diverse 
views talking to  each other and reasoned political decisions emerging through such talk. 
This intuitively appeals to some of our most cherished democratic and liberal values; 
inclusion, tolerance, trying to arrive at good and mutually acceptable decisions. I do not 
wish to fight the intuitive appeal of these values. Instead, what I would like to  show is that 
deliberative democracy is not the best way to fulfil them , despite the fact that at first sight 
it appears to be their perfect embodiment. In the rem ainder of this chapter I will argue that 
deliberative democracy is not sufficient as a model of how democracies should function.
The Justifications o f  Deliberative Democracy
Much of the normative basis for the theory of deliberative democracy stems from the 
justifications offered that secure the legitimacy of such a decision-making process. Thus, it 
is im portant to examine whether they offer a secure normative foundation for the theory. 
Many of the previous chapters have done just this, w ith sceptical results.
In chapter six I examined the epistemic justification for deliberative democracy, 
which is the m ost common outcome-based justification of democratic processes. H ere,
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democratic decisions are legitimate because the procedure has an epistemic value: it is 
m ore likely to arrive at the tru th  or a be tter outcome than other decision-making 
procedures would be. I argued that while it is quite likely that reasoned discussion will be 
an epistemically good decision-making procedure, this will not always be the case. It is 
easier to evaluate deliberative processes based on procedural than epistemic grounds and 
such procedural justifications will also hold if we are sceptical about the existence of a 
correct choice. Furtherm ore, any epistemic gains rely heavily on the procedural values of 
deliberation. Therefore, if we want to find a solid basis for justifying deliberative 
democracy, we are better off by turning to procedural justifications.
However, procedural justifications of deliberative democracy do not always fare 
be tter either. In chapter three I have examined the claims that political deliberation will 
take the form of reasoned debate that fosters other-regarding, rather than selfish, attitudes 
and preferences. One of the key claims of the theory of deliberative democracy is that it 
will assist the formation and transformation of preferences by exposing deliberators to  new 
facts as well as the beliefs and preferences of their fellow citizens. I argued that the 
mechanisms of such preference change cannot be taken for granted, as there may be other 
mechanisms at work, such as conformity, which will hinder the objectives of deliberative 
theory.
In chapter four I looked at procedural justifications of deliberative democracy that 
emphasize the values of un-coerced, equal and inclusive discussion. I have argued that 
given the nature of deliberative democracy, the values of equality and inclusion should not 
only be applied to persons, but also to arguments. I differentiated betw een external and 
internal inclusion and formal and substantive concepts of equality. I argued that substantive 
equality was both infeasible and undesirable and while both forms of inclusion were 
desirable, deliberative democracy only offered us limited means for ensuring them . The 
only value I found to be both feasible and desirable was formal equality. However, this is a 
relatively weak form of equality which is already adequately satisfied by liberal 
representative models of democracy.
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In chapter five I turned my attention to a m ore contentious procedural justification 
of deliberative democracy; that we should value it because it aims to find a consensual 
decision. I argued that this aim has limited normative value and even m ore lim ited practical 
use and as such is insufficient as a procedural justification of democratic deliberation.
Thus, none of the standard procedural or epistemic justifications of deliberative 
democracy offer a secure enough grounding for the theory. And this leads to  normative 
difficulties, as without these we cannot argue that the model of deliberative democracy is 
be tter than its alternatives.
But even if these justifications were insufficient on their own, would they be 
powerful enough if they were used in conjunction with each other? Thus, the procedural 
values of reasoned, equal and inclusive debate could w ork to ensure the epistemic value of 
the decision-making procedure and as a result these justifications taken together could be 
sufficient to make deliberative democracy a good model.
Further evidence from empirical studies could prove the epistemic properties of 
deliberation to be stronger than I have depicted them  here, given adequate procedural 
qualifications. However, no such study is likely to  prove that deliberation is epistemically 
better at solving moral problems than other decision-making procedures, given the 
problems of moral epistemology in general. Thus, the epistemic justification cannot simply 
be used in conjunction with procedural ones to give us a strong explanation of why the 
model of deliberative democracy is better than its rivals.
On its own equality is not a particularly solid basis for justifying deliberative 
democracy: substantive equality is undesirable and formal equality is too weak as a 
requirem ent. Using formal equality, inclusion and a requirem ent for reasoned and 
reciprocal debate in conjunction is thus the only possibility left from those examined in this 
thesis. O n their own, each justification may be weak, but together they might just be 
strong enough. Formal equality and reciprocity can be taken as a background condition for 
inclusion and reasoned debate, thus they only take a supporting role on this fist o f values. 
Therefore, we can further restrict the question to  w hether the values of reasoned, inclusive 
debate are enough to offer a strong justification of deliberative democracy.
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But these would only be sufficient for a strong model of democracy if they could 
actually shown to be an empirical result of deliberation. W hile institutional measures could 
be devised to foster them , they cannot be ensured conclusively in a political debate. 
Deliberators will often not have the right incentives to  be either inclusive or reasoned 
enough to satisfy the normative requirem ents set down by theorists. And any model of 
democracy will ultimately have to answer to how well it can be used to design institutions 
that are successful given the nature of real-world politics. This is no different in the case of 
deliberative democracy, where the normative theory clearly indicates that m ore 
deliberative institutions need to  be introduced that will deliver significant normative 
benefits. Furtherm ore, in the case of reasoned debate these normative requirem ents can be 
suspect themselves, as they prom ote a very specific conception of what is reasonable and 
what politics should look like. And on its own, while inclusion is an im portant value, it 
cannot provide a sufficient justification for a deliberative model of democracy.
The Problem o f  Defining Deliberative Democracy
I have presented two complimentary models of deliberative democracy in this thesis: the 
formal model that centres on specific face-to-face meetings, and the informal modal that 
focuses on diffuse deliberation in the public sphere. However, both of these models are 
problematic. Both the formal and informal models suffer from a lack of clear definition. It 
is often unclear what form the normative theory would take in practice. As a result, 
theorists feel that empirical studies do not engage sufficiently w ith the normative theory 
(Thompson 2008) and empirical political scientists are unsure about what deliberation is 
exactly and how to test the hypotheses the theory generates (Mutz 2008).
It is easier to identify formal deliberative settings. Thus, empirical studies of 
deliberation focus primarily on this area and aim to identify w hether deliberation will 
produce the positive outcomes ascribed to it by the normative literature. Yet political 
scientists still find it difficult to identify the relevant independent and dependent variables
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for such research. Mutz (2008) gives three reasons for this. Firstly, the concepts used by 
the normative theory are insufficiently clearly defined to be applied empirically. Thus, 
even if political talk takes place, it is not easy to  know whether it was deliberative or not, 
since there are no necessary and sufficient conditions that are routinely applied to  the 
concept of deliberation (Mutz 2008, 526). Secondly, the logical relationship betw een 
different concepts and their effects on each other are often unclear. Thirdly, as we have 
seen in earlier chapters of this thesis, some of the assumptions made by deliberative 
democrats go against findings from various branches of the social sciences.
The lack of clear concepts and links to findings from the social sciences can make 
studying formal deliberation a frustrating experience. These problems are even m ore 
severe for informal models of deliberation, where it is not even possible to identify 
potentially deliberative setting easily, such as tow n hall meetings are for formal models. It 
is difficult to identify exactly what counts as political deliberation in the informal sense. 
W e can define it minimally, as public political discussion broadly interpreted, which tends 
to follow standards of civility and reciprocity and which encompasses very diverse political 
dialogues in legislatures, betw een citizens and in civil society. However, this definition 
becomes decidedly murky at the edges.
As a result, it also becomes difficult to classify whether existing democratic systems 
are already deliberative, with the theory offering better grounding for practice, or w hether 
existing democracies need to change in order to become deliberative. From the 
expressions used by some of the most prom inent scholars in the field (Gutmann and 
Thompson 1996, Dryzek 2000) it strongly appears that the latter is the case. Probably the 
most realistic assessment is that existing democracies are already deliberative to some, 
limited extent. But this needs to  be extended so that a larger proportion of political 
decisions are decided deliberatively and m ore citizens and officials participate in 
deliberation. A parallel can be drawn with franchise; just because some already had the 
vote in 19th century England, this did not mean that the franchise could not be widened by 
being extended to all social classes and to women.
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Even if we define informal deliberation as I do, as public political dialogue that is 
reasoned and civil, we still have problems in drawing the line of what counts as reason or 
civility. As we have seen earlier, in chapters four and seven, this is not always easy to  do. It 
is difficult to tell whether demonstrations or conversations among friends are always 
reasoned or civil enough to be part of the informal deliberative process. I have suggested 
that usually demonstrations do not m eet these criteria, but there are bound to  be 
exceptions to the rule. Personal conversations about politics are often not civil towards 
those not present and are often not reasoned either. Gutmann and Thompson (1999) 
exclude them  from their model of deliberation exactly because they do not conform to the 
values of reciprocity, publicity and accountability that democratic deliberation is expected 
to fulfil. Thus, they argue that such talk should take place w ithout being held to  the high 
standards of the theory. However, this reasoning excludes most democratic political talk 
from the informal deliberative model, making its definition too narrow.
The difficulty in defining informal democratic deliberation poses both pragmatic and 
normative problems. The pragmatic problem is that if we do not know what democratic 
deliberation is, where its boundaries lie and when it takes place, it is difficult to  either 
study or foster it. It is difficult to study deliberation, as it is difficult to  measure the level 
and quality of participation. W hile we could use proxies, such as the num ber of citizens 
who have actively contributed to political campaigns, attended certain public meetings or 
contacted their representatives, this would only capture participation in a small part of the 
public sphere. And the quality of informal deliberation is even m ore elusive and finding 
proxies for measuring it is even harder. Thus, there exist no macro-level studies of 
informal deliberation in the wider public sphere.
Instead, there exist studies which examine various forms of political participation in 
societies, as well as citizen attitudes and social capital. The books by Gamson (1992) and 
Cramer Walsh (2004) are two excellent examples of recent w ork that seeks to analyse the 
characteristics of political talk among citizens. Verba et al. (1995) carried out an 
impressively large-scale survey study of political participation in the US. The think-tank 
Demos has put together an index of ‘everyday democracy’, ranking EU countries
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(Skidmore and Bound 2008). But these studies still cannot tell us how deliberative a 
democracy is. At m ost they will give us snapshot pictures of various aspects of civic life in 
various countries.
The same problem  applies when it comes to fostering informal deliberation. If we 
have no clear idea where and how it takes place and who participates, we are most likely 
not going to know what kinds of policies would be m ost effective in increasing the level of 
public deliberation and whether existing policies are achieving their intended outcomes.
The normative problem this causes is that if we are unsure of what deliberation is in 
the first place, then attributing normatively desirable properties to it becomes an exercise 
in futility. If we cannot define a concept clearly, we cannot make clear predictions about 
its consequences either. W e need to be able to define what types of political talk constitute 
deliberation in order to be able to make statements about its benefits. And unless it is 
defined m ore clearly, informal democratic deliberation may become indistinguishable from 
other models of democracy, such as the liberal representative one.
The Problem w ith Compulsory Deliberation
W hen deliberation is m entioned formal, face-to-face meetings come immediately to mind. 
For these we can ensure through rules or the use of m oderators that deliberation 
corresponds to  the normative standards set out in the literature. But deliberative theorists 
face a difficult choice if they want these kinds of meetings to  be something that every 
citizen takes part in regularly. They need to  decide betw een making deliberation 
compulsory or having an imperfect and biased deliberative procedure. This is one of the 
main problems with formal models of deliberative democracy, just as indeterminacy and 
the difficulty with which it can be defined is one of the main problems with informal 
models of deliberative democracy.
I have observed in chapter two that we cannot in general assume that citizens are 
very motivated to participate in deliberation. They may be happy to do so when it is a once
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in a lifetime event, such as when they are invited to  a deliberative poll, either because of 
genuine interest or because they feel that this is an opportunity when their voice is finally 
being heard. But in general citizens do not often participate in politics; low rates of 
participation and voter apathy are perennial topics in both the media and the academic 
literature. The paradox of turnout tells us that it is surprising that people vote in the 
numbers they do given how little impact they will have. Deliberation is unlikely to change 
this. The average citizen will not suddenly have m ore impact on politics when he starts to 
participate in deliberation. He will in fact likely to be less motivated to  participate in 
deliberation than he is in voting, since the costs are so m uch higher and the benefits are 
much less certain. The paradox of turnout tells us that the cost of voting is higher than the 
probability of being pivotal multiplied by the benefit received from seeing one’s preferred 
party elected42. The cost of deliberation is significantly higher than the cost of voting and, 
given the complexity of deliberative decision-making, the link betw een participation and 
getting one’s way is less clear; therefore it would be even m ore paradoxical for people to 
participate in deliberation than it is to turn  out to vote.
Representative democracy developed as an alternative to  direct democracy, to help 
citizens avoid these costs by delegating political decision-making to professional politicians. 
Citizens pay politicians a salary to take part in politics on their behalf. They elect them  to 
do the job and do not re-elect them if they do not like what they see.
i f P eople w ere not motivated to participate in deliberation voluntarily, it would need 
to be made compulsory. This would mean fines or other sanctions for those who do not 
participate. Participation in informal deliberation would be difficult to police — political 
conversations in the pub or time spent commenting on web sites would make a poor 
m ethod of measurem ent for compulsory participation. Therefore, some kind of formal 
deliberative procedure would need to be introduced, where participation would be 
compulsory. This could take the form of tow n hall meetings, deliberation day or jury duty. 
At first sight this does not necessarily appear problematic. In some countries, such as
42 This can be expressed by the inequality ‘C >  pB’, where ‘C’ stands for cost, ‘p’ stands for probability and 
‘B’ stands for benefit (Mueller 2003).
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Greece or Australia, it is already compulsory to vote. W hat is the difference betw een 
making people vote and making people deliberate?
Let us see what is involved in each of these activities. It is reasonable to  say that the 
vast majority of voters do not just walk into the polling station and tick a box randomly, 
but give their decision some thought. Therefore, voting involves two distinct activities: 
getting informed and casting your vote.
The cost of getting informed can vary enormously from individual to individual. 
There are those who enjoy reading and talking about politics; for them  getting informed is 
a positive benefit rather than a cost. But picking up the minimum amount of information 
needed to make m ore than a random choice at an election should not be very costly. 
Television news, free newspapers, political campaign posters, canvassing, leaflets, news on 
the radio and so on allow citizens to find out such basic details as the names and party 
affiliations of candidates and their key policy priorities. Over time people build up 
knowledge about heuristic cues, such as party policies, and will use this knowledge to  fill 
in some of the gaps. How easy and cheap it is for people to acquire this information and 
where they will stop their search will vary from individual to individual. As we have seen 
in chapter six, seeking out information will not necessarily result in becoming m ore 
competent. Receiving information from unreliable sources may make individuals less 
competent when choosing the candidate that is best for them and if they do not prize 
getting informed very highly, they might never invest the time into figuring out that the 
source was unreliable in the first place. But in general it can be said that getting sufficiently 
informed to make a decisions about who one should vote for before walking into the 
polling station is not too onerous a demand.
The cost of voting itself varies less from individual to individual than the cost of 
getting informed. Things that m atter here are the distance citizens need to travel to get to 
the polling station, whether they need to queue, the weather on the day and other 
commitments they might have on the day - few people are likely to turn  out to vote on 
their wedding day or right after a funeral for example. By organising elections well some of 
these costs can be reduced. Short travelling distances to  polling stations and no queues
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make it less costly to vote. But in developed countries going to the polling station in itself 
is a relatively easy task.
O n one side of the equation we have the cost of voting. On the other side of the 
equation we have the benefit that a citizen receives from getting her preferred party or 
candidate elected. These could be material benefits, such as tax cuts, increased pensions 
and benefit payments, improved public services, more public goods or they can be 
psychological, such as the positive feeling one receives on knowing that the ‘right’ people 
are governing the country. These benefits could be substantial. However, they need to  be 
multiplied by the probability that a vote will be pivotal, that is it will be the decisive vote 
in the election. W hen thousands or millions vote in an election this probability is so low 
that the benefit side of the equation is bound to be smaller than the cost side. And yet 
people do turn  out to vote in large numbers. This is known as the paradox of voting.
In order to solve this paradox often another variable is inserted into the equation: 
duty or a taste for voting (Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Voting in elections can be seen as 
the minimum amount of effort required in order to remain a virtuous citizen. Not voting 
can lead to guilt and voting can lead to positive emotions, which outweigh the cost of 
voting. Education and observing what the majority does in society can reinforce this 
(Brennan and Pettit 2004). If we accept that voting is a minimal requirem ent of civic duty 
in a democratic society, then making it compulsory makes sense. It gives a very strong 
signal to people that they need to vote in order to be good citizens. It provides democratic 
government with greater legitimacy. And it can be argued that the cost of voting is 
outweighed by the benefit of each citizen participating in politics and carrying out his or 
her civic duty.
Now let us return  to compulsory deliberation. Both acquiring information and taking 
part in deliberation are m ore costly than in the case of voting. In order to participate in 
deliberation that even minimally approximates the ideal citizens need to be able to offer 
arguments that they can justify publicly. This means that the minimum amount of 
information gathering people can get away with is significantly greater than in the case of 
voting. It is not enough to know candidates’ names and party affiliations and to have a
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vague idea of their policy positions in order to participate in deliberation properly. This is 
costly for citizens. No m atter what topic will be up for debate, relatively detailed 
knowledge of the issue, different positions taken on it and the possible solutions to it is 
required. As we have seen in the previous chapter, there are very few issues that citizens 
are willing to become informed about to this extent. M oreover, the information they do 
possess is often biased and incorrect.
In order to  simplify this task, organisers can provide information to deliberators, as it 
is done in deliberative polls. Here material on the issues discussed is distributed to 
participants before the actual event, offering them an opportunity to prepare in advance, 
and expert testimonies are provided during deliberation as well, where participants also 
have the opportunity to question the experts themselves. This also tells participants how 
much knowledge is required, thus they do not need to  decide themselves when they should 
term inate their search for information.
There are two problems with this argum ent. Firstly, organisers would need to  
ensure that the material provided to participants was unbiased and sufficiently 
comprehensive. Even if there is no obvious bias in the material, leaving out a relevant 
argument may influence the debate in unexpected ways. This problem  is no t crippling, 
however. W ith the necessary publicity and checks and balances in place it could be ensured 
that the information supplied to deliberators was of a high quality.
The second problem  is that providing information to deliberators will only remove 
one of the costs to participants: the cost of searching for information. They would still 
need to find the time and the motivation to read through or listen to these arguments and 
to think them through. This is often just as resource-intensive as searching for the 
information itself.
In addition, the personal benefits of taking part in deliberative processes are less 
obvious than in the case of voting, as there is no clear link between attending a deliberative 
meeting and getting one’s desired political outcomes. W hile we can define the pivotal 
voter as the individual whose vote is decisive given the votes others have cast, there is no
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equivalent definition for a pivotal deliberator. The impact each individual in a deliberating 
group has on the final decision depends on a very complex system of interactions.
Individuals who are confident public speakers and are able to make convincing 
arguments will be m ore inclined to  participate in deliberation. This is especially the case if 
they need to invest little into becoming informed, as they are already interested in the issue 
under discussion and probably hold strong preferences over it. Yet this is no t going to be 
true in the case of most citizens.
Some theorists argue that part of the reason why such deliberation should be 
introduced is that it would induce citizens to  hold better reasoned preferences. 
Accordingly, participating in deliberation would lead them  to believe that holding well- 
reasoned preferences is both necessary in order to be able to  participate fully in political 
life and desirable in order to  fulfil one’s civic duty. And in turn , such citizens would be 
m ore likely to participate in informal deliberation amongst themselves.
Citizens, however, cannot have a duty to participate in politics to an extent that 
interferes with their other opportunities and interests. This violates their liberty to choose 
what their idea of the good life is. The argum ent that voting should be considered a 
minimal duty for citizens is m ore acceptable, as it contributes to the checks and balances 
and the upkeep of a political system — liberal representative democracy — that allows them  
to live freely and to choose their own conception of the good life. Deliberation does not do 
this. Inasmuch as the state forces citizens to participate in deliberation it tells them that the 
good life is one where everyone participates in political life extensively.
This means that making deliberation compulsory would impinge on citizens’ 
freedom to participate as little or as much in politics as they want to. W hile some have 
made an argument for compulsory voting, these arguments will not hold given the cost of 
deliberation for individuals. And as I argued in chapter four, some citizens, such as the 
Amish or Trotskyists, hold a conception of politics or the good fife which is opposed to 
participation in deliberation. If only a few citizens would want to take part in deliberative 
exercises, the only possibility is to ensure participation through coercion. This violates the 
principle of political liberty.
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However, if deliberation is not compulsory, it is m ore likely to becom e biased. 
There is a statistically significant relationship betw een participation in political activities 
and socio-economic background (Verba et al. 1995). Better-educated, wealthier citizens 
are not only m ore likely to vote, but they are also m ore likely to  participate in other forms 
of political activity, such as campaigning for parties and candidates. A similar bias could 
develop in the case of deliberation as well. This would decrease the legitimacy of 
deliberative decisions significantly. W e cannot argue that a community, a society or the 
electorate decided an issue through deliberative discussion when in fact a biased subgroup 
of it has done so. This is especially true as those who hold intense preferences over issues 
are also m ore likely to participate in deliberation. These participants are unlikely to  change 
their preferences drastically as a result of hearing new arguments during deliberation, as 
they already have strong beliefs and preferences over the issue in question.
Such biased deliberation does not correspond to the normative standards laid out in 
the deliberative democracy literature. And such im perfect deliberation also raises questions 
about other normative issues, such as equality or legitimacy, which could threaten the 
deliberative democracy project.
Problems w ith the Deliberative Conception o f  Politics
W e can now see that the theory of deliberative democracy assumes the existence of a very 
specific normative conception of politics. This conception wants to honour the seriousness 
of collective decisions and it wants to do so by making collective decision-making m ore 
reasoned and m ore mutual. However, there are three problems with such a conception of 
politics. Firstly, the kind of debate favoured by deliberative democrats often seems 
apolitical in nature. Focusing on reasoned discussion and preference transform ation in line 
with the deliberative ideal leads to a relative neglect of citizens’ interests and strongly held 
moral and ethical beliefs. Secondly, deliberative democrats make very specific assumptions 
about which viewpoints count as reasonable, how preferences will be transform ed and
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what kind of outcomes they will result in. Thirdly, as we have seen in the section above, 
participating in deliberative democracy is very costly, which creates problems for those 
who do not agree with the deliberative conception of politics. As a result, deliberation 
cannot be used as the main decision-making m ethod and the foundation of a model of 
democracy.
My first charge is that deliberative democracy is apolitical. Deliberative democrats 
do not require citizens to  put aside their own interests and preferences entirely. They 
argue that it is acceptable to introduce our interests into the discussion as one of the factors 
which everyone should take into account when decisions are made, but ultimately we 
should not base our final collective decision only on each citizen’s selfish private interests. 
This still requires them  to adopt a specific frame when it comes to  collective goods, one 
that is not only tolerant of others, but also other-regarding, seeking to  take the needs of 
others into account when choices are made. This is a view of politics where self-interest is 
less im portant than making decisions that are mutually no t only acceptable, but appear to  
be good for other participants.
Difference democrats, m ost notably Young (2000), have of course pointed out that 
one of the problems with the standard model of deliberative democracy is that it favours 
dispassionate, logical debate of the form traditionally practiced among well-educated white 
males, thereby putting everyone else, including wom en, minorities, and the not so well- 
educated at a disadvantage. The solution Young offers to  this problem  is shifting the focus 
from ‘deliberation’, a conceptually loaded term  that reminds us of the seminar room  m ore 
than it does of politics, to ‘communication’. Communication includes m ore ways of 
exchanging information than deliberation does, and communicative democracy puts a 
special emphasis on inclusion. The rough reasoning is that by including m ore forms of 
communication, we will also include m ore people. However, this does not solve the 
fundamental problem that frequently deliberation will not be the best way of solving 
collective problem s, as it is apolitical and does not accommodate the magnitude of 
disagreement betw een citizens.
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Politics is founded on disagreement over moral issues as well as on disagreement 
about allocating scarce resources. As we have seen above, this leads us to desire a political 
process that gives proper weight to collective decisions. But at the same tim e, it should 
also lead us to seek a political system that takes into account people’s interests, as well as 
the very strong beliefs that they hold over some issues such as abortion, wars or the 
environment. Sometimes the strength of people’s interests and beliefs will preclude the 
kind of benign, apolitical discussion that deliberation m ust be in order to  remain reasoned 
and other-regarding. Instead they will need political opportunities that will allow these 
interests to be expressed and reconciled and solutions to be found without asking citizens 
to compromise on the strength of their preferences or beliefs. For these reasons, 
bargaining and interest group politics are often be tte r ways of resolving democratic 
conflict.
The second problem  is that the model of deliberative democracy makes im portant 
assumptions about the types of beliefs and preferences reasonable individuals will hold and 
the way these will be transformed.
At times the model of deliberative democracy does not accommodate viewpoints 
which do not correspond to the conception of politics that it portrays. Thus, Gutmann and 
Thompson (1996) reject viewpoints that they consider irrational on the basis that they are 
weakly grounded in morality. Arguments they disagree with are classified as 
‘unreasonable’ or not ‘moral reasons’. Stanley Fish notes the following about Gutmann 
and Thom pson’s treatm ent of the parents in the M ozert v. Hawkins Board of Education 
case, who objected to the use of certain textbooks on religious grounds: “Notice that what 
looks like an argument is really a succession of dismissive gestures designed to deflect 
objections to  a position [Gutmann and Thompson] are unwilling to  relinquish or even 
examine. Ironically, these gestures are the best example of the closed-mindedness the 
authors inveigh against” (Fish 1999, 91).
Furtherm ore, the deliberative process does not just aggregate individual views and 
preferences. The outcomes that emerge out of discussion are m ore than the sum of their 
parts and instead they are the result of a collective transformation of preferences. This
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partly explains the repeated emphasis on consensus, that the decisions made through 
deliberation are somehow m ore agreeable to each individual than a simple compromise, 
because they are the result of this collective and valuable process.
O f course this means that we have to make the assumption that the deliberative 
procedure results in the right kind of preference transformation. Deliberative democrats 
rely on the argum ent that if citizens get together to deliberate, they will do so in a civil 
m anner and will increasingly come to adopt other-regarding preferences. As their 
preferences are transform ed, as they create shared meaning out of their discussion with 
other groups, they will produce a collective decision that is qualitatively different from 
decisions produced through non-deliberative means such as interest group and electoral 
politics.
Experience tells us and the social sciences confirm that social and political life is 
often not like this. Instead, people often define themselves in opposition to others and use 
perspectives that are not other-regarding, or at least not when it comes to  those whom 
they do not regard as ‘one of them ’. Politics is often highly adversarial. Citizens have 
interests and beliefs and are often willing to fight for them , rather than assessing the needs 
of others.
The problem  with the literature on deliberative democracy is that when it argues 
that m ore political decisions should be made through discussion betw een citizens, it also 
defines how those discussions should take place and what kind of outcomes they should 
result in. O r even m ore problematically, the literature sometimes prescribes how those 
discussions should take place in order to arrive at an outcome which the theorists hold to 
be desirable. But we cannot even usually agree on how to fulfil the values that deliberative 
democracy advocates. One person’s other-regarding policy may be another person’s 
selfish, misguided one. W elfare policies are a prime example for this.
The third problem  is that, as we have seen in the section of this chapter above, 
participating in deliberation is a very costly activity. In the theory, this participation 
becomes the civic duty of citizens, but at no point is this assumed to  be burdensome. 
However, we cannot assume that all citizens will hold a conception of the political that
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allows for this. Many citizens will view politics as something which does not require active 
participation on their part, as something irrelevant, or as something that is fundamentally 
rooted in strong moral claims or conflict. This is born out by evidence from  surveys 
m entioned earlier in this thesis both from the US (Verba et al. 1995) and the UK (Electoral 
Commission 2006, 2007).
As we have seen above, the amount and kind of political participation that is required 
by the theory of deliberative democracy will limit the freedom of citizens. O f course, even 
the m ost minimal conceptions of the political will restrict this freedom to some extent, but 
the deliberative conception of politics will do so m ore than let us say the current liberal 
representative one. The reason for this is that it requires very specific standards of 
deliberative political behaviour that are costly both in term s of time and resources as well 
as psychologically, by requiring citizens to be other-regarding and practice reciprocity.
As a result of these problems, deliberation m ust be seen not as the ultimate 
foundation of democratic politics, but as one element among many in political decision­
making. O ther elements are necessary for a healthy democracy. Bargaining is often 
necessary to resolve interest group politics. High emotions and strong beliefs are 
manifested through protests and demonstrations. Citizens are relieved from  day-to-day 
political decision-making through delegation to elected representatives and career 
bureaucrats.
One can now raise the objection that no deliberative democrat ignores the continued 
need for elections and representation and other forms of political action. However, they 
do argue that deliberation is at the very least the first among equals. W hile these other 
aspects of political life may be necessary too, it is deliberation that should be the 
legitimating driving-force in democratic regimes, since it connects citizens and politicians 
in a framework of moral policy-making and it should be the basis on which other decision­
making mechanisms, such as bargaining, are legitimised.
But deliberation is unable to achieve this function. As we have seen, the justifications 
offered for it are not strong enough and the kind of conception of politics that it favours is 
too participatory and too apolitical to be the best one in a pluralistic society. Instead,
236 of 257
Chapter Eight: Conclusion
democratic politics needs to be viewed as a m ore complex system of interactions. One of 
these is deliberation, and while it is im portant, it is not m ore im portant than other 
mechanisms such as representation or interest group politics.
Alternatives in Democratic Theory
One could argue that there is something missing in contemporary democratic practice and 
thought. The deliberative turn  in democratic theory offers us a way in which the 
shortcomings of democracies can be addressed. No one would argue that existing 
democracies already model for us an ideal form of political organisation and political 
decision-making. However, we need to  ask ourselves whether this desire for improving 
democracy is primarily a problem  of practice or theory or perhaps both.
On the practical side there is m uch that theorists and political scientists bemoan 
about stable democracies. Citizens participate little in politics and most of this participation 
takes the very limited form of voting once every few years. They are also badly informed 
and apathetic. Citizens themselves often complain about the corruption of politicians and 
the inefficacy of the democratic system. They often do not see clearly how their 
preferences are translated into policies and m ore often they feel that they are not. Many 
feel that the inequalities in stable liberal democracies are far worse than wealthy m odem  
societies should tolerate. The state is often seen as both too intrusive and as not doing 
enough.
On the theoretical side we have to admit that currently the m ost coherent model of 
democracy is the deliberative one. O ther models of democracy are often rooted too far in 
empirical political science to offer us viable normative models or they are not very well- 
developed or they are seen as outmoded.
Deliberative democracy aims to offer answers both to the practical and the 
theoretical problems of democracy. O n the theoretical side, over the last tw enty years a 
highly sophisticated model of democracy was developed through scores of academic
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publications. O n the practical, empirical side, there are m ore and m ore ideas of how 
deliberation could be im plem ented in real-world politics, a growing field of experimental 
research and a developing netw ork of practitioners.
However, deliberative democracy is not the only answer to problems with the 
theory and practice of democratic politics. Another model may be offered by the recent 
literature on representative democracy (Manin 1997, Urbinati 2006, Dovi 2007, Urbinati 
and W arren 2008). These authors do not reject the advances made by scholars working on 
deliberative democracy, by emphasizing the inclusive, reasoned debate that is necessary to 
honour the seriousness of collective decisions. However, following in the footsteps of 
Pitkin (1968, 2004), they turn the theoretical focus back to also include interests and 
representation. Urbinati (2006) argues that representative democracy is not a second-best, 
a form of democracy that should only be im plem ented when our efforts at direct 
democracy have failed. Instead, representation brings with itself a distance in tim e and 
space that allows us to make decisions that be tter correspond to our real needs.
Apart from offering ways in which the democratic practice may be revolutionised, 
deliberative democracy could serve another purpose. It can offer us a fresh perspective on 
current democratic institutions and a yardstick against which they can be evaluated. Thus, 
its primary function may not be necessarily to call for the introduction of new , m ore 
deliberative institutions. Instead, it can serve to  give new focus to the study of democracies 
in empirical political science.
A viable model of m odem  democracy needs to incorporate not only deliberation, 
but also representation, voting and interest group politics. It needs to represent the fact 
that in politics citizens compete for scarce resources and try  to solve seemingly intractable 
moral dilemmas. Thus, at different times, different decision-making mechanisms will 
become necessary. W e cannot solve the problem  of democratic politics by applying 
deliberation to all problems, in all places, at all times. The best m ethod of democratic 
problem-solving and decision-making will always be contingent on many factors. But what 
makes such a theory democratic? In order to achieve this we need to ensure that each of
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these different elements is as inclusive and as equal as possible. Most of the time this will 
m ean formal rather than substantive equality.
Current liberal representative democracies already embody these different decision­
making methods. M odern liberal representative democracies are quite stable, given the 
historical and social context within which they exist. Once this context changes, they 
might not be able to survive in their current form , but this is no t the situation that 
deliberative democrats envision. Despite their shortcoming, they also exhibit m ore 
tolerance, equality and inclusion than any other existing large-scale political decision­
making process.
Liberal representative regimes do not place undue burdens on citizens. Electing 
representatives who have incentives to act in the best interest of their constituents works as 
an effective mechanism for the division of labour. Furtherm ore, all citizens have a right to 
participate in politics to the extent they want to , whether this means not participating at 
all, or running for high office.
But how does liberal representative democracy fare when it comes to  some of the 
core normative values of democracy? Consolidated liberal representative democracies are 
usually highly transparent, making the governm ent accountable to its citizens. W hile there 
are some systematic differences to the extent citizens participate in politics (Verba et al. 
1995) these are not formalised in laws or constitutions and each citizen has a right to 
participate. They also provide equality at the fundamental legal and political level. They 
provide rights, such as free speech, that ensure that no view can be officially suppressed in 
politics. Given m odern communication technology, ideas can be disseminated easily, 
without significant barriers. Liberal representative democracies also provide human rights 
m ore reliably than any other political system. They are responsive to the wishes of 
majorities, while they have effective legal, institutional mechanisms for preventing tyranny 
of the majority.
Overall, liberal representative democracies provide a good fram ework within which 
improvements to democratic theory and practice can be conceptualised, such as prom oting 
m ore participation or deliberation. A viable m odel of democracy needs to  acknowledge
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that choosing the best decision-making procedure is not as simple as applying deliberation 
to as many situations as possible. Instead, different procedures will fit different 
circumstances and what makes these democratic are the underlying values that motivate 
them.
This leads me to conclude that a more comprehensive model of democracy needs to 
be developed that integrates deliberation with preference-aggregation and representation. 
Such a model would have to take into account the preferences, interests and strong moral 
beliefs of individuals, given that political decisions have to be made under conditions of 
scarcity and competing moral values cannot always be accommodated. W hile such a model 
of democracy would include deliberation, it would not make it its primary m ethod of 
decision-making.
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